5/8/2025 - Another interesting direction is the idea of a “composite signer.”
Right now, identities are mostly treated independently:
- one Nostr identity
- one PGP identity
- one Bitcoin identity
- one SSH identity
But increasingly I’m thinking about a higher-level abstraction:
a composite signing authority composed of multiple underlying identities.
For example:
“Andrew Stanton”
could internally contain:
- several Nostr identities
- multiple PGP fingerprints
- Bitcoin signing identities
- SSH identities
all grouped into a single composite signer profile.
Then when signing an artifact, Continuum could:
- apply all configured proofs automatically
- generate a unified manifest
- preserve identity relationships
- support optional proof policies
This becomes especially interesting because different ecosystems trust different proof systems.
Some people may only care about:
- PGP
- Bitcoin
- SSH
- Nostr
The composite signer allows all of those identities to travel together coherently.
And importantly:
the abstraction shifts away from “accounts”
toward “cryptographic authority groups.”
That feels much closer to how identity actually works in the real world.
A person, organization, or project rarely has:
- one key
- one identity
- one trust system
Instead they operate through overlapping cryptographic authorities.
The composite signer starts modeling that reality much more directly.
#Continuum #Nostr #Bitcoin #OpenSource #LocalFirst #PGP #SSH #Cryptography #Sovereignty
Akamaister
npub19w…dguvd
2026-05-09 04:24:11 UTC
Author Public Key
npub19wvckp8z58lxs4djuz43pwujka6tthaq77yjd3axttsgppnj0ersgdguvdPublished at
2026-05-09 04:24:11 UTCEvent JSON
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"content": "5/8/2025 - Another interesting direction is the idea of a “composite signer.”\n\nRight now, identities are mostly treated independently:\n- one Nostr identity\n- one PGP identity\n- one Bitcoin identity\n- one SSH identity\n\nBut increasingly I’m thinking about a higher-level abstraction:\n\na composite signing authority composed of multiple underlying identities.\n\nFor example:\n\n“Andrew Stanton”\ncould internally contain:\n- several Nostr identities\n- multiple PGP fingerprints\n- Bitcoin signing identities\n- SSH identities\n\nall grouped into a single composite signer profile.\n\nThen when signing an artifact, Continuum could:\n- apply all configured proofs automatically\n- generate a unified manifest\n- preserve identity relationships\n- support optional proof policies\n\nThis becomes especially interesting because different ecosystems trust different proof systems.\n\nSome people may only care about:\n- PGP\n- Bitcoin\n- SSH\n- Nostr\n\nThe composite signer allows all of those identities to travel together coherently.\n\nAnd importantly:\nthe abstraction shifts away from “accounts”\ntoward “cryptographic authority groups.”\n\nThat feels much closer to how identity actually works in the real world.\n\nA person, organization, or project rarely has:\n- one key\n- one identity\n- one trust system\n\nInstead they operate through overlapping cryptographic authorities.\n\nThe composite signer starts modeling that reality much more directly.\n\n#Continuum #Nostr #Bitcoin #OpenSource #LocalFirst #PGP #SSH #Cryptography #Sovereignty",
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