Luke Dashjr [ARCHIVE]

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🗓️ Active from 2014-04-30 to 2023-05-08
💬 Posted a total of 376 messages
📚 Participated in the following categories: Bitcoin-development, BIP draft, SPAM, Libbitcoin, BIP, bitcoin-dev, xxxx, BIP/Draft, patch, BIP Draft, BIP Proposal, Meta, Pre-BIP, Lightning-dev, Opt-in full-RBF, Mempool spam
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Last Notes

2023-08-03 17:31:03 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2023-08-02
🗒️ Summary of this message: Storage is not the issue with block sizes, and there are efforts to optimize how much space is needed by individual nodes.
📝 Original message:
Storage is not and never has been the trouble with block sizes. Please,
before participating in discussions of this topic, at least get a basic
understanding of it. Here's a talk I did a few years ago to get you
started: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqNEQS80-h4&t=7s
Luke
On 8/2/23 07:07, GamedevAlice via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > If the rate of growth of the blockchain is too high, Ordinals aren't the
> > cause, it's rather that the theoretical limit of the amount of
> storage that
> > can be added per block isn't sufficiently limited. (Whether they are
> used
> > to produce Ordinals or something else)
>
>
> True, the real question is whether the storage is in fact sufficiently
> limited. And I believe the answer to be 'yes'.
>
> Why? Consider a worst case scenario using the maximum block size of
> 4MB and a block time of 10min, that's a growth of 210.24GB per year.
> Some of that can be pruned, but let's just assume that you don't want
> to. And currently the entire blockchain is roughly 500GB.
>
> Now that looks like a lot of growth potential based on where we are at
> now. However, with the current cost of hardware, you can get a 5 TB
> hard drive for less than $150. That will last you 21 years before you
> run out of space. That's less than $0.02 per day.
>
> That is a worst case scenario.
>
> Consider that since cost of hardware drops over time, it will become
> less of a burden over time.
>
> Also, keep in mind there are efforts to optimize how much of that
> actually needs to be stored by nodes. For example, the aforementioned
> topic announcing Floresta which seems to be a node implementation that
> uses utreexo to allow nodes to run without needing to maintain the
> full UTXO set. Other initiatives exist as well.
>
> There is definitely a lot of optimization potential for drastically
> reducing how much space is actually needed by individual nodes.
>
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 2, 2023, 5:40 AM ,
> <bitcoin-dev-request at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> bitcoin-dev-request at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> bitcoin-dev-owner at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: Pull-req to enable Full-RBF by default (Peter Todd)
> 2. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions". (ashneverdawn)
> (Keagan McClelland)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2023 01:28:06 +0000
> From: Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org>
> To: Daniel Lipshitz <daniel at gap600.com>
> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Pull-req to enable Full-RBF by default
> Message-ID: <ZMmxJoL1ZH4//8Fg at petertodd.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> On Wed, Aug 02, 2023 at 01:27:24AM +0300, Daniel Lipshitz wrote:
> > Your research is not thorough and reaches an incorrect conclusion.
> >
> > As stated many times - we service payment processors and some
> merchants
> > directly - Coinspaid services multiple merchants and process a
> > significant amount of BTC they are a well known and active in
> the space -
> > as I provided back in December 2022 a email from Max the CEO of
> Coinspaid
> > confirming their use of 0-conf as well as providing there
> cluster addresses
> > to validate there deposit flows see here again -
> >
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-December/021239.html
> > - if this is not sufficient then please email
> support at coinspaid.com and ask
> > to be connected to Max or someone from the team who can confirm
> Conspaid is
> > clients of GAP600. Max also at the time was open to do a call, I
> can check
> > again now and see if this is still the case and connect you.
> >
> > That on its own is enough of a sample to validate our statistics.
>
> Why don't you just give me an example of some merchants using
> Coinspaid, and
> another example using Coinpayments, who rely on unconfirmed
> transactions? If
> those merchants actually exist it should be very easy to give me
> some names of
> them.
