Bacchus

Ukrainian. M.D., ex forensic expert. Civil volunteer. OpSec, applied OSINT, SIGINT & EW. Network admin. Systems architect. IT security red-teamer. CEO, CTO, COO, owner of businesses, whatnot. Crypto amateur & privacy advocate. Ancap. Off-grid. Proud adopter of 26 cats and 8 dogs.

Public Key

npub1q0syq2dnp8f50y9m869ec7wv2v73w4vytlv6q0hjmcwwm2t9zn6qdndpms

Profile Code

nprofile1qqsq8czq9xesn568jzanazuu08x9x0gh2kz9lkdq8medu88d49j3faqpz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerpd46hxtnfduqs6amnwvaz7tmwdaejumr0dslf26jq

Publishing to

offchain.pub

relay.damus.io

nos.lol

Author Public Key

npub1q0syq2dnp8f50y9m869ec7wv2v73w4vytlv6q0hjmcwwm2t9zn6qdndpms

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Last Notes

2024-09-05 19:38:08 UTC

https://www.theregister.com/2024/02/15/echr_backdoor_encryption/

2024-09-01 10:12:47 UTC

https://github.com/0xor0ne/awesome-list/blob/main/topics/cybersec.md?ref=0xor0ne.xyz

2024-09-01 08:30:36 UTC

https://freemansperspective.com/peak-obedience/

2024-08-31 12:44:04 UTC

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It's not planned, it's already there for quite a while, since they separated Session nodes from Oxen network.

2024-08-30 20:56:07 UTC

https://tuta.com/blog/german-government-publishes-encryption-law

2024-08-30 20:40:19 UTC

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They indeed refused to implement PFS at some point, and even had some logical explanation for this decision (can't recall what exactly it was, unfortunately, I guess it was somehow related to codebase ties with Oxen implementation). As of now, they've split from OX blockchain and they do indeed use extended triple Diffie-Hellman agreement (==PFS) in recent (1 year?) versions. What other features are lacking?

2024-08-30 20:18:49 UTC

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Few notes on this (and going to fork discussion by quoting you to maintain all due credits, if you don't mind).
1. Neither of these 4 are decentralized. By "decentralized" I specifically mean that the system does operate without ANY central infrastructure in peer2peer+DHT style, central server used for hash table bootstrap may be an acceptable compromise. Briar may be a good example of decentralized platform.
2. You're missing the context both in terms of threat model and use case, which makes the choice between the 4 pretty vague, like "just some 4 privacy messengers".
3. First question one should ask when choosing privacy tools: "Who's the adversary?" 2nd key question is individual definition of privacy.
4. Govt imposed blockings and restrictions are rapidly becoming problem #1 in private communications land and must be considered as a factor of platform choice.
5. Endpoint device is the most successful attack vector, in practice. Thus, features improving endpoint device security (e.g. "panic button") should be considered as well.

2024-08-30 18:12:17 UTC

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C'mon, he's one of the happiest deities, it's just not possible to be "dark" when wine is your domain. Happy Friday and don't drink too much, I'm watching you! 😁🍷

2024-08-30 17:39:26 UTC

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Did they say what exactly is considered "dark" traits?🫤

2024-08-30 14:37:56 UTC

https://biz.censor.net/resonance/3499242/yak_zabronyuvatysya_vid_mobilizatsiyi

2024-08-30 14:20:06 UTC

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I would say it's about semiotics as a mean to overcome Shannon capacity theorem limitation, but it's lossy by default (that's the whole point!). Mind the difference between "simplifying" ("naming", as a matter of fact) and "understanding". From slightly different angle, it's an old good nominalism vs. realism debate.

2024-08-30 14:12:47 UTC

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Well, basically humans were never "designed" to process vast amounts of information unless it's social (or somehow projects to social dimension). Dominant encephalization theory is that neural capacity was required specifically to handle interactions in the group. It's kinda "hardware level".

2024-08-29 20:41:35 UTC

https://malwaretech.com/2024/08/exploiting-CVE-2024-38063.html

2024-08-29 15:12:14 UTC

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Єбеня :)
#nevent1q…ueqd

2024-08-29 11:27:36 UTC

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Reply with system architecture diagram:)

2024-08-26 19:46:29 UTC

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Violently captured I guess? ;)

2024-08-26 19:44:28 UTC

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It's not a simple case of non-compliance. I say it again, Telegram ecosystem is a deliberately designed honeypot, and thus, valuable resource for any government. He was aware French are formally after him, he had some vague intercourse with RU top just before the flight, and probably found out something. He already created and handed over one RU honeypot for internal use, VK, and thus, has connections with "siloviki" (you NEVER quit!). I would assume it's rather a deal than enforcement.

2024-08-26 19:23:10 UTC

https://github.com/NousResearch/DisTrO/blob/main/A_Preliminary_Report_on_DisTrO.pdf

2024-08-26 19:20:54 UTC

https://github.com/ClusterM/wg-obfuscator

2024-08-26 17:59:35 UTC

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TON is receiving a lot of buzz and allegedly used for big stuff like RU sanctions circumvention.

2024-08-26 17:57:12 UTC

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It doesn't actually set a precedent, just confirms the trend.

2024-08-26 17:53:58 UTC

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It's multilayer. To start with, Telegram is a honeypot. They do make false claims about their security features. They do have undocumented API calls of surveillance nature, some of these have been discovered and reported by infosec community. They allegedly provide privileged API access to RU security service and there are confirmed cases of FSB acquiring full data of deleted TG accounts. Yes, they do store data forever and there's no way for a user to delete it. Thus, valuable asset for any government. Obviously has nothing to do with true freedom of speech.