{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","title":"Subhra Mazumdar [ARCHIVE] wrote","author_name":"Subhra Mazumdar [ARCHIVE] (npub1sn…g9vl0)","author_url":"https://yabu.me/npub1snw7t4auupm70ntyeywuzqn80cf6es53ym8rlzymh8ft97qmyq9qrg9vl0","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://yabu.me","html":"📅 Original date posted:2020-03-06\n📝 Original message:\nHi,\n      I was reading the paper by Poon and Dryja on Bitcoin Lightning\nNetwork and was going through the construction of HTLC. Suppose 2 parties A\nand B have a channel with each party locking 0.5 BTC. Suppose A wants to\ntransfer 0.1 BTC to B contingent to the knowledge of R : H=h(R) produced\nwithin a locktime of say t days. So the script output for A is -\n1. 0.4 BTC to A\n2. 0.5 BTC to B\n3. 0.1 BTC locked in HTLC between A \u0026 B.\nWhy we cannot set the terms as say 0.4 BTC to A, 0.2 BTC to B and 0.4 BTC\nto HTLC, where HTLC output can follow either of the paths - If B produces R\nwithin t days then it gets back 0.4 BTC else after t days A can broadcast\nwith 0.4 BTC going to the A? This prevents B from not responding (and\ninduce possibly griefing attack across a longer path by withholding the\nsolution) since it will lose out 0.3 BTC. What can be the problem if the\nterms of HTLC itself tries to enforce a penalty on the counterparty?\n\n-- \nYours sincerely,\nSubhra Mazumdar.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20200306/6350cd37/attachment.html\u003e"}