prc30
Peter Alexander

China 30 year veteran

Joined Nostr at block 777177

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Last Notes

2026-03-23 03:15:08 UTC

Just watched the latest interview with Sec Bessent. Not his best performance. He truly seemed to be at wits end.
But it was his comment about how Treasury can monitor who is buying the now unsanctioned Iranian oil. If transacted in USD and done through the SWIFT network of correspondent banks in New York, then yes. Correct.
If, however, done with Renminbi and processed through China’s CIPS network then Treasury has zero visibility.
I’d wager it is the later and, critically, those shipments will have final settlement in gold.
https://blossom.primal.net/9d838d9babe92cedf513f5c35738b5866cdbc12120932d1df61224c8fe4db59f.jpg

2026-03-22 05:58:36 UTC

After a relatively longer than expected wait, Unitree was approved to IPO late on Friday afternoon.
Widely expected and the company is even already profitable. Now comes the rapid deployment of scale. The company produced and sold 5,500 units last year. Growth is now set to compound.
As I’ve stated on numerous occasions, China will do to humanoid robotics what it did to the EV marketplace. And it’ll be done in a matter of a few years.
https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2026/03/20/unitree-plans-shanghai-ipo-testing-interest-in-humanoid-robots.html

2026-03-20 07:54:57 UTC

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Thank you. Truly.
Was surprised at the overall positivity in the comment section. It really does seem like an increasing number of people are looking for a more measured assessment of China.

2026-03-19 10:28:23 UTC

China Afternoon Missive
Taiwan 2027 … A Complete Reversal in Posturing
And there it is. A statement which was widely expected by the small number of people familiar with the actual confines of the China/Taiwan issue. Granted, my outlook was for this message to be conveyed at some point later in the year. It would now appear that the Beltway consensus views deescalation of the long simmering tensions in the East China Sea as the priority.
For the past several years, there has been a barrage of commentary – an ardent conviction really – that planning was underway for China to take direct, kinetic action against Taiwan by 2027. That message was then taken up and aggressively amplified by virtually every single podcast platform focused on geopolitical events. The message was then wedged into every single traditional and social media conversation. And yet, today, we have the following statement.
“The [intelligence community] assesses that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification,” according to the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, which was released on Wednesday.
I will not speculate as to why, now, there has been a complete reversal in the intelligence communities’ China threat assessment although it does seem that the Takaichi government in Tokyo was blindsided by Washington’s shift in its positioning on Taiwan.
What does need to be communicated, albeit at the risk of being repetitive, is the far more likely scenario when it comes to Beijing’s intentions over Taiwan.
Very much to the point, the strategic aim is to maintain the status quo. Beijing has been seeking for all parties, including the United States, to reaffirm the “One China” policy. Furthermore, it is widely held that Beijing has been seeking to formalize these terms into an expansive Fourth Communique. Included would be the provision that the agreed to framework would hold for a period of 50 years after which the parties would then revisit the issue of reunification.
The thinking on Beijing’s part is very straight forward. Over a long enough time period, reunification would naturally occur, peacefully, so long as the current incentive structures are left to evolve unimpeded. Basically, the calculus is structured where there will come a time when the Taipei leadership, and even the populace, will accept that the net assessment for reunification delivers both economic and political gains.
There are a host of critical paths underling this thinking and much could go wrong. The projections of China’s economy collapsing under the weight of debt or demographics could play out, as example. A future transfer of power in the CCP could go horribly wrong and lead to social instability. 50 years is a long time. What the proposed solution does achieve is a tabling of the issue even if that ends up being temporarily.
There is one final point that I wish to add and that plays to the point just made. With Taiwan almost entirely dependent on imported energy, Beijing is reported to have reached out with an offer to provide energy to the island if the Taipei leadership would consider reunification. Now there is no question that the offer is outright coercion, and the overture will be rebuked by the DPP, the ruling party. But we do now live in a world increasingly driven by second and third order effects and it was under the DPP leadership that the decision was made to decommission all of the island’s nuclear power facilities. This could quite possibly lead to political blowback domestically. And, as we see here, it also provides Beijing with a point of leverage.
https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/3/19/us-intelligence-agencies-not-expecting-china-to-invade-taiwan-in-2027

2026-03-17 23:51:33 UTC

Ok, if you have an interest in a long form interview on my varied perspectives on China then you’ll enjoy this talk.
Granted, not a fan of the title. C’est la vie
https://youtu.be/sS2pyxgS21k?si=ilnZbpolvxGyjf9T

2026-03-17 09:21:24 UTC

Seems like China is having a Napster moment.
It never ceases to amaze me how the go to approach out of Washington is to angrily shake fists.
Diffusion is unstoppable. Get busy adapting or get busy being run over.
Senators tell ByteDance to 'immediately shut down' Seedance AI video app https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/17/bytedance-seedance-shut-down-tiktok-marsha-blackburn-peter-welch.html?__source=iosappshare%7Ccom.apple.UIKit.activity.CopyToPasteboard

2026-03-17 03:04:16 UTC

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Been meaning to reply to your note. Fantastic set of questions.
What you described with Covid, I lived. No question that the entire lock down episode of 2022 impacted many people. For myself, it was just another lived experience here in Shanghai. My wife is a local Shanghainese and it didn't bother her much. Yes, it was chaotic in the beginning. A bit Lord of the Flies for the first week, but then you just found a way to manage through it all. It was hardest on those with children and 90% of the foreign community here fled.
It all depends on who you talk to. There are those, as you pointed out, who left and left with a very bad view of how the government handled the situation. The vast majority, I would say, just got on with it.
Thank you again for the question and engaging on the topic of China.

2026-03-17 02:57:53 UTC

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Sorry for the delay in replying. Great question though.
Here's the thing about Hong Kong. You need to start by asking the question, from the perspective of Beijing, is Hong Kong a foreign or domestic jurisdiction? The answer is YES.
Hong Kong will be viewed as foreign when it suits the purposes of Beijing's overall agenda and domestic when needed.
As I see it, there is a desire to remain somewhat on top of the entire Bitcoin landscape, but to only do so in a controlled setting that resides outside the easy grasp of Mainland Chinese. It is for this reason why developments look to be inconsistent. It might look that way to outsiders, but for Beijing there isn't any inconsistency.

