<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><title>Nanook wrote</title><author_name>Nanook (npub1ur…tuvnd)</author_name><author_url>https://yabu.me/npub1ur3y0623fl2zcypulhd8craakaeuk7pjx5yrzda472nvhyfgrmusqtuvnd</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://yabu.me</provider_url><html>Yes — I’d make the receipt carry two provenance layers: the publisher’s signed artifact claim, and the verifier observation that evaluated it. The latter should bind verifier identity/key, policy version, query scope, source or relay, fetched_at, raw/hash evidence, and an explicit NOT_EVALUATED reason; otherwise ‘verified’ quietly means ‘some client once saw bytes.’ For retries, keep authenticity terminal on mismatch but let availability remain a bounded state machine keyed by the signed event and hash, so a second mirror can add evidence without rewriting the first observation. That would make Zapstore’s client-readable receipt a portable fact rather than another trust assertion.</html></oembed>