kravietz 🦇 on Nostr: Lengthy (as usual) analysis from the “Volya” channel about the latest series of ...

Lengthy (as usual) analysis from the “Volya” channel about the latest series of #Ukraine counterattacks on the southern and eastern front and how they match the general Ukraine’s defense strategy and don’t match Russian offensive strategy:

Since 8 February, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been doing something they haven’t done in over two years — driving the Russians out of their territory. In the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions, Ukrainian units, operating in small groups of motorised infantry, have driven the Russian Armed Forces out of 19-22 settlements during this time. However, what is happening cannot be called a counteroffensive or a ‘major offensive operation’ because so far it looks more like a well-thought-out and prepared series of local tactical strikes on the enemy’s most vulnerable points, the goal of which is not to regain villages and kilometres, but to create conditions for changing the situation on the entire southern front.

While the Ukrainian Armed Forces are advancing north and north-east (and probably already east) from Huliaipole and have created a vast grey zone stretching almost from Stepnogorsk to Kamenskoye on the banks of the Dnieper, the Russian command seems to have decided to ignore what is happening. Instead of trying to restore order in the Vostok Military District, two of whose four armies have enormous problems in organising their defences and troops, the Vostok command is throwing most of its reserves into assaults in Huliaipole itself, because it needs to report its successes to the top. The fact that the Russians officially ‘took’ Huliaipole back in December 2025 does not bother anyone in the Russian Armed Forces or the Eastern Military District. Neither of them are new to taking for the second to fifth time what they have already ‘liberated’ before.

Attempts to solve the problem in Huliaipole at any cost, trying to patch up the expanding gap from Ternovato to Aleksandrograd, could lead the Russians to a serious crisis not only in one local area, but across the entire southern front.

There is nothing and no one to reinforce the Southern Front of the Russian Armed Forces and the combined group, because simultaneously with the events there, the Russian offensive is intensifying in the Limansky, Slavyansk-Kramatorsk and Dobropolsky (formerly Pokrovsky) directions.

The generals do not yet have any major successes to report to Putin and the people who support him. Moreover, the deadlines for achieving many of the objectives were missed a month or a month and a half ago. This is pushing the OGV command to make fierce demands on the commanders of the South and Centre groups to do everything possible to deliver results.

By results, they mean establishing control over Chasov Yar (also officially ‘liberated’ on 31 July 2025), Liman, Dobropillya, and direct access to Konstantinovka and Slavyansk.

To achieve this, to the surprise of the Ukrainian military defending Chasov Yar, the Russians attacked the city with tanks for several days at the end of February. Not dozens — between 5 and 16 vehicles were involved — but tanks in such numbers had not been used in an offensive in the city for a long time. The result is clear: most of the tanks have already burned out and cooled down in the ruins of the city.

Near Liman, Konstantinovka and Dobropillya, the tasks are being carried out by infantry, which is generously sent on infiltration, assault and consolidation missions. The results are, shall we say, limited, and the losses are high, partly due to the huge mortality rate among the wounded. The Russians are not thinking about evacuation under the tight deadlines.

Russian losses in January-February equalled, and according to some reports, exceeded the number of recruits. Given that the problems of the Russian Armed Forces in the south will only grow, and in other areas there is no sign of a reduction in losses, the command will have to solve the problem of a multiple increase in recruitment as early as March. If this is not done, by the end of March the problem will begin to resemble a serious crisis.

Options for solving the problem of recruitment in the Russian Armed Forces and what this may affect will be discussed in the morning posts.

Original: https://t.me/volyamedia/1933 (in Russian)