<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><title>Karl-Johan Alm [ARCHIVE] wrote</title><author_name>Karl-Johan Alm [ARCHIVE] (npub17c…qmtzy)</author_name><author_url>https://yabu.me/npub17cwk7hm623dm5npjzu8cvv994h43k2keanegs8w78xyvlez8hqqsqqmtzy</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://yabu.me</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2021-03-15&#xA;📝 Original message:On Tue, 16 Mar 2021 at 07:48, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev&#xA;&lt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Overall, the tradeoffs here seem ludicrous, given that any QC issues in Bitcoin need to be solved in another way, and&#xA;&gt; can&#39;t practically be solved by just relying on the existing hash indirection.&#xA;&#xA;The important distinction here is that, with hashes, an attacker has&#xA;to race against the spending transaction confirming, whereas with&#xA;naked pubkeys, the attacker doesn&#39;t have to wait for a spend to occur,&#xA;drastically increasing the available time to attack.&#xA;&#xA;It may initially take months to break a single key. In such a&#xA;scenario, anyone with a hashed pubkey would be completely safe* (even&#xA;at spend time), until that speeds up significantly, while Super Secure&#xA;Exchange X with an ultra-cold 38-of-38 multisig setup using Taproot&#xA;would have a timer ticking, since the attacker need only find a single&#xA;privkey like with any old P2PK output.&#xA;&#xA;(* assuming no address reuse)</html></oembed>