<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><title>vinney...axkl wrote</title><author_name>vinney...axkl (npub19m…8axkl)</author_name><author_url>https://yabu.me/npub19ma2w9dmk3kat0nt0k5dwuqzvmg3va9ezwup0zkakhpwv0vcwvcsg8axkl</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://yabu.me</provider_url><html>&gt; So if a network is exit preserving then does that mean that someone can easily exit and then snitch on everyone else in the network in return for a large state reward?&#xA;&#xA;yes.&#xA;&#xA;&gt; Is there anything besides force that preserves a norm of &#34;don&#39;t snitch on us even if there is a large perverse incentive to do so?&#34;&#xA;&#xA;no. except for better incentives in the opposite direction. and high moral character and personal integrity. and bulletproof opsec.&#xA;&#xA;ultimately i believe a proper agora only works if it is composed of &#34;enlightened&#34; (using that term loosely to mean impeccable character) and perfectly pseudonymous actors.  &#xA;snitching drops enormously when: A. actors value integrity over snitching and cheap rewards &amp; B. nobody knows who to turn in, identification-wise.  &#xA;once bootstrapped by that process, it might get large enough that the reward for hewing to the norms is greater that any State can match. But by that point you&#39;re talking about a fully-established &#34;Ancapistan&#34;</html></oembed>