>
> Without actual concrete examples for everyone to see for
> themselves, why should
> we believe you?
>
> > I have also spoken to Changelly earlier today and they offered
> to email pro
> > @ changelly.com <http://changelly.com> and they will be able to
> confirm GAP600 as a service
>
> Emailed; waiting on a reply.
>
> > provider. Also please send me the 1 trx hash you tested and I
> can see if it
> > was queried to our system and if so offer some info as to why it
> wasnt
> > approved. Also if you can elaborate how you integrated with
> Changelly - I
> > can check with them if that area is not integrated with GAP600.
>
> Why don't you just tell me exactly what service Changelly offers
> that relies on
> unconfirmed transactions, and what characteristics would meet
> GAP600's risk
> criteria? I and others on this mailing list could easily do test
> transactions
> if you told us what we can actually test. If your service actually
> works, then
> you can safely provide that information.
>
> I'm not going to give you any exact tx hashes of transactions I've
> already
> done, as I don't want to cause any problems for the owners of the
> accounts I
> borrowed for testing. Given your lack of honesty so far I have
> every reason to
> believe they might be retalliated against in some way.
>
> > As the architect of such a major change to the status of 0-conf
> > transactions I would think you would welcome the opportunity to
> speak to
> > business and users who actual activities will be impacted by
> full RBF
> > becoming dominant.
>
> Funny how you say this, without actually giving any concrete
> examples of
> businesses that will be affected. Who exactly are these
> businesses? Payment
> processors obviously don't count.
>
> > Are you able to provide the same i.e emails and contacts of
> people at
> > the mining pools who can confirm they have adopted FULL RBF ?
>
> I've already had multiple mining pools complain to me that they
> and their
> employees have been harassed over full-rbf, so obviously I'm not
> going to
> provide you with any private contact information I have. There's
> no need to
> expose them to further harassment.
>
> If you actually offered an unconfirmed transaction guarantee
> service, with real
> customers getting an actual benefit, you'd be doing test transactions
> frequently and would already have a very good idea of what pools
> do full-rbf.
> Why don't you already have this data?
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> <http://petertodd.org>
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 22:58:53 -0700
> From: Keagan McClelland <keagan.mcclelland at gmail.com>
> To: Hugo L <ashneverdawn at gmail.com>, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions".
> (ashneverdawn)
> Message-ID:
>
> <CALeFGL2Z3q90Esnu0qV0mqpHZaCnOV-5aks2TKGOjY4L+14d3w at mail.gmail.com
> <mailto:CALeFGL2Z3q90Esnu0qV0mqpHZaCnOV-5aks2TKGOjY4L%2B14d3w at mail.gmail.com>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> There is an open question as to whether or not we should figure
> out a way
> to price space in the UTXO set. I think it is fair to say that
> given the
> fact that the UTXO set space remains unpriced that we actually
> have no way
> to determine whether some of these transactions are spam or not.
> The UTXO
> set must be maintained by all nodes including pruned nodes,
> whereas main
> block and witness data do not have the same type of indefinite
> footprint,
> so in some sense it is an even more significant resource than
> chain space.
> We may very well discover that if we price UTXOs in a way that
> reflect the
> resource costs that usage of inscriptions would vanish. The
> trouble though
> is that such a mechanism would imply having to pay "rent" for an
> "account"
> with Bitcoin, a proposition that would likely be offensive to a
> significant
> portion of the Bitcoin user base.
>
> Cheers,
> Keags
>
> On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 4:55?AM Hugo L via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> > I don't think it's anyone's place to judge which types of
> transactions
> > should be allowed or not on the network, in fact, when it comes
> to privacy
> > and censorship resistance, it would be better if we were not
> even able to
> > distinguish different types of transactions from one another in
> the first
> > place.
> >
> > We have limited resources on the blockchain and so they should
> go to the
> > highest bidder. This is already how the network functions and how it
> > ensures it's security.
