Thanks. As a thought experiment is there a super low tech solution to make KYC irrelevant? I am thinking of something like a person buys a cold card; buys a bitcoin on coinbase; creates a 24 seed phrase “base” wallet. Then 100 wallets from that with passphrase and sends 1/100th of the bitcoin to each sub wallet. Each subwallet has had its public address used once to receive the 1/100 bitcoin. How would you make the 100 different passphrases such that 1) the person does not remember them 2) they are not physically written down anywhere near the person 3) the process that created the phrases the first time can be re created anytime and anyplace with not more than a public computer and a pay phone. Such that the person can say honestly they do not know / have access to the coins themselves at anytime, and yet they or their future heirs could. It need not be that all the phrases can be re created at the same time- in fact it would be better if the process actually required time.
A dumb example would be say the person creates 100 different nostr accounts; makes only one post with each account posting a single passphrase to a single subwallet. Then deletes the nostr public and private keys. Then creates 100 free throw away email accounts. With each email account they send a single email to their work account, home account, friend account etc. the email is set to be delivered in the future - in 1 month for account 1, 2 months for account 2, etc….
Email 1 has the npub of nostr1
Email 2 has the npub of nostr1&2
Email 3 has npubs 1,2,3… etc …
Then deletes all the emails.
So that all takes a day. Maybe destroy the computer used for all that after.
Practically then you have 24 seed words you need to keep but does no good on its own. Month after month you get a rando email leading you to nostr and to a a passphrase but only if you know what the email refers to. It’s vulnerable if the email fails but subsequent emails include previous links.
I’m sure there a much better way but on the surface this seems to make kyc less useful even to wrench attacks and creditors.
viper_1 / viper_1
npub1c2…ss4hq
2026-01-03 00:17:13 UTC
in reply to nevent1q…jcn5
Author Public Key
npub1c2apjrhrtpar4v7a9xm4plesudpn4577hhkn9nkdrddx68cvrnxqhss4hqSeen on
wss://nos.lolPublished at
2026-01-03 00:17:13 UTCEvent JSON
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"content": "Thanks. As a thought experiment is there a super low tech solution to make KYC irrelevant? I am thinking of something like a person buys a cold card; buys a bitcoin on coinbase; creates a 24 seed phrase “base” wallet. Then 100 wallets from that with passphrase and sends 1/100th of the bitcoin to each sub wallet. Each subwallet has had its public address used once to receive the 1/100 bitcoin. How would you make the 100 different passphrases such that 1) the person does not remember them 2) they are not physically written down anywhere near the person 3) the process that created the phrases the first time can be re created anytime and anyplace with not more than a public computer and a pay phone. Such that the person can say honestly they do not know / have access to the coins themselves at anytime, and yet they or their future heirs could. It need not be that all the phrases can be re created at the same time- in fact it would be better if the process actually required time. \nA dumb example would be say the person creates 100 different nostr accounts; makes only one post with each account posting a single passphrase to a single subwallet. Then deletes the nostr public and private keys. Then creates 100 free throw away email accounts. With each email account they send a single email to their work account, home account, friend account etc. the email is set to be delivered in the future - in 1 month for account 1, 2 months for account 2, etc…. \nEmail 1 has the npub of nostr1\nEmail 2 has the npub of nostr1\u00262\nEmail 3 has npubs 1,2,3… etc … \nThen deletes all the emails.\nSo that all takes a day. Maybe destroy the computer used for all that after.\nPractically then you have 24 seed words you need to keep but does no good on its own. Month after month you get a rando email leading you to nostr and to a a passphrase but only if you know what the email refers to. It’s vulnerable if the email fails but subsequent emails include previous links.\n\nI’m sure there a much better way but on the surface this seems to make kyc less useful even to wrench attacks and creditors.",
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