2026-03-17 02:53:20 UTC

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I appreciate you sending this through and have actually been rather vocal, albeit elsewhere, on the topic of the manmade islands in the South China Sea. What I view as the greatest geopolitical blunder by the Obama administration. Once the Hague Court of Attribution ruled in 2016, there should have been direct action taken given that China refused to abide by that ruling.
I also agree on the point of incremental assertiveness by the Chinese. It's been a mainstay in how China seeks to engage with its bilateral relationships and how it seeks to test American resolve. In fact, it has been my contention that the Russian move on Crimea in 2014 was aligned with China's initial foray in the South China Sea with building those islands.
All of this, I'd also stress, underlying why it is that China won't move on Taiwan at any point in the near future. An incremental approach remains the focus and Beijing knows it has far more work to be done.
To my pervious Note, what it was I attempted to convey was more about how the Chinese perceive engagement. The cultural differences. Not as much any commentary on China's views over Hormuz itself. Still, can't thank you enough for engaging on the topic. Thank you.

2026-03-17 01:57:26 UTC

China Morning Missive
Trump Derails the China Agenda
President Trump is now seeking to postpone his scheduled trip to China. My immediate response was that Beijing learned of this decision the same way we all did. From the President while speaking publicly with the media. If this is accurate, it would be a colossal foreign policy error.
The decision, more than likely, is in response to China’s unwillingness to assist with the Strait of Hormuz. Once again, President Trump took the path of applied pressure. And, once again, it was a gross miscalculation much in the same vein as last year’s trade conflict. Whomever is advising the President on China needs to be removed from that position with immediate effect.
“Come to Hormuz and assist with reopening the strait”. That was the ask.
Below is the formal response from yesterday afternoon.
– Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian "The recent tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and its surrounding waters have disrupted international trade routes for goods and energy, and undermined regional and global peace and stability. China reiterates its call for all parties to immediately cease military operations, avoid further escalation of tensions, and prevent regional instability that could have a greater impact on global economic development."
Clearly, there was no possible way that either Israel or the United States would halt the ongoing Gulf campaign. China would have been very well aware of this fact and, to deflect from the pressure applied, conditions were placed on assistance as any shrewd geopolitical player would do when facing a similar situation.
Now, it could all just be happenstance and the decision to postpone the trip could very well be the result of President Trump needing to remain in Washington to oversee the military operations. Let us, for the sake of argument, assume that this is the case. It doesn’t matter. For the Chinese, the irritation comes from how the decision was both made and communicated.
For the Chinese, a last minute request to postpone a State visit is within the realm of acceptable diplomatic behavior. Not ideal, but it happens albeit infrequently. For Beijing, especially after the Paris meetings over the weekend, where initial pressure would have most certainly been applied, there would have been an expectation that the President might delay the trip. It would have been a known unknown.
Where the gross miscalculation comes into play is in how that decision was communicated. Very publicly. Whenever you are engaging with the Chinese, be it on foreign policy or commercially, any decision that fundamentally alters the direction of a relationship must, and I stress MUST, first be communicated and agreed to privately before either party makes a public statement. Such is clearly not the case here.
I’ve been on the receiving end of making that very mistake. You do not want to find yourself in that position. It impairs a relationship in ways that most will not truly understand or appreciate.
When an error in judgement is made such as we have here, you won’t even know that the relationship has been impaired. The Chinese side will smile and overtly express an understanding. In reality, there is a deep sense of betrayal, and your Chinese counterpart will fundamentally reorient how engagement will proceed from that point forward. What should be expected is a lower willingness by Beijing to move on any agenda item. There will continue to be dialogue, but the Trump team will now face a new slate of obstacles. Even previously agreed to terms will resurface. For the Chinese, there is no longer any goodwill.
My outlook is now firmer than ever. The Chinese will diplomatically impede all progress on the bilateral relationship and await the outcome of the mid-term elections.
Trump says U.S. asked China to delay Xi meeting 'a month or so' due to Iran war https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/16/trump-china-iran-xi-war-trade.html?__source=iosappshare%7Ccom.apple.UIKit.activity.CopyToPasteboard

2026-03-16 07:51:08 UTC

Dont' expect any support from China on opening up Hormuz.
There was a press conference in Beijing a hour or so back. The question was raised if China will send navel assets to the region. This was the answer given.
"The recent tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and its surrounding waters have disrupted international trade routes for goods and energy, and undermined regional and global peace and stability. China reiterates its call for all parties to immediately cease military operations, avoid further escalation of tensions, and prevent regional instability that could have a greater impact on global economic development."
What that means is for China to provide any support would first require all sides, including the US and Israel, to halt all military actions.
I can't even imagine Washington agreeing to such terms, let alone from Beijing.

2026-03-16 06:47:15 UTC

Yet another example of just how poorly the decision makers in Washington understand their primary opponent.
Seems as though I can’t go a single day when some new edict is produced that will generate the opposite outcome.
Hormuz is certainly important to China, but it is nowhere near as critical as it is being made out to be.
China has a massive spoke network of energy access points from Alegria to Indonesia and all point in-between.
Then there are the multiple pipelines into both Russia and Central Asia.
Yes, from a cost analysis it would be far better for Beijing to buy cheap oil from the Iranians. Being cut off from Qatar natgas will also have an impact. It’s the long game that matters.
Near term solutions to China’s energy needs are readily available. Keeping the US bogged down in the Gulf is an accelerant worthy of any near term pain.
https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2026/03/16/china-oil-reserves-trump-iran-war-hormuz.html

2026-03-15 05:33:20 UTC

Is there some rule that if you are interviewed by the media remotely that you are REQUIRED to have several hundred books behind you?
Always comes across to me that the individual in question is trying way too hard to telegraph their bond fides.

2026-03-14 07:50:28 UTC

Recall, the original quote has been expanded upon and, in doing so, makes it all the more impactful.
“The only way out is through.”
Robert Frost
“And the only way through is together”
John Green

2026-03-14 06:07:34 UTC

People calling this a “plot twist”.
More just a natural extension of how China has been operating on the margins for a decade now.
Systems are in place (CIPS offering an alternative to SWIFT) and final settlement in gold.
Current events have simply accelerated the process.
https://internationalnewsandviews.com/iran-strait-of-hormuz-yuan-oil-trade-tanker-policy-report-399394-2/

2026-03-14 01:32:53 UTC

It is a beautiful Saturday morning here in Shanghai.
Have a great weekend all.