> >
> > Rather than thinking about this as "spam", I think it's useful to
> > objectively think about it in terms of value to the marketplace
> (fees
> > they're willing to pay) against cost to the network (storage
> consumed). It
> > comes down to supply and demand.
> >
> > If the rate of growth of the blockchain is too high, Ordinals
> aren't the
> > cause, it's rather that the theoretical limit of the amount of
> storage that
> > can be added per block isn't sufficiently limited. (Whether they
> are used
> > to produce Ordinals or something else)
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Jul 30, 2023, 5:51 PM , <
> > bitcoin-dev-request at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> >> Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
> >> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >>
> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> >> bitcoin-dev-request at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >>
> >> You can reach the person managing the list at
> >> bitcoin-dev-owner at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >>
> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> >> than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..."
> >>
> >>
> >> Today's Topics:
> >>
> >> 1. Re: Concern about "Inscriptions". (rot13maxi)
> >>
> >>
> >>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> Message: 1
> >> Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 18:34:12 +0000
> >> From: rot13maxi <rot13maxi at protonmail.com>
> >> To: L?o Haf <leohaf at orangepill.ovh>, "vjudeu at gazeta.pl"
> >> <vjudeu at gazeta.pl>
> >> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
> >> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> >> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions".
> >> Message-ID:
> >>
> >>
> <RIqguuebFmAhEDqCY_0T8KRqHBXEfcvPw6-MbDIyWsAWpLenFFeOVx88-068QFZr7xowg-6Zg988HsRCKdswtZC6QUKPXnrTyTAc_l5jphg=@
> >> protonmail.com <http://protonmail.com>>
> >>
> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> >>
> >> Hello,
> >>
> >> > This cat and mouse game can be won by bitcoin defenders. Why
> ? Because
> >> it is easier to detect these transactions and make them a
> standardization
> >> rule than to create new types of spam transactions.
> >>
> >> One of the things discussed during the mempoolfullrbf
> discussion is that
> >> a small (~10%) of nodes willing to relay a class of transaction
> is enough
> >> for that class of transaction to consistently reach miners.
> That means you
> >> would need to get nearly the entire network to run updated
> relay policy to
> >> prevent inscriptions from trivially reaching miners and being
> included in
> >> blocks. Inscription users have shown that they are willing and
> able to send
> >> non-standard transactions to miners out of band (
> >>
> https://mempool.space/tx/0301e0480b374b32851a9462db29dc19fe830a7f7d7a88b81612b9d42099c0ae),
> >> so even if you managed to get enough of the network running the
> new rule to
> >> prevent propagation to miners, those users can just go out of
> band. Or,
> >> they can simply change the script that is used to embed an
> inscription in
> >> the transaction witness. For example, instead of 0 OP_IF?,
> maybe they do 0
> >> OP_DUP OP_DROP OP_IF. When the anti-inscription people detect
> this, they
> >> have to update the rule and wait for 90%
> >> + of the network to upgrade. When the pro-inscription people
> see this,
> >> they only have to convince other inscription enthusiasts and
> businesses to
> >> update.
> >>
> >> The anti-inscription patch has to be run by many more
> participants (most
> >> of whom don?t care), while the pro-inscription update has to be
> run by a
> >> small number of people who care a lot. It?s a losing battle for the
> >> anti-inscription people.
> >>
> >> If you want to prevent inscriptions, the best answer we know of
> today is
> >> economic: the cost of the blockspace needs to be more expensive
> than
> >> inscribers are willing to pay, either because its too expensive
> or because
> >> there?s no market demand for inscriptions. The former relies on
> Bitcoin
> >> becoming more useful to more people, the latter is the natural
> course of
> >> collectibles.
> >>
> >> > Finally, I would like to quote satoshi himself who wrote
> about spam
> >> here is the link:
> >> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1617#msg1617
> >>
> >> Appeals to Satoshi are not compelling arguments.
