This is also forgotten in favor of defending your team.
Bitcoin is not private, Lightning for a state-level attacker has the same problems as Tor, and many more.
Coinjoins do not improve Bitcoin’s fungibility unless everyone uses them, which is impossible.
Cashu is a joke of a protocol full of bugs and it is also custodial.
Let’s start from honesty, from accepting this.
And also ask yourself, if someone invents a method for Bitcoin to have Monero-level privacy without the risk of hidden inflation, do you think it would be implemented in Bitcoin?
My opinion is no.
So start from the premise that Bitcoin developers do not want privacy, since the government does not want privacy.
Even so, I still hope that someone has a brilliant idea that makes Bitcoin truly private, even if only optionally, because as of today it must also be clear that Bitcoin is the only currency that cannot be attacked by the state with a 51% attack.
quotingOne of the big problems of Bitcoin, especially with regard to privacy, is that if the problem is not acknowledged and addressed honestly, all that remains are half-truths and snake oil salesmen.
nevent1q…t335
For example, this statement by Kruw is completely false; it should be reformulated like this:
"Some Wasabi CoinJoins can produce estimated anonymity sets larger than Monero’s current ring size, but those metrics are not directly comparable; Monero offers protocol-level privacy by default for sender, receiver, and amount, while Wasabi depends on correct usage, liquidity, subsequent user behavior, and trust in the coordinator.”