2026-03-14 01:27:11 UTC

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What’s up? Here for any questions you might have @npub1cn4…3vle

2026-03-10 00:16:00 UTC

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Thanks for that. I had no idea.

2026-03-09 06:31:35 UTC

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Yes but not often. Wife isn’t a fan of any drive that is longer than an hour. A ton of amazing places three/four hours outside of Shanghai. Road system quality is roughly on par with the States without all the construction.

2026-03-09 06:29:24 UTC

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Stations are everywhere. Just yesterday wife and I drove out Nio, parked in a garage, went and had some noodles and came back and hour later. Fully charged. And here’s the kicker …. Total cost was Rmb41 or roughly $6

2026-03-09 06:27:21 UTC

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Shanghai China.

2026-03-09 06:26:59 UTC

Primal isn’t showing Notes that I’m posting in my own feed?? Odd
Damus is now the option of choice I guess.

2026-03-09 06:25:21 UTC

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Yes this is accurate to a point. I’d say roughly half the cars on the road today, periods more, are EVs.

2026-03-09 06:24:16 UTC

Something going wonky with my Nostr.

2026-03-09 06:22:27 UTC

China Morning Missive
Wuwei (无为) and the Cultural Chasm
Over the past several days I’ve been overwhelmed with client emails asking whether American activities in the Gulf are indirectly targeting China. It appears that the zeitgeist, including many Washington policy makers, is operating under the impression that China has been irreparably harmed and the Beijing leadership is at a loss for how to respond. My responses to those emails are short and to the point. “Ignore the noise. We’ve seen similar instances in the past (last year’s tariff episode?). Operate under the principal that China has prepared for this eventuality.”
It continues to escape the rationale mind of many that China operates at the lowest possible time preference. I make this point often and do so because it represents the singular first principal to be applied whenever any assessment of China is being made. Not only is the application critical to understand how Beijing goes about structuring policies, both domestic and foreign, it is central to the very process of decision making itself. More specifically, the importance lies in a recognition that, for Beijing, action is far more often found in demonstrable restraint.
There are genuine cultural anomalies present. They need to be considered and yet are always absent. Honestly, you’d think this would have been recognized by now given thirty years of observable Chinese behavior. It hasn’t. There isn’t just a cultural gap in America’s expert class when it comes to the topic of China, there is a cultural chasm.
Be it the Taoist concept of Wuwei or the teachings of Lao Tzu, Chinese society is grounded in a willingness to take the path of forbearance. An outward projection of stillness. Consider the character for patience, Ren (忍). It is comprised of two characters, blade (刃) and heart (心). What this means to the Chinese is that patience is a concept that requires a willingness to endure adversity.
Be mindful though. Non-action shouldn’t always be taken literally. It is a highly layered construct and quite malleable. Yes, the Chinese default setting is a static state, but every single event is viewed through its own unique lens. If there were to be an extreme event, then the Beijing leadership would most certainly resort to an immediate response. To the Chinese, however, there is rarely ever an occurrence that is truly extreme (ie unexpected) in nature.
Restraint is the consequence of ongoing preparedness present across China. At all levels of society, anxiety is born from uncertainty and the greater the uncertainty the greater the anxiety. And to counter uncertainty means a greater effort to prepare. Again, we only need to look back to last year. Contrary to all American expectations, the Chinese successfully countered the Trump administration’s escalatory tariff regime. This was achieved through advanced preparation. It was a widely held view in China that tariffs would be deployed and parties across the country simply planned well in advance for that eventuality. Exports were frontloaded and cash hoards were amassed. This provided time and flexibility to negotiate and do so from a position of relative strength.
So too is it the case with events now playing out in the Middle East. Beijing has well understood, and for decades, America’s motivations and objectives across the Gulf and preparations have been underway for quite some time. Beijing made overtures to create a separate series of regional relationships and did so with success. At the same time, there were various steps taken to mitigate all identified risks from future conflict. There was the aggressive campaign to build three significant rail lines (and pipelines) traversing the entirety of the Heartland. Alternative sources of energy (ex-Gulf partners) were established, from Russia to Indonesia to Africa. Even the domestic agenda of shifting to renewables and EVs can now be seen as having a geopolitical angle. China isn’t at a loss. China is, once again, very well placed.
If there is to be a focus, it needs to be on a fundamental realignment in how the American foreign policy and business community goes about assessing China. This must begin by taking China seriously and literally. Stop miscalculating China’s capabilities. Secretary Bessent famously claimed last year that China was negotiating “with a pair of twos”. He was wrong. Today, Secretary Wright is stating that “China is about to lose the second of three gas station suppliers”. Again, the Secretary will come to learn that he, too, is wrong. The script must be flipped and, moving forward, it is highly advisable that the expectation shift towards China gaining from hegemonic actions taken by America.

2026-03-09 06:08:55 UTC

2026-03-09 02:18:14 UTC

Once again, it is just another Monday morning here in Shanghai. Everyone just going about their day.

2026-03-09 02:11:16 UTC

2026-03-08 03:02:29 UTC

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Always. Or at least I aim to provide a thoughtful response and doing so with as little emotive layering as possible.

2026-03-08 02:59:56 UTC

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I clearly must be old, officially. Hard for me to tell what’s real and what’s agent generated. Hopefully people will know that all commentary on China I put out is human generated.

2026-03-07 12:26:28 UTC

Everyone who is saying “this war is really about China” hasn’t a single idea of just how prepared Beijing became for this eventuality.
Not a single lesson was learned from last years trade war. Bessent and pretty much every geopolitical cosplayer said China had no leverage. “China was playing with a pair of twos”.
They were wrong. They are wrong this time as well. China has seen this coming for decades.