> >>
> >> Cheers,
> >> Rijndael
> >>
> >> On Sun, Jul 30, 2023 at 2:04 PM, L?o Haf via bitcoin-dev <[
> >> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org](mailto:On Sun, Jul 30,
> 2023 at
> >> 2:04 PM, L?o Haf via bitcoin-dev <<a href=)> wrote:
> >>
> >> > ?According to you, the rules of standardization are useless
> but in this
> >> case why were they introduced? The opreturn limit can be
> circumvented by
> >> miners, yet it is rare to see any, the same for maxancestorcount,
> >> minrelayfee or even the dust limit.
> >> >
> >> > This cat and mouse game can be won by bitcoin defenders. Why
> ? Because
> >> it is easier to detect these transactions and make them a
> standardization
> >> rule than to create new types of spam transactions.
> >> >
> >> > As for the default policy, it can be a weakness but also a
> strength
> >> because if the patch is integrated into Bitcoin Core by being
> activated by
> >> default, the patch will become more and more effective as the
> nodes update.
> >> >
> >> > Also, when it came to using a pre-segwit node, it is not a
> solution
> >> because this type of node cannot initiate new ones, which is
> obviously a
> >> big problem.
> >> >
> >> > Finally, I would like to quote satoshi himself who wrote
> about spam
> >> here is the link:
> >> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1617#msg1617
> >> >
> >> >> Le 27 juil. 2023 ? 07:10, vjudeu at gazeta.pl a ?crit :
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> ?
> >> >
> >> >>> not taking action against these inscription could be
> interpreted by
> >> spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> Note that some people, even on this mailing list, do not
> consider
> >> Ordinals as spam:
> >>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021464.html
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> See? It was discussed when it started. Some people believe that
> >> blocking Ordinals is censorship, and could lead to blocking regular
> >> transactions in the future, just based on other criteria. That
> means, even
> >> if developers would create some official version with that
> option, then
> >> some people would not follow them, or even block
> Ordinals-filtering nodes,
> >> exactly as described in the linked thread:
> >>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-February/021487.html
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>> as spammers might perceive that the Bitcoin network
> tolerates this
> >> kind of behavior
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> But it is true, you have the whole pages, where you can find
> images,
> >> files, or other data, that was pushed on-chain long before
> Ordinals. The
> >> whole whitepaper was uploaded just on 1-of-3 multisig outputs, see
> >> transaction
> >>
> 54e48e5f5c656b26c3bca14a8c95aa583d07ebe84dde3b7dd4a78f4e4186e713.
> You have
> >> the whole altcoins that are connected to Bitcoin by using part
> of the
> >> Bitcoin's UTXO set as their database.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> That means, as long as you won't solve IBD problem and UTXO set
> >> growing problem, you will go nowhere, because if you block Ordinals
> >> specifically, people won't learn "this is bad, don't do that",
> they could
> >> read it as "use the old way instead", as long as you won't
> block all
> >> possible ways. And doing that, requires for example creating
> new nodes,
> >> without synchronizing non-consensus data, like it could be done
> in "assume
> >> UTXO" model.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> Also note that as long as people use Taproot to upload a lot
> of data,
> >> you can still turn off the witness, and become a pre-Segwit
> node. But if
> >> you block those ways, then people will push data into legacy
> parts, and
> >> then you will need more code to strip it correctly. The block
> 774628 maybe
> >> contains almost 4 MB of data from the perspective of Segwit
> node, but the
> >> legacy part is actually very small, so by turning witness off,
> you can
> >> strip it to maybe just a few kilobytes.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve
> implementing a
> >> soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is
> simply to
> >> consider adding a standardization option. This option would
> allow the
> >> community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> 1. Without a soft-fork, those data will be pushed by mining
> pools
> >> anyway, as it happened in the block 774628.
> >> >
> >> >> 2. Adding some settings won't help, as most people use the
> default
> >> configuration. For example, people can configure their nodes to
> allow free
> >> transactions, without recompiling anything. The same with
> disabling dust
> >> amounts. But good luck finding a node in the wild that does
> anything
> >> unusual.
