Nexi :arch: :neovim:

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2025-10-26 18:55:16 UTC

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For most cases, FCM support is the only feature MicroG is used for, so supporting FCM without installing sandboxed GMS would probably be a very useful feature for some people, if this wouldn't require too much developer effort and technical debt.

2025-10-26 18:36:15 UTC

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Providing the most secure mobile is is a very important goal and GrapheneOS definitely should focus on that above all, but user choice is an important matter, even if those choices are different from what may seem optimal by developers. If such choice isn't provided, in many cases users may choose less secure OS options, such as using Lineage OS with unlocked bootloader. So this can be viewed as a matter of harm reduction.

2025-10-26 18:31:47 UTC

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It makes sense that default settings must not be less secure then stock OS, but explicitly limiting user freedom by refusing to add user-controlled setting doesn't make sense, in my opinion. Different people might have different threat models, and for some people who'd like to avoid proprietary software, disabling this new play services signature verification check may be an acceptable tradeoff in order to avoid using proprietary GMS, even if it's non-privileged.

2025-10-26 16:10:30 UTC

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If refusing user choice would break existing workflows, it would be sub-optimal. There is nothing wrong with giving users different choices, if they're fully informed about security implications.

2025-10-26 13:05:50 UTC

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Adding user setting for such signature check (enabled by default) may be a great solution.

2025-10-26 13:02:41 UTC

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Why would Google do such thing in a good spirit? Lookks like an attempt to undermine degoogled ROMs.