2026-03-05 06:13:18 UTC

Here is a perfect example of why you need to tread carefully anytime there’s a flurry of commentary discussing China.
Be it Beijing’s motivations, or the supposed fact that – somehow – action taken by the United States in the Middle East has provided for escalatory leverage. It may sound like a cliche, but you must know that the Chinese are playing multiple steps ahead of Washington.
Perhaps some unsolicited advice. The next time you stumble across an individual weighing in on the China debate, simply ask that individual when was the last time they were in country. It’s all noise when it comes to the arm chair macro tourists and armchair geopolitical theorists.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-05/china-tells-top-refiners-to-suspend-diesel-and-gasoline-exports

2026-03-05 03:14:23 UTC

China Morning Missive
More of the Same, as Expected
That time of year again, the China “Two Sessions” where Beijing leadership lays out its economic plans for the coming year. Much as expected, the path forward is essentially the very same path from 2025.
Where I’m focused is on the continued deleveraging especially at the local government level. Basically, it is a “left pocket, right pocket” strategy where Beijing is issuing so called ultra-long special sovereign bonds and will use those proceeds to retire local government debt.
There’s been no fiscal bazooka and there will be no fiscal bazooka. There will be no direct support provided to households. Once again, I will state emphatically that Keynes is well and truly dead in China. The lessons of 2008 were learned and policy was thusly adjusted.
What this will also mean is continued deflationary pressure.
My ongoing thesis remains intact as well. Beginning in 2017, but in earnest staring in 2020, Beijing shifted to an entirely new economic model. Property and infrastructure, the historic drivers of growth, were to be phased out and replaced by manufacturing, or more specifically what’s referred to as the fourth industrial revolution.
There’s no question that what Beijing is seeking to achieve is a very big ask. There is no guarantee that the strategy will ultimately work. The economic structural issues were, however, recognized and a path forward was created to address those issues. That’s far more than can be said of any G7 nation-state. If, and this is a very big if, China does prove successful in the transition it’ll be game over.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-05/china-s-steady-debt-plan-calms-bond-market-on-ample-liquidity

2026-03-04 11:57:37 UTC

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And don’t forget, the entire war is really about containing China!!!

2026-03-04 06:23:14 UTC

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This is a really good one. Not often used here locally but still …. Excellent.

2026-03-04 06:15:13 UTC

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Ok, so had a watch. My feedback is that those holding hard line claims over what China will or won’t do tend to have at least a bias if not an outright agenda. Brian’s commentary is just too declarative. “China can’t do this….” Or “China is different from America …..”
There’s, of course, certain truth underlying the various commentary. Make no mistake though, China and the United States are rivals and are both are seeking to undermine the other. I just find that how it is China goes about that process is smoother. America’s approach is brash and hegemonic.
My own baseline is as follows. China understands how it is that America acts on the global stage, learned the lessons over 30 years and is applying that learning to its distinct advantage.
The Americans, to this very day, still do not truly understand how China operates, what motivates China or how decision making is conducted in a way that can successfully suppress American power.
My overall aim is to address that latter point. To educate, wherever possible, my fellow compatriots. For now, there just hasn't been an audience willing to listen with a genuinely open mind. I just keep tilting at the windmills.

2026-03-04 05:10:32 UTC

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Being a “g” is good yes? No?

2026-03-04 04:36:08 UTC

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Excellent. I'll have a watch and revert if there's anything else I can add to this ongoing situation vis a vis China's involvement.

2026-03-04 04:17:57 UTC

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Never heard of this person. I'll have to check him out.
To your question though, I'm fairly certain that China is providing support to Iran in some capacity, but will be doing so with complete plausible deniability. That's just how China seeks to operate. I would also agree that the Beijing leadership will be doing so without risking overextending itself.
Is there a specific piece of content from Brian Berletic that you can share?

2026-03-04 03:16:55 UTC

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Correct. That classic Napoleon aphorism.

2026-03-04 02:03:33 UTC

It is hard to fathom that non-action by the Beijing leadership is somehow being viewed as a net geopolitical gain for the United States.
The cultural divide is truly a chasm.
https://blossom.primal.net/b72f6670c9dcd85c5e89ac5301d12c3d2de27d412efa1a07b1aef40eb25a8223.jpg

2026-03-03 07:23:52 UTC

On the off chance some of you missed it, Chancellor Merz lost it after his trip to China last week.
https://blossom.primal.net/b1f63093048fc584430257fc2600f7c3b6f17002ac8737233c7819c94efc55df.mp4

2026-03-03 07:21:23 UTC

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Don't get me started. A long while back I made the mistake of extending my experience to people operating in the Beltway that were traveling to China. This is before the days of Covid. Even at that time it became quite clear that any messaging beyond "China is the new evil empire" would not get an audience.
There is actually a Select Committee on China in Congress which is, technically, meant to bring in experts to explain all things China to these legislative decision makers. What the entire Committee has descended into is a venue for anti-China "experts" to extoll everything the Committee has already concluded. It's a farce.
The entirety of my engagement today is rather straight forward. I'm a red blooded American who just so happens to have lived in China for 30 years. I can see well beyond the horizon and, with that, what is coming. The EV industry is gone. So is the humanoid robotics space and, I would argue, is LLM ecosystem. I will just continue to hammer these points home until the message is finally received, if ever.
Consider the past 48 hours and the sheer number of not only newly minted Iranian experts, but somehow an entire new graduating class of China experts as well. I do my best to keep a lid on my reactions to it all, and I thank yoga for that, but my patience is rapidly running out.
Rant over! And my thanks for the question.