> >> >
> >> >> 3. This patch produced by Luke Dashjr does not address all
> cases. You
> >> could use "OP_TRUE OP_NOTIF" instead of "OP_FALSE OP_IF" used
> by Ordinals,
> >> and easily bypass those restrictions. This will be just a cat
> and mouse
> >> game, where spammers will even use P2PK, if they will be forced
> to. The
> >> Pandora's box is already opened, that fix could be good for
> February or
> >> March, but not now.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>> On 2023-07-26 11:47:09 user leohaf at orangepill.ovh wrote:
> >> >
> >> >>> I understand your point of view. However, inscription
> represent by
> >> far the largest spam attack due to their ability to embed
> themselves in the
> >> witness with a fee reduction.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> Unlike other methods, such as using the op_return field
> which could
> >> also be used to spam the chain, the associated fees and the
> standardization
> >> rule limiting op_return to 80 bytes have so far prevented
> similar abuses.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> Although attempting to stop inscription could lead to more
> serious
> >> issues, not taking action against these inscription could be
> interpreted by
> >> spammers as tacit acceptance of their practice. This could
> encourage more
> >> similar spam attacks in the future, as spammers might perceive
> that the
> >> Bitcoin network tolerates this kind of behavior.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >> I want to emphasize that my proposal does not involve
> implementing a
> >> soft fork in any way. On the contrary, what I am asking is
> simply to
> >> consider adding a standardization option. This option would
> allow the
> >> community to freely decide whether it should be activated or not.
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >>>> Le 26 juil. 2023 ? 07:30, vjudeu at gazeta.pl a ?crit :
> >> >
> >> >>>> and I would like to understand why this problem has not been
> >> addressed more seriously
> >> >
> >> >>> Because if nobody has any good solution, then status quo is
> >> preserved. If tomorrow ECDSA would be broken, the default state
> of the
> >> network would be "just do nothing", and every solution would be
> >> backward-compatible with that approach. Burn old coins, and
> people will
> >> call it "Tether", redistribute them, and people will call it
> "BSV". Leave
> >> everything untouched, and the network will split into N parts,
> and then you
> >> pick the strongest chain to decide, what should be done.
> >> >
> >> >>>> However, when it comes to inscriptions, there are no available
> >> options except for a patch produced by Luke Dashjr.
> >> >
> >> >>> Because the real solution should address some different
> problem, that
> >> was always there, and nobody knows, how to deal with it: the
> problem of
> >> forever-growing initial blockchain download time, and
> forever-growing UTXO
> >> set. Some changes with "assume UTXO" are trying to address just
> that, but
> >> this code is not yet completed.
> >> >
> >> >>>> So, I wonder why there are no options to reject
> inscriptions in the
> >> mempool of a node.
> >> >
> >> >>> Because it will lead you to never ending chase. You will
> block one
> >> inscriptions, and different ones will be created. Now, they are
> present
> >> even on chains, where there is no Taproot, or even Segwit. That
> means, if
> >> you try to kill them, then they will be replaced by N regular
> >> indistinguishable transactions, and then you will go back to
> those more
> >> serious problems under the hood: IBD time, and UTXO size.
> >> >
> >> >>>> Inscriptions are primarily used to sell NFTs or Tokens,
> concepts
> >> that the Bitcoin community has consistently rejected.
> >> >
> >> >>> The community also rejected things like sidechains, and
> they are
> >> still present, just in a more centralized form. There are some
> unstoppable
> >> concepts, for example soft-forks. You cannot stop a soft-fork. What
> >> inscription creators did, is just non-enforced soft-fork. They
> believe
> >> their rules are followed to the letter, but this is not the
> case, as you
> >> can create a valid Bitcoin transaction, that will be some
> invalid Ordinals
> >> transaction (because their additional rules are not enforced by
> miners and
> >> nodes).
