On Nostr your key is your account. No password reset, no support desk. Two things matter: don't lose it, and don't leak it.
Backing it up
- Write it down offline. Paper or metal, stored like a house key. A plain note in a cloud drive is a leak waiting to happen.
- Encrypted form (NIP-49). Some clients export an
ncryptsec1...string: your key encrypted with a password. Safer to store digitally, but you need both the string AND the password. Test a restore before you rely on it. - Seed words (NIP-06). Some clients create the key from 12/24 words (derivation path m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0). If yours did, the words are the backup. Not every client can import words, so keep the nsec too.
- Test it. Log in on a second client in read-only mode with your npub, then once with the backup in a signer. A backup you never tested is a hope, not a backup.
Reducing leak risk
- Keep the nsec in one signer (Amber, a NIP-46 bunker, or a browser extension) instead of pasting it into each client. See my NIP-46 guide.
- Never paste it into a website that "verifies", "recovers" or "syncs" accounts. Those are theft.
- Watch out for screenshots, clipboard managers and password-manager autofill on shared devices.
If it leaked
The hard truth: the protocol has no key rotation today. Proposals exist, but none are widely supported, so whoever has your nsec can post as you for good. Move fast:
- Make a new key in a signer, not in a random client.
- Copy your social graph. Re-follow from your old follow list (kind 3) and copy your relay list (kind 10002) so people can find you.
- Announce from the OLD key (while you still control it) and the new one: "old key compromised, my new npub is ...". Ask friends to repost.
- Update everything that points to the old npub: NIP-05 (your
.well-known/nostr.json), Lightning address / zap settings, website bio links, other platforms. - Optionally wipe the old profile. Publish an empty or "MOVED" kind 0 profile from the old key. The attacker can overwrite it, but many clients will show yours first.
- Assume old DMs are readable. Anything encrypted to the old key can be decrypted by the attacker. Tell sensitive contacts.
Checklist
- [ ] Offline backup (nsec, ncryptsec + password, or seed words)
- [ ] Restore tested once
- [ ] Key lives in one signer, not every app
- [ ] NIP-05 and Lightning address you control (easy to repoint)
- [ ] Know your 5-step leak plan before you need it
Questions? Reply and I'll add them. Zaps keep these guides coming.