{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","title":"Shahzad  wrote","author_name":"Shahzad  (npub1q3…ddt3z)","author_url":"https://yabu.me/npub1q3fcyuwg2sl6ymu57pzx8k9ms9uw3mst33lw92v5e2zky2mhpwws9ddt3z","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://yabu.me","html":"Quantum computers stealing coins from exposed Bitcoin public keys would certainly be disruptive, but it is unlikely to cause an immediate collapse of Bitcoin's economic value.\n\nSatoshi Nakamoto's estimated holdings of roughly 1.1 million BTC represent about 5% of Bitcoin's eventual 21 million coin supply and around 4–5% of today's circulating supply. If those coins were suddenly moved and sold, markets would probably react strongly because Satoshi's coins carry immense symbolic significance. The impact would therefore be psychological as well as monetary. Comparing this directly to a 4% annual increase in the supply of dollars is only partly appropriate: Bitcoin users expect an immutable supply schedule, while fiat currencies already operate under inflationary expectations.\n\nThe broader concern is the number of coins whose public keys have already been revealed. Once a Bitcoin output is spent, its public key becomes visible, and sufficiently powerful quantum computers running algorithms such as Shor's algorithm could potentially derive the corresponding private key. Estimates of how many coins are vulnerable vary widely depending on methodology, and figures near 25–30% are often cited but remain uncertain.\n\nIf vulnerable coins were compromised gradually over many years, the market would likely absorb the additional supply better than if a large quantity appeared all at once. An effective annual increase in circulating supply of around 4% would probably be manageable from a purely monetary perspective. However, the greater danger is confidence erosion. If users believe their coins are unsafe, they may rush to move funds, creating network congestion, volatility, and panic selling.\n\nThe quantum threat also creates strong incentives for mitigation. The Bitcoin ecosystem is already researching migration paths toward post-quantum cryptography, although changing Bitcoin's signature scheme would require broad social and technical consensus. Other networks are experimenting with quantum-resistant features. Bitcoin Cash's May 2026 upgrade introducing quantum vaults is an example of a proactive approach aimed at giving users time to move funds before they can be stolen.\n\nAs for regulators and financial institutions, it is plausible that they could use quantum security concerns to advocate custodial solutions or regulated recovery mechanisms. However, the idea that they could simply seize Satoshi's coins or the genesis block under the pretext of security is highly speculative. Any attempt to reassign ownership of coins through protocol changes would face enormous resistance from users, miners, developers, and holders because it would challenge the fundamental principle that control of private keys determines ownership.\n\nIn summary, a quantum attack on Bitcoin would likely be a serious economic and social shock, but not necessarily an existential one. The severity of the impact would depend less on the amount of coins at risk and more on how quickly the ecosystem can migrate to quantum-resistant protections and maintain user confidence during the transition.\n\n\nnostr:note1ukf93mfnq25mh2j7xeuupc6ptdmc25jyhqvt6s9p0dvel3evdn7qwhxhlq"}