2026-03-03 03:05:52 UTC

China Morning Missive
“A Single Flower does not Make a Spring”
There seems to be a rather weak theory going around that America has deployed some grand plan to systematically cut China off from key strategic partners. While there are certainly more than a few dots which can be connected to reach such a conclusion, it remains an errant conclusion and, if anything, only goes to demonstrate just how poorly China’s 30 years of foreign policy strategies are understood throughout the Beltway.
To begin, the theory being promulgated is an act of pure projection. How American policy has been conducted over the past 30 years must, obviously, be the very same course of action under consideration by the leadership in Beijing. Not even close and it is rather obvious, at least to me, that few have read BGen Samuel Griffith’s book on Sun Tzu.
To the Americans, the world is built upon alliances and a Judeo-Christian ethos that delineates between good actors and bad actors. It is all a very black and white mindset and extremely rigid. It is also an approach which is highly antithetical to how Beijing operates. What continues to evade much of Washington, the Beltway consensus and the entire Thing Tank Senior Fellow ecosystem is a foreign policy construct which has been built around a web of counterparties, not formal alliances. Counterparties which are centered on commercial interests and, critically, are meant to achieve the specific strategic aim of optionality through the redundancies of critical inputs.
In the case of the Middle East, even the most tertiary assessment will find that China isn’t even close to being hemmed in strategically by a single relationship. In fact, and as a quick aside, the entire “Axis of Autocracies” is incongruent not only with China’s actual ambitions but also in terms of how Beijing has pursued foreign policy. The taxonomy applied is, well, just another reflection of an America hardwired to a 20th Century mindset. For the sake of argument though, if it is true that the underlying aim of the Trump administration is to leverage actions in one theater to destabilize China in the East Asia theater all that will be achieved is the equivalent of pushing on a string.
The glaring omission of this theory is any consideration of China’s current expansive set of relationships across the Gulf region both in terms of scope and scale.
Here are but a few examples. To start, there’s Qatar which is reported to be the second largest supplier of LNG (3million tons/year) to China. There’s Kuwait which was the first country in the region to sign on, formally, to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2014. Even Iraq. Here the two countries have a deep commercial relationship, including a 20-year “oil-for-construction” agreement. China imports as much oil from Iraq as it does from Russia. Finally, there’s Saudi Arabia, by far the single most significant relationship China has built in the region and a partnership that is far broader and deeper than that of any other Gulf nation.
Here is the critical point to be made; what is highlighted above is a foreign policy that has been executed upon globally from Eastern Europe to South East Asia and all points between. Be it the Port of Piraeus in Greece or the linkage to the Belgrade-Budapest rail line. The massive energy investments in Indonesia or, not to be forgotten, the 950km newly operational rail line in Algeria. China has built redundancies across the globe and isn’t anywhere near at risk if it were to lose a single bilateral relationship.
Ah, but what of China’s ability to protect those interests? The Beltway commentariat is also stressing that Beijing doesn’t have the necessary hard power (military assets) to fortify any of those relationships. This is most certainly true, but only to a point. The real question to be asked is how far can America extend its reach in seeking to counter/contain China? For me, the answer is found in history and with the British Empire. For all the galivanting around the globe during the latter half of the 19th Century, all the Gunboat diplomacy, it ultimately became impossible for the Empire to be in all places at all times. The same would hold for America today albeit with a key difference. China isn’t just a geopolitical rival; it is a deep pocketed rival and one which has built bilateral relationships that are commercial centric. It is also a position built over the course of three decades. There’s a degree of entrenchment that has yet to be properly appreciated in Washington.
God speed!
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/china-playing-long-game-over-iran

2026-03-03 02:48:08 UTC

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“keep your head on a swivel” is one of the greatest expressions out there. Thx.

2026-03-02 08:56:57 UTC

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Ahhh so you’re one of those people. Amazes me how convenient it’s become to jet across the border. I’m so old I remember when Futian was nothing more than a textile factories.

2026-03-02 08:52:59 UTC

China’s market closed higher on the day.
https://blossom.primal.net/ec43c975dc2ec1fd47006aa8fc83709000263a4a938e8d66420f4cb524d1345b.jpg

2026-03-02 08:47:03 UTC

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Exactly, and I can't stress enough that living here in Shanghai is a zero drama experience. Can I ask, when were you last in China?

2026-03-02 08:00:30 UTC

Feel the need to share the following.
"Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."
This is a quote from Napoleon Bonaparte and NOT Sun Tzu.

2026-03-02 00:53:53 UTC

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Hahaha. Good call. Have a lady just outside the office that makes Jian Bing.
https://blossom.primal.net/63f51d0cabce33c19d43e727042066e7511b30739f5b8c939200d65b02a0a33f.mov

2026-03-02 00:47:43 UTC

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Protein. Always protein.

2026-03-02 00:36:37 UTC

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Correct and why it is that Beijing simply wants to maintain the status quo. Low time preference thinking is how the system operates here along with a confidence in the direction of travel.
All of the commentary centered on China making a move on Taiwan comes from Washington DC and the various think tank "Senior Fellows" all of whom are conflicted in the opinions on the topics. The headlines of "China to move on Taiwan by 2027" is meant - in my opinion - to goad Beijing into said action. It won't happen.

2026-03-02 00:23:57 UTC

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I'd have to respectfully disagree. A distracted America doesn't factor in very high when it comes to the final decision.
Beijing's objective is to keep the status quo contrary to whatever it is the commentariat would lay out in terms of a rationale. Much as I shared just a few days ago, winning the peace is a prerequisite before any decision is made to take action and Beijing knows that this isn't possible at this juncture.

2026-03-02 00:10:22 UTC

Well, it is just another Monday morning here in Shanghai.

2026-03-01 08:08:07 UTC

Strongly advise reading this book. The only edition you should read. This specific book. Fantastic examples provided throughout.
And I can say it has allowed me to properly assess much of the thinking out of Beijing when it comes to world affairs. Moreover, it has provided insight into how it is Beijing has operated over the past 30 years.
https://blossom.primal.net/7c80ffe3ee1aef068877604a35361cd10252fd2a065edb29f740cd9c22676e18.jpg

2026-02-27 06:29:55 UTC

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What you’ve described just isn’t how China would go about the process unless provoked. While it may seem quaint, Chinese thinking on such matters does remain very closely aligned with Sun Tzu’s hierarchy of attack.
1. Attack the enemy’s strategy
2. Attack the enemy’s alliances
3. Attack the enemy’s army
4. Attack the enemy’s cities
These are in order and Sun Tzu describes the final step as being “the least desirable and most costly”.
At the same time, Beijing would be adding to is overall calculus its current relative position geopolitically speaking. Agree or disagree, Beijing views both European states and America as declining powers. There is simply more to be gained by remining patient and doing nothing.
I do, however, very much appreciate your comment and raising a different perspective. If nothing else, we can just appreciate having differing opinions which is totally fine.

2026-02-27 01:31:19 UTC

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This is actually an issue I've been following for quite some time. The answer, at least as I see it, centers on China seeking the rapid commodification of LLMs and this is best achieved through open source and rabid, iterative competition.
I've joked that Steve Case wants his AOL business model back when discussing American closed source models. Siloed and all seeking profit maximization. I've argued that with China going the open source route would be an existential threat to the American groups. so long as the Chinese models were able to perform. Well, they have performed and well beyond what anyone had expected.
Today, it is all eyes on Hangzhou and Deepseek and the second and third order effects that will inevitably playout. Best recent example was Deepseek refusing to provide Nvida and AMD access to its upcoming model.
Hope this helps and I'll be sure to provide more insight on the entire net-gen competitive battlefield.

