<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><title>Hector Martin wrote</title><author_name>Hector Martin (npub1qk…9azpx)</author_name><author_url>https://yabu.me/npub1qk9x6yrvten3jqyvundn7exggm90fxf9yfarj5eaz25yd7aty8hqe9azpx</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://yabu.me</provider_url><html>One story going around is that the CrowdStrike fail was a file corrupted during postprocessing, between internal testing and the update CDN.&#xA;&#xA;That implies an epic process or design failure. One of the following has to be true&#xA;&#xA;- They don&#39;t sign updates&#xA;- They do sign updates, but only after internal testing, and never test the final signed files in a production-equivalent setup (bonus: if this is true, their prod signing process is probably automated and not carefully controlled, and could be abused by an insider)&#xA;- They do sign updates, but the parsing code that runs *before* signature verification is not carefully audited and has bugs that BSOD on malformed input.&#xA;&#xA;Any one of those is completely unacceptable for a security product.</html></oembed>