m4d4m on Nostr: Still the same playbook; it will never end. ...
Still the same playbook; it will never end.
These smear campaigns conflate GrapheneOS with forks and modifications of it sold by shady companies. Those usually include a device management app to remotely manage the devices of their customers as if they're employees. These are largely not GrapheneOS devices or have preinstalled malware apps.
In Czechia, there is corruption case 'Dozimetr' - here the ex-minister is responsible for delivery of 'krypťáky', a secured phones for the group.
https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/o-dozimetru-bude-svedcit-exministr-nemec-skupine-kolem-redla-mel-shanet_2606111246_mst
Never cease to amaze me how tech-illiterate idiots on the broad spectrum of power hungry hierarchies, here specifically politicians, who constitute a subset of organized crime, fall for this scam of so-called "secured phones."
The inability to set up with of the shelf HW, the dependency on external chain of supply is weakness and being harvested by enemy for many decades.
Like good for us, knowing the members capabilities, and it shows some cracks within the ranks.
Just there is the GOS for years, verified by the 3 letter agencies as the secure option.
On top of that - bunch of messengers starting from most convenient normie lvl, the Signal.
That is basically all one need (for what the AiO devices exists basically) - rest is about group hygiene and trust within.
None can be anyhow covered for by encryption, auto-delete, not storing messages and alike.
If counterparty snitch, make prtscn, store messages elsewhere, you're fucked up anyway.
The latest famous additions are:
https://darknetdiaries.com/transcript/146/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Trojan_Shield