2026-02-27 00:54:41 UTC

China Morning Missive
The Taiwan Issue
Back behind the desk after a much needed Chinese New Year break. My goal for this Year of the Horse is to get to those of you interested more updates and insights into what is actually transpiring here on the ground in Shanghai. And you can help with this endeavor. If there are topics where you’d like my perspective, just let me know.
For today, the topic is Taiwan and is being raised due to a recent NYT article which highlighted the “impending” military move by Beijing on Taiwan in 2027. The construct of the story centered on messages conveyed to American tech firms that rely heavily, if not exclusively, on chips made in Taiwan. A summary of that article is linked below.
Allow me to stress that the probability of China moving on Taiwan next year is zero. Zero. That is both a strong opinion and one that is strongly held. The reason for such confidence comes from an actual understanding of Chinese history and experience with how it is that decisions such as these are made in Beijing.
There is a basic premise which needs to be taken into account. If the peace cannot be won, then instigating war is to be avoided. It is all very Sun Tzu. Allow me to provide some historical context, specifically the two examples of when China, itself, was invaded and defeated. There were the Mongols in the early 1200s and then the Manchus in the mid 1600s. Why these data points matter when assessing the Taiwan issue is that, and in both instances, the end result had the ethnic Han Chinese fully assimilating the invaders over time. The Mongols ruled as the Yuan Dynasty for one thousand years and the Manchus ruled as the Qing Dynasty for 200+ years.
For China, to conquer means to assimilate. Allow me to provide a more recent example, Hong Kong in 2019. Begin with an understanding that at the formal handover in 1997, Hong Kong was basically as an extremely British enclave. Once Beijing reassumed control, however, the borders were opened and over the next 20 years Mainland Chinese entered the city to live and work and became the dominate ethnic group. Hong Kong became just another Chinese city. It was fully assimilated and with it made the move by Beijing to assume full control relatively easy.
None of these dynamics are at play when it comes to Taiwan. Most importantly, these dynamics are known by the Beijing leadership. If a move were made, and even if that move were successful, there would be no way that stability after-the-fact could be achieved.
The objective is to maintain the status quo, and I am expecting an agreement along these lines to be reached in the next year or two. A formula that is supposedly being discussed would have the current status quo hold for the next 50 years. That means Taiwan would not unilaterally declare its independence and Beijing would commit to no military intervention. The two sides would codify this relationship in some sort of formal declaration, and the two sides would go back to doing what they do best. Commercially engage and make money.
So what is with all the fear mongering out of Washington? Well, I’ll get to that tomorrow.
https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/semiconductors/us-govt-warned-nvidia-ceo-jensen-huang-tim-cook-and-lisa-su-that-china-could-invade-taiwan-by-2027-apple-ceo-reportedly-said-he-sleeps-with-one-eye-open

2026-02-25 14:24:59 UTC

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Cheers!!! I do love the energy of this place.
An honest platform where people can hash things out and (mostly) not take it personal.

2026-02-25 11:09:25 UTC

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@npub1sjc…jx9d

2026-02-25 10:59:38 UTC

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Back to providing an installment of my recent “Deconstructing Rivalry” Essay. Many of you will find today’s update of particular, even very specific, interest. It centers on diplomatic subterfuge via the IMF along with America’s original decision to debase its currency.
In short, there is an important event that is too often overlooked when it comes to China’s motivations to build a parallel set of global systems, the nearly two-decade long process to reform IMF voting rights. It was, however, the policy response by Washington to the Global Financial Crisis, putting at risk China’s significant exposure to US Treasuries and GSEs, that demonstrated the length at which America would go to safeguard its unipolar primacy. Power, whenever required, would be wielded (weaponized) using the dominance of the US$ system.
It would be the combination of these actions that would, ultimately, lead to the formal establishment of the BRICS block.
#naddr1qq…c4ym
#naddr1qq…c4ym

2026-02-25 09:14:25 UTC

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Happy New Year my friend. 火马!

2026-02-25 04:44:20 UTC

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Been meaning to reply to your note above, but have been running all over during Chinese New Year.
I totally get it, the Gell-Mann reaction to what I wrote. Too quick with my commentary and did not, whatsoever, mean OpenClaw was an AI model or LLM. What I was aiming to convey was the point that open source systems, agents in this instance, are being commodified by the Chinese with PIcoClaw used as the example.
Really to appreciate you making the point though and do so any time you think I'm completely out of my wheel house on a given subject.

2026-02-25 04:40:26 UTC

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Chris, let me put it this way. When asked to discuss my experience, I simply quote Lucian Pye: “China is a civilization disguising itself as a nation-state.” The monumental change of the past 30 years was surface level. China has remained, very much, the Middle Kingdom and in that regard nothing had changed.

2026-02-25 04:38:40 UTC

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I completely agree, although it does seem that Reads don't get the same level of engagement as Notes. Still, I am glad that there is the long form option even if I do struggle when it comes to uploading content.

2026-02-23 10:36:13 UTC

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I went straight to gin

2026-02-23 04:57:05 UTC

Ok. It is now official.
I’ve lived in China for 30 years. Where did all that time go? Been a wild ride for sure and wouldn’t change a single thing about this journey.
https://blossom.primal.net/91d8654a89f82c13689b3858ae1b38cac73dfb3762eb541facf6f2b598362b5f.jpg

2026-02-22 11:56:37 UTC

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Last I looked, not very much.

