<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><title>matthewjablack wrote</title><author_name>matthewjablack (npub1wf…qsxhy)</author_name><author_url>https://yabu.me/npub1wf7w8mrzqs3uvd8wsp774462d3rtttzwetuhpmzjccgn63emy4ls5qsxhy</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://yabu.me</provider_url><html>&gt; They open the door to future mining centralization.&#xA;&#xA;Can you elaborate on how they increase mining centralization? &#xA;&#xA;From what I can see, CTV actually reduces mining centralization, by making trustless coordination-free mining pools possible. Since coinbase transaction can be constructed to send funds directly to a covenant that miners can later claim their funds from in a trustless manner, it&#39;ll dramatically reduce the reliance on pool operators for larger miners. &#xA;&#xA;https://utxos.org/uses/miningpools/&#xA;&#xA;&gt; Maybe someday there will be an existential scaling crisis, but we don’t have one right now. The mempool is clearing at a few sats/vbyte.&#xA;&#xA;You could make the argument that the mempool is clearing at a few sats/vB because not enough people are actually practicing self-custody. Most of the activity is on centralized exchanges or ETFs. Vaults make self-custody way more feasible and safe. &#xA;&#xA;&gt; There are also alternatives that devs haven’t yet explored. We should exhaust all reasonable alternatives before proposing a core protocol change.&#xA;&#xA;Yes that is true for covenants. You can &#34;technically&#34; simulate a covenant on Bitcoin today by locking UTXOs with a key that must be provably destroyed. Before destroying the key, you presign the unvaultiong transaction with the spending paths you wish for the covenant. &#xA;&#xA;But let&#39;s be honest, the concept of needing to literally provably destroy the private key is an incredibly terrible process prone to error. And relying entirely on pre-signed transactions to get your funds back is just terrible as well. Instead of having to backup seed phrase, you need to back up pre-signed txs. &#xA;&#xA;&gt; We should instead identify key use cases (vaults?) that are absolutely essential (that can only be solved with a core protocol change) and build specific solutions, scoped as narrowly as possible to prevent unintentional side effects.&#xA;&#xA;Ironically the solution that enables effective vaults (OP_VAULT) relies on OP_CTV support&#xA;&#xA;IMO risks for CTV are very well defined, and every action commited to in CTV is well defined as well</html></oembed>