<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><title>Subhra Mazumdar [ARCHIVE] wrote</title><author_name>Subhra Mazumdar [ARCHIVE] (npub1sn…g9vl0)</author_name><author_url>https://yabu.me/npub1snw7t4auupm70ntyeywuzqn80cf6es53ym8rlzymh8ft97qmyq9qrg9vl0</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://yabu.me</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2020-03-06&#xA;📝 Original message:&#xA;Hi,&#xA;      I was reading the paper by Poon and Dryja on Bitcoin Lightning&#xA;Network and was going through the construction of HTLC. Suppose 2 parties A&#xA;and B have a channel with each party locking 0.5 BTC. Suppose A wants to&#xA;transfer 0.1 BTC to B contingent to the knowledge of R : H=h(R) produced&#xA;within a locktime of say t days. So the script output for A is -&#xA;1. 0.4 BTC to A&#xA;2. 0.5 BTC to B&#xA;3. 0.1 BTC locked in HTLC between A &amp; B.&#xA;Why we cannot set the terms as say 0.4 BTC to A, 0.2 BTC to B and 0.4 BTC&#xA;to HTLC, where HTLC output can follow either of the paths - If B produces R&#xA;within t days then it gets back 0.4 BTC else after t days A can broadcast&#xA;with 0.4 BTC going to the A? This prevents B from not responding (and&#xA;induce possibly griefing attack across a longer path by withholding the&#xA;solution) since it will lose out 0.3 BTC. What can be the problem if the&#xA;terms of HTLC itself tries to enforce a penalty on the counterparty?&#xA;&#xA;-- &#xA;Yours sincerely,&#xA;Subhra Mazumdar.&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20200306/6350cd37/attachment.html&gt;</html></oembed>