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2023-06-09 13:02:48 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2021-06-30
📝 Original message:
Or just use BIPs instead of further fracturing...?
On Jun 30, 2021 10:10 AM, Ryan Gentry via Lightning-dev <lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
>
> The recent thread around zero-conf channels [1] provides an opportunity to discuss how the BOLT process handles features and best practices that arise in the wild vs. originating within the process itself. Zero-conf channels are one of many LN innovations on the app layer that have struggled to make their way into the spec. John Carvalho and Bitrefill launched Turbo channels in April 2019 [2], Breez posted their solution to the mailing list for feedback in August 2020 [3], and we know at least ACINQ and Muun (amongst others) have their own implementations. In an ideal world there would be a descriptive design document that the app layer implementers had collaborated on over the years that the spec group could then pick up and merge into the BOLTs now that the feature is deemed spec-worthy.
>
>
> Over the last couple of months, we have discussed the idea of adding a BIP-style process (bLIPs? SPARKs? [4]) on top of the BOLTs with various members of the community, and have received positive feedback from both app layer and protocol devs. This would not affect the existing BOLT process at all, but simply add a place for app layer best practices to be succinctly described and organized, especially those that require coordination. These features are being built outside of the BOLT process today anyways, so ideally a bLIP process would bring them into the fold instead of leaving them buried in old ML posts or not documented at all.
>
>
> Some potential bLIP ideas that people have mentioned include: each lnurl variant, on-the-fly channel opens, AMP, dynamic commitments, podcast payment metadata, p2p messaging formats, new pathfinding heuristics, remote node connection standards, etc.
>
>
> If the community is interested in moving forward, we've started a branch [5] describing such a process. It's based on BIP-0002, so not trying to reinvent any wheels. It would be great to have developers from various implementations and from the broader app layer ecosystem volunteer to be listed as editors (basically the same role as in the BIPs).
>
>
> Looking forward to hearing your thoughts!
>
>
> Best,
> Ryan
>
>
> [1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-June/003074.html
>
> [2] https://www.coindesk.com/bitrefills-thor-turbo-lets-you-get-started-with-bitcoins-lightning-faster
>
> [3] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-August/002780.html
>
> [4] bLIP = Bitcoin Lightning Improvement Proposal and SPARK = Standardization of Protocols at the Request of the Kommunity (h/t fiatjaf)
>
> [5] https://github.com/ryanthegentry/lightning-rfc/blob/blip-0001/blips/blip-0001.mediawiki

2023-06-09 13:00:06 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2020-05-05
📝 Original message:
On Tuesday 05 May 2020 10:17:37 Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Trust-minimization of Bitcoin security model has always relied first and
> above on running a full-node. This current paradigm may be shifted by LN
> where fast, affordable, confidential, censorship-resistant payment services
> may attract a lot of adoption without users running a full-node.
No, it cannot be shifted. This would compromise Bitcoin itself, which for
security depends on the assumption that a supermajority of the economy is
verifying their incoming transactions using their own full node.
The past few years has seen severe regressions in this area, to the point
where Bitcoin's future seems quite bleak. Without serious improvements to the
full node ratio, Bitcoin is likely to fail.
Therefore, all efforts to improve the "full node-less" experience are harmful,
and should be actively avoided. BIP 157 improves privacy of fn-less usage,
while providing no real benefits to full node users (compared to more
efficient protocols like Stratum/Electrum).
For this reason, myself and a few others oppose merging support for BIP 157 in
Core.
> Assuming a user adoption path where a full-node is required to benefit for
> LN may deprive a lot of users, especially those who are already denied a
> real financial infrastructure access.
If Bitcoin can't do it, then Bitcoin can't do it.
Bitcoin can't solve *any* problem if it becomes insecure itself.
Luke
P.S. See also
https://medium.com/@nicolasdorier/why-i-dont-celebrate-neutrino-206bafa5fda0
https://medium.com/@nicolasdorier/neutrino-is-dangerous-for-my-self-sovereignty-18fac5bcdc25

2023-06-09 12:51:10 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2018-07-22
📝 Original message:
Lightning is covered by BIPs already. There's no need for a separate
repository, and the existing BOLTs should be submitted to the BIPs repository
too.
