<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><title>Final wrote</title><author_name>Final (npub1hx…sg75y)</author_name><author_url>https://yabu.me/npub1hxx76n82ags8jrduk0p3gqrfyqyaxnrlnynu9p5rt2vmwjq6ts3q4sg75y</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://yabu.me</provider_url><html>Discussed this in a SimpleX chat yesterday, but worth thinking leaving thoughts here: &#xA;&#xA;A software project that has received a fancy, formal security / privacy audit document shouldn&#39;t be considered a gold standard of trust alone. It is a practice that should build a larger image of trust. There&#39;s a lot that goes into an application being trustworthy or not.&#xA;&#xA;A PDF file from a team / field expert saying a program is good can only go so far. Just because a project may not have a document like this, doesn&#39;t mean they are not held under heavy scrutiny or that they do not have trust. It isn&#39;t always possible, not may it be fitting to review certain software in such a manner. In fact audited projects may be less scrutinised.&#xA;&#xA;A project can be audited but miss out on having potential important security / privacy features. Would you rather use a wallet that was alike to Bitcoin Core that had such a PDF you could read, or would you use a wallet like Samourai (forks) or Wasabi that didn&#39;t, knowing it had privacy features?&#xA;&#xA;Audits need to be continuous to be most effective. Software that is rapidly updating, adding new features, or ends up changing the architecture significantly are not a good fit for one-time audits. The document would just be an advertising gimmick and nothing more, since it either covers code doesnt exist now, or doesn&#39;t cover code that exists now.&#xA;&#xA;Security reviews shouldn&#39;t be a one time. A far better merit is an application being targeted by security researchers frequently, and vulnerability disclosures are a good sign of scrutinised, improving software. &#xA;&#xA;For something like GrapheneOS or a Linux distribution, these things don&#39;t work due to the sheer size of the projects and different conditions of users. Security researchers should routinely attempt to uncover vulnerabilities and developers should be campaigned to shift left.&#xA;&#xA;These formal reviews do work better for single user facing software projects, or for online services to prove technical claims about their services. But it doesn&#39;t mean that it would always be the same since the latest being published though.&#xA;&#xA;</html></oembed>