<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><title>brugeman wrote</title><author_name>brugeman (npub1xd…mntxy)</author_name><author_url>https://yabu.me/npub1xdtducdnjerex88gkg2qk2atsdlqsyxqaag4h05jmcpyspqt30wscmntxy</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://yabu.me</provider_url><html>I&#39;m not sure what is meant by cache hijacking. &#xA;&#xA;Re. session hijacking we might be talking about at least two things:&#xA;- vulnerability inside nsec.app such that someone gets access to your &#34;session&#34; in nsec.app&#xA;- vulnerability inside nostr app connected to nsec.app that exposes the app&#39;s session/connection info so that hackers can access keys on behalf of the app&#xA;&#xA;The first part doesn&#39;t have much surface with nsec.app - we only use server to store encrypted keys and to subscribe to notifications for the signer to wake up. There&#39;s basically no &#34;session&#34;. And any server-side auth is based on nip-98 which requires a new token signed by your nostr keys for every request, so again there&#39;s no &#34;session&#34; - you can only sign those tokens if you steal the main key. &#xA;&#xA;The second part doesn&#39;t depend on the signer (online or offline) - no matter which signer you use, it&#39;s the app that&#39;s connected to the signer that needs to be hardened against session hijacking. That&#39;s why it&#39;s super-important to not give excessive permissions to any (even trusted) app in your signer, so that potential hackers&#39; access to keys was as limited as possible. Also when connection is established using bunker-url or nostrconnect url we use a one-time &#34;secret&#34; so make sure the connection can&#39;t be spoofed and url can&#39;t be reused.&#xA;&#xA;I&#39;m not a security specialist, and I agree that a formal security audit would be beneficial. We&#39;ll get there eventually. </html></oembed>