On Sunday 22 July 2018 13:45:21 René Pickhardt via Lightning-dev wrote:
> Hey everyone,
>
> in the grand tradition of BIPs I propose that we also start to have our own
> LIPs (Lightning Network Improvement proposals)
>
> I think they should be placed on the github.com/lightning account in a repo
> called lips (or within the lightning rfc repo) until that will happen I
> created a draft for LIP-0001 (which is describing the process and is 95%
> influenced by BIP-0002) in my github repo:
>
> https://github.com/renepickhardt/lips (There are some open Todos and
> Questions in this LIP)
>
> The background for this Idea: I just came home from the bitcoin munich
> meetup where I held a talk examining BOLT. As I was asked to also talk
> about the future plans of the developers for BOLT 1.1 I realized while
> preparing the talk that many ideas are distributed within the community but
> it seems we don't have a central place where we collect future enhancements
> for BOLT1.1. Having this in mind I think also for the meeting in Australia
> it would be nice if already a list of LIPs would be in place so that the
> discussion can be more focused.
> potential LIPs could include:
> * Watchtowers
> * Autopilot
> * AMP
> * Splicing
> * Routing Protcols
> * Broadcasting past Routing statistics
> * eltoo
> * ...
>
> As said before I would volunteer to work on a LIP for Splicing (actually I
> already started)
>
> best Rene

2023-06-09 12:40:22 UTC

- reply

2023-06-07 23:07:59 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-04-22
📝 Original message:There's no reason for before/after/in place. We have version bits specifically
so we can have multiple deployments in parallel.
But none of this ST nonsense, please. That alone is a reason to oppose it.
Luke
On Friday 22 April 2022 11:11:41 darosior via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I would like to know people's sentiment about doing (a very slightly
> tweaked version of) BIP118 in place of (or before doing) BIP119.
>
> SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT and its precedent iterations have been discussed for
> over 6 years. It presents proven and implemented usecases, that are
> demanded and (please someone correct me if i'm wrong) more widely accepted
> than CTV's.
>
> SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT, if its "ANYONECANPAY" behaviour is made
> optional [0], can emulate CTV just fine. Sure then you can't have bare or
> Segwit v0 CTV, and it's a bit more expensive to use. But we can consider
> CTV an optimization of APO-AS covenants.
>
> CTV advocates have been presenting vaults as the flagship usecase. Although
> as someone who've been trying to implement practical vaults for the past 2
> years i doubt CTV is necessary nor sufficient for this (but still useful!),
> using APO-AS covers it. And it's not a couple dozen more virtual bytes that
> are going to matter for a potential vault user.
>
> If after some time all of us who are currently dubious about CTV's stated
> usecases are proven wrong by onchain usage of a less efficient construction
> to achieve the same goal, we could roll-out CTV as an optimization. In the
> meantime others will have been able to deploy new applications leveraging
> ANYPREVOUT (Eltoo, blind statechains, etc..[1]).
>
>
> Given the interest in, and demand for, both simple covenants and better
> offchain protocols it seems to me that BIP118 is a soft fork candidate that
> could benefit more (if not most of) Bitcoin users. Actually i'd also be
> interested in knowing if people would oppose the APO-AS part of BIP118,
> since it enables CTV's features, for the same reason they'd oppose BIP119.
>
>
> [0] That is, to not commit to the other inputs of the transaction (via
> `sha_sequences` and maybe also `sha_amounts`). Cf
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0118.mediawiki#signature-me
>ssage.
>
> [1] https://anyprevout.xyz/ "Use Cases" section
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

2023-06-07 18:30:54 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2021-03-16
📝 Original message:(To reiterate: I do not intend any of this as a NACK of Taproot.)