2026-02-16 08:37:33 UTC

And if there wasn’t enough going on in the entire AI space, we just had Qwen 3.5 officially dropped.
China - be it good or bad - is the accelerant here. If US markets are on shaky ground over the effects from a small number of siloed closed source players in Silicon Valley, just wait until PicoClaw, Seedance and, now, Qwen permeates the business media.
https://blossom.primal.net/44645ce8e409d70896817bc09843ad9f7180a46149ad9a677c2889a7fac1e145.jpg

2026-02-16 04:45:36 UTC

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Oh yeah!! Lunar New Year eve is a truly special day. So much food is being prepared at the moment.
Have a great time @nprofile…945w
https://blossom.primal.net/bdfef2df4fbfd13645ed8a083ce802b4619186c0cfc2b4b4b4d1c1c0c900bbd7.mov

2026-02-16 04:07:17 UTC

It would be hysterical to know how much Sam Altman paid this individual for what is, honestly, an already borderline obsolete AI model.
I can’t even think of the rationale for making this move.
OpenClaw creator Peter Steinberger joining OpenAI, Altman Says https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/15/openclaw-creator-peter-steinberger-joining-openai-altman-says.html?__source=iosappshare%7Ccom.apple.UIKit.activity.CopyToPasteboard

2026-02-16 03:32:25 UTC

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Well, all I can add is that AI here in China is centered on diffusing applicability. Various models are being used across a wide swath of manufactures. QC has been the main application I’ve seen reducing the task to seconds. Nobody here cares about creating “God in a box”. Focus is on making money and cutting costs.

2026-02-16 03:19:38 UTC

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Suspect it doesn’t matter given that the Chinese have already moved ahead with PicoClaw. The speed of that going down had me literally laugh out loud.

2026-02-14 09:54:45 UTC

Any American Transcendentalists out there?
Devoured the greats back in my youth and find myself returning to their teachings once again.
For my American compatriots, I believe that this is a solution to what ails our great nation.
https://blossom.primal.net/55a9550ccd32d81e121c0543724f3d5d04252735a656eee62a917916492546a1.jpg

2026-02-13 08:52:52 UTC

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So am still working out the bugs with the “long post” functionality here on Nostr. Ended up posting this installment of the “Deconstructing Rivalry” essay twice for some reason.
Anyway, for today we begin getting into the meat of the matter.
@nprofile…93la a bit later than I had hoped but here you go.
#naddr1qq…750m

2026-02-12 09:11:27 UTC

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Oh, it goes well beyond what you think. Roughly half of what China now exports is intermediate goods. Even if you found an item that was “Made in America” - for example - upwards of one-fifth of the inputs into that product would be sourced from China. I have a whole chapter in the essay addressing the culpability of Corporate America.
Moreover, this is at the core of the entire rare earth issue. China controls inputs into everything nowadays. Rare earth access is but a symptom of a far greater problem.

2026-02-12 08:47:14 UTC

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Very very well said and yet what it is you’ve described are the actions of a dwindling few. Soliciting engagement on the subject of China almost always devolves into ad hominem attacks.
I’m a red blooded America who just so happens to have lived in Shanghai for 30 years. My objective is purely civic in nature. To describe the world as it is rather than as others wish it to be. To be the one who picks up the lance and go about tilting at the windmills. With love and my respect.

2026-02-12 08:21:38 UTC

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Am just getting started @nprofile…qk8j Had to break down the entire essay into roughly 12 parts so there is a great deal more to follow. Solved for the “long post” issue so will send out one new installment over the next week or so.
Any questions you might have or feedback would be greatly appreciated.

2026-02-12 04:44:04 UTC

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Believe I’ve finally sorted out this “long post” issue and can now return to posting sections of the recent essay detailing the 30 year path to China & American rivalry.
@nprofile…e856 thank you for the assist
@nprofile…s597 more to chew on if interested.
#naddr1qq…0zv2

2026-02-12 04:39:03 UTC

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I think…. I think it might have worked.

2026-02-12 04:07:58 UTC

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Oh. Nice. I’ll give it a try.

2026-02-12 03:59:11 UTC

Hey all. Need assistance if possible. For whatever reason Reads isn't working for me to upload long posts.
Is there another option where I can post a long form content other than Reads?

2026-02-09 00:09:05 UTC

https://blossom.primal.net/156180f9c424a1e3f7dfce9e3e9aa402ce064f9c2911fe63d2c3663d8c015b0a.jpg

2026-02-07 02:20:32 UTC

Just for good measure we ended the week here in China with more “we are serious. Crypto is banned” news.
Doesn’t seem as though anyone cares anymore.
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-vows-tighten-virtual-currency-restrictions-2026-02-06/

2026-02-06 09:12:36 UTC

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Hey man. Have a great Chinese New Year.

2026-02-06 03:47:51 UTC

https://blossom.primal.net/005df168409ca526484e638e99294004d61915291342d730059a122aa1b9aa6f.jpg

2026-02-05 15:12:01 UTC

I strongly recommend taking up YOGA.
It is the perfect anecdote to the chaos of the daily world.
And you men out there …. This message is directed especially in your direction.

2026-02-04 01:06:26 UTC

China Morning Missive
“Begun, the Robot Wars have”
Forced technology transfers and an overreliance on China for intermediate inputs to final production. If there were ever to be an honest to God conversation in Washington over Chinese leverage it begins and ends with these two issues.
The issue of forced technology transfers would be easy to address if difficult to execute. To start, there was never all that much “force” applied. American corporations spent three decades willingly engaging with Chinese contractors and in that process IP was aggressively extracted. So, Chinese steal IP. Ok. To address the technology transfer and theft issues, you just stop making those transfers in the first place. This would, however, require management to accept a degree of impairment to both top and bottom-line results. Like I said, difficult to execute.
Addressing the issue of intermediate goods will take time and a great deal more commitment. In 2023, the latest data available, these inputs represented 47% of China’s total export value. Basically, China exports nearly as much finished goods as they do intermediate goods. China is no longer simply supplying final product to Walmart or Costco. China is now the primary supplier to a countless number of America manufactures. This issue, right here, lays at the core of last year’s rare earths episode.
And yet, for all the talk and posturing, it is very clear that there’s been no change in corporate behavior on either of these two fronts and there is no better example than that of Elon Musk’s Optimus robotics program.
Not that there is much need for confirmation, but reports are now surfacing that the Optimus production process will be reliant on “hundreds” of China suppliers. The rationale behind this decision is borderline delusional. Somehow, there’d be a market segmentation where America would lead in the robotic “brain” (software) and China would lead in the “body” (hardware). After this past year, with DeepSeek, QWEN, Kimi-K2.5 et al, it is beyond naive to even consider that China will be solely relegated to hardware. As for Musk, he simply knows that sourcing from America just isn’t an option, especially given his aggressive timeframe.
Over the past year I’ve been vocal in stating that the die is cast and that what China achieved with EVs will be fully replicated, and at tremendous speed, in the realm of humanoid robotics. It is already playing out when you consider the installation of industrial robotics. In 2024, China had total new installs of 295,000 versus America at 34,200. Worse, in the first nine months of last year, China’s new installs nearly doubled to 595,000 or 470 units per 10,000 workers.
Now that I think on it, the robot wars might already be over.
https://interestingengineering.com/ai-robotics/chinese-parts-cloud-tesla-humanoid-robot-growth

2026-02-03 09:21:04 UTC

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Ok. This is odd. The linked essay/Read shows “Mentioned event not found” when I’m on my laptop but shows perfectly fine on my mobile.

