AFAIR LEA aren't a concern here. The classic example of a LEA attack vector is a badly designed HMAC in which the data to be authorised is appended *after* the secret key. Then you can add more data that is erroneously authorised. For a commitment to fixed length data this doesn't apply.
Haven't looked it up, but I *think * that's right.
waxwing /
npub1va…knuu7
2023-04-17 16:54:10
in reply to nevent1q…2kg2
Author Public Key
npub1vadcfln4ugt2h9ruwsuwu5vu5am4xaka7pw6m7axy79aqyhp6u5q9knuu7Published at
2023-04-17 16:54:10Event JSON
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"pubkey": "675b84fe75e216ab947c7438ee519ca7775376ddf05dadfba6278bd012e1d728",
"created_at": 1681750450,
"kind": 1,
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"content": "AFAIR LEA aren't a concern here. The classic example of a LEA attack vector is a badly designed HMAC in which the data to be authorised is appended *after* the secret key. Then you can add more data that is erroneously authorised. For a commitment to fixed length data this doesn't apply.\n\nHaven't looked it up, but I *think * that's right.",
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