On Monday 15 March 2021 22:05:45 Matt Corallo wrote:
> > First, so long as we have hash-based addresses as a best practice, we can
> > continue to shrink the percentage of bitcoins affected through social
> > efforts discouraging address use. If the standard loses the hash, the
> > situation cannot be improved, and will indeed only get worse.
>
> I truly wish this were the case, but we've been beating that drum for at
> least nine years and still haven't solved it.
I think we've made progress over those 9 years, don't you?
> > Second, when/if quantum does compromise these coins, so long as they are
> > neglected or abandoned/lost coins (inherent in the current model), it can
> > be seen as equivalent to Bitcoin mining. At the end of the day, 37% of
> > supply minable by QCs is really no different than 37% minable by ASICs.
> > (We've seen far higher %s available for mining obviously.)
>
> Except its not? One entity would be able to steal that entire block of
> supply rather quickly (presumably over the course of a few days, at
> maximum), instead of a slow process with significant upfront real-world
> cost in the form of electricity.
My understanding is that at least initial successes would likely be very slow.
Hopefully we would have a permanent solution before it got too out of hand.
On Monday 15 March 2021 23:01:47 Karl-Johan Alm via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> The important distinction here is that, with hashes, an attacker has
> to race against the spending transaction confirming, whereas with
> naked pubkeys, the attacker doesn't have to wait for a spend to occur,
> drastically increasing the available time to attack.
More importantly, once an attack is recognised, with hashes, people can simply
stop sending transactions and await a fix, to protect their stash. Without
hashes, there is no defense at all (other than sending bitcoins to a
non-taproot address and hoping they evade the attack in time).
On Monday 15 March 2021 23:12:18 Andrew Poelstra wrote:
> "No gain" except to save significant CPU time and bandwidth?
The CPU time is localised to involved nodes, and (correct me if I'm wrong)
trivial in comparison to what is required to run a full node in the first
place. I'm not sure how it looks with bandwidth.
> Having exposed keys also lets you do ring signatures over outputs, creating
> the ability to do private proof of funds via Provisions.
But you can also do comparable proofs behind a hash with Bulletproofs, right?
> > Despite this, I still don't think it's a reason to NACK Taproot: it
> > should be fairly trivial to add a hash on top in an additional softfork
> > and fix this.
>
> This would make Bitcoin strictly worse.
How so? People could just not use it if they don't care, right?
The alternative (if people care enough) is that those concerned about quantum
risk would be forced to forego the benefits of Taproot and stick to p2pkh or
such, which seems like an artificial punishment.
> > In addition to the points made by Mark, I also want to add two more, in
> > response to Pieter's "you can't claim much security if 37% of the supply
> > is at risk" argument. This argument is based in part on the fact that
> > many people reuse Bitcoin invoice addresses.
>
> 37% is a dramatic understatement. Every address which is derived using
> BIP32 should be assumed compromised to a QC attacker because xpubs are not
> treated like secret key material and are trivial to e.g. extract from
> hardware wallets or PSBTs. I expect the real number is close to 100%.
xpubs should be treated like secret key material IMO.
A quantum attacker would need to compromise your PC to attack a hardware
wallet, right?
> In any case, Taproot keys, when used according to the recommendation in
> BIP-0341, are already hashes of their internal keys, so (a) Taproot outputs
> actually have better quantum resistance than legacy outputs; and (b) adding
> another hash would be strictly redundant.
It not only stops the attacker from obtaining the original key, but also
prevents creating a new private key that can spend the output?
On Tuesday 16 March 2021 02:38:55 ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> From this point-of-view, it seems to me that the amount of energy to mount
> a "fast" attack may eventually approach the energy required by mining, in
> which case someone who possesses the ability to mount such an attack may
> very well find it easier to just 51% the network (since that can be done
> today without having to pour R&D satoshis into developing practical quantum
> computers).
Mining adapts its difficulty to the block rate, so it will slow you down up to
4x each retarget. An attack on public keys would probably scale better. :)
Luke