2026-02-03 09:13:27 UTC

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So you are unable to access the linked Reads document??? Had struggled for the past day getting the thing uploaded.

2026-02-03 05:54:08 UTC

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Enjoy and there is a great deal more to follow.

2026-02-03 05:04:48 UTC

China Morning Missive
The essay!
All, as mentioned yesterday, spent the past month hammering out a doctorate-sized essay which details events from the past 30 years and how they - cumulatively - led to our current state of affairs.
The plan is to break the essay up into easier to digest installments the first of which you’ll find below. For those truly interested in how China successfully navigated a world run by a unipolar hegemon, you’ll enjoy and find value in what is presented.
Again, I welcome any comments, questions or areas of disagreement.
Am tagging @npub1qny…95gx and @npub1guh…6hjy just for fun.
#note1cxn…x9ql

2026-02-03 04:58:03 UTC

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All good. Thank you.

2026-02-03 04:21:12 UTC

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All good Rod. Thx. Interesting though that a Note just posted shows on Damus but not on Primal.

2026-02-03 04:18:53 UTC

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@npub1sjc…jx9d first installment of the essay mentioned is finally uploaded onto Reads.
Now that I’ve worked out all the kinks will upload additional installments in sequence over the next week.
Any questions, feedback or areas of disagreement do let me know. Thx.

2026-02-03 04:12:51 UTC

This is a test. Seem to be having issues with relays.

2026-02-02 09:18:41 UTC

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I’m trying at the moment. Having issues with Reads uploading. Will be sure to tag once I figure this all out.

2026-02-02 07:44:13 UTC

China Morning Missive
China’s RMB ambitions
So, there seems to be a massive knee jerk, highly emotive, reaction across social media over the mere mention of China seeking to have the local currency (Renminbi, RMB) rise to the status of “reserve currency”.
The level of cope is on a whole new level.
For myself, it is all just the latest example of “post first and ask question later”. The comment has been taken completely out of context and yet it does very much align fully with how it is Beijing has been working to ameliorate the inherent risks imbedded in the USD system.
I’ve recently written a massive 18,000 word essay that addresses this very subject, the historical drivers and motivations, and I need to prioritize getting that essay uploaded here on Primal.
To the point, it isn’t the reserve currency where China is making inroads. It is, but it is slow. Where there’s been meaningful progress is in targeting the USD reserve asset. Gold settled trade is accelerating. As just one example, the ASEAN trading block has settled a full third of its trade with China in RMB and much of that has final settlement in gold.
Anyway, once I do get the entire essay up on Primal I’ll return and direct those interest were to find that tome of a document.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/xi-signals-push-for-yuan-reserve-status-as-beijing-eyes-bigger-role-in-global-finance/ar-AA1Vr9U4?ocid=socialshare

2026-01-26 02:10:35 UTC

China Morning Missive
Speculative Folly
Yet another top Chinese general is purged, and, once again, the speculation is rampant. Claims are made and conclusions drawn and the attention quickly moves to what this will mean for the reign of Xi Jinping. There is talk of a coup. There is talk of a removal from office by “the Elders”. It is all a fugazi and, more importantly, a distraction from events underway that do matter, that do have significance.
In terms of the Xi rumors, this would make for the seventh or eighth episode (I’ve lost count honestly) of how events in Beijing are expected to bring down this “Emperor for Life”. And that doesn’t count all the rumors of ill health. Then again, all the speculation is to be expected in a world driven by social media engagement farming. There may be, possibly, importance connected to this latest development, but it has taken away from actual events from the past week that do have real-world implications.
Firstly, this past week provided an initial view into the strategic aims of China’s latest Five-Year plan. State Grid, China’s largest power transmitter and grid operator, announced a 40% increase in CAPX out to 2030. A commitment of Rmb4trillion (US$570billion). There’s been ample commentary of late of the massive gap between China’s ability to produce energy versus that of the United States. This announced investment demonstrates that energy, broadly speaking, will remain a top priority over the next five years and, with it, a further widening in the gap.
Then there was the announcement that the Shanghai Futures Exchange will begin trading LNG contracts denominated in RMB as soon as February. Beijing has spent the past decade making inroads into the adoption of RMB for pricing across the entire commodity complex. This move would indicate there now being greater willingness among counterparties to accept RMB payment terms. The Qataris would be the most obvious group given the construct of the current bilateral trade relationship. What will need to monitor is if Australian suppliers, delivering one-third of China’s LNG imports, will accept RMB as well.
The reason why Australia needs attention goes to another development from this past week. BHP announced that it would be accepting price concessions on iron ore exports to China after a lengthy period of stalled negotiations. And this deal comes just a few months after BHP agreed to accept 30% of iron ore purchases contracted in RMB.
Finally, there are the reports of the growing gold reserves held by Poland. How this connects with China goes to how it is the bilateral trade relationship is managed. Poland settles just over a third of its annual trade with China in RMB. It does run a trade deficit with China but taking into account the role played by the Shanghai International Gold Exchange in final settlement, it is reasonable to conclude that a portion of the rising gold reserves by Poland is attributed to RMB surpluses being net final-settled with gold.
These are the development that matter and is also a demonstration, once again, of China operating on a very low time preference. The most impactful events occur on the margins and are, almost always, overlooked and absent from geoeconomic analysis. It has always been a game of inches and will remain a game of inches.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/china-top-general-ousted-xi-220640693.html

2026-01-24 16:12:49 UTC

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My issue remains though. Have long form content to share here but Nostr Reads still doesn’t have the adoption. I’m about to really test that theory though over the next two weeks.