i think the anti-BIP300 arguments get too convoluted (51% attacks, MEV?, creates miner centralisation).
keep it simple- the game theory of it fails. economically, miners are overwhelmingly incentivised to steal. i believe any meaningful amount of drivechain TVL will be stolen by miners voting for a WT^ transaction that splits the escrow by pool % hashpower- no offchain coordination required.
why turn bitcoin into a laughing stock?
doot
npub13a…k8m54
2023-08-31 02:22:34 UTC
Author Public Key
npub13azv2cf3kd3xdzcwqxlgcudjg7r9nzak37usnn7h374lkpvd6rcq4k8m54Published at
2023-08-31 02:22:34 UTCEvent JSON
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"pubkey": "8f44c56131b362668b0e01be8c71b24786598bb68fb909cfd78fabfb058dd0f0",
"created_at": 1693448554,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [],
"content": "i think the anti-BIP300 arguments get too convoluted (51% attacks, MEV?, creates miner centralisation).\n\nkeep it simple- the game theory of it fails. economically, miners are overwhelmingly incentivised to steal. i believe any meaningful amount of drivechain TVL will be stolen by miners voting for a WT^ transaction that splits the escrow by pool % hashpower- no offchain coordination required. \n\nwhy turn bitcoin into a laughing stock?",
"sig": "32d853c0118ddf8ec0e0eb4992cd1814ce4b52115b6370a7609600b87daeab3be2febbc308618ce5ea84e07dd6c330a775c419bd31803445a1663400e6b7b218"
}