{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","title":"Antoine Riard [ARCHIVE] wrote","author_name":"Antoine Riard [ARCHIVE] (npub1vj…4x8dd)","author_url":"https://yabu.me/npub1vjzmc45k8dgujppapp2ue20h3l9apnsntgv4c0ukncvv549q64gsz4x8dd","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://yabu.me","html":"📅 Original date posted:2020-01-30\n📝 Original message:\n\u003e The funding transaction sig would actually fail verification if tip\ndiffers between funder and fundee\n\nYes that's the reason I wrote the initiator can just\nannounce its own and receiver use it to sign the funding tx,\neven if receiver tip is backward. Funding tx won't propagate\nfrom receiver mempool but that's fine if it does from the initiator\none.\n\nOr are you talking about the commitment tx (different issue and there is\nbroader privacy leaks there) ?\n\n\u003e Darosior ( i'll stick with my pseudo, first names definitely don't have\nenough entropy :-) )\n\nAhaha yeah this pseudo-random-name-generator is definitely not trustworthy\n:p\n\n\nLe jeu. 30 janv. 2020 à 13:19, darosior \u003cdarosior at protonmail.com\u003e a écrit :\n\n\u003e Sorry I wasn't clear enough in the `(cdecker)` paragraph.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e The funding transaction sig would actually fail verification if tip\n\u003e differs between funder and fundee.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Darosior ( i'll stick with my pseudo, first names definitely don't have\n\u003e enough entropy :-) )\n\u003e -------- Original Message --------\n\u003e On Jan 30, 2020, 19:09, Antoine Riard \u003c antoine.riard at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Hey Darosior,\n\u003e\n\u003e You don't need a strict synchronization between both peers,\n\u003e just let nLocktime picked up by initiator and announce it at\n\u003e same time than feerate or at `tx_complete`. Worst-case,\n\u003e a slow-block-processing receiver may not be able to get\n\u003e the transaction accepted by its local mempool, but IMO that's\n\u003e fine if at least the initiator is able to do so. We are requiring peers\n\u003e to be weakly in sync before operating channel anyway (`funding_locked`\n\u003e exchange).\n\u003e\n\u003e Funding_tx can already be drop from mempool for others\n\u003e reasons like mempool shrinks or expiry so broadcaster\n\u003e should always be ready to re-send it or bump feerate.\n\u003e\n\u003e Or are you describing another issue ?\n\u003e\n\u003e Le jeu. 30 janv. 2020 à 04:06, darosior \u003cdarosior at protonmail.com\u003e a\n\u003e écrit :\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Hi Antoine and all,\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e About nLockTime fun thing is Lisa, Cdecker and I had this conversation to\n\u003e\u003e integrate it to C-lightning just yesterday.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Unfortunately you need to add a \"My tip is xxxx\" to the openchannel msg,\n\u003e\u003e otherwise if you set nLockTime to tip. (cdecker)\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Moreover in case of reorg the funding tx (now non-final) would be dropped\n\u003e\u003e from mempool ? But you could set nLockTime to, say, tip - 6. (niftynei)\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Antoine\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e -------- Original Message --------\n\u003e\u003e On Jan 30, 2020, 01:21, Antoine Riard \u003c antoine.riard at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Hey thanks for this proposal!\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e 2 high-level questions:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e What about multi-party tx construction ? By multi-party, let's define\n\u003e\u003e Alice initiate a tx construction to Bob and then Bob announce a\n\u003e\u003e construction to Caroll and \"bridge\" all inputs/outputs\n\u003e\u003e additions/substractions\n\u003e\u003e in both directions. I think the current proposal hold, if you are a bit\n\u003e\u003e more\n\u003e\u003e tolerant and bridge peer don't send a tx_complete before receiving ones\n\u003e\u003e from all its peers.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e What about transactions format ? I think we should coordinate with\n\u003e\u003e Coinjoin\n\u003e\u003e people to converge to a common one to avoid leaking protocol usage when\n\u003e\u003e we can hinder under Taproot. Like setting the nLocktime or sorting inputs\n\u003e\u003e in some protocol-specific fashion. Ideally we should have a BIP for format\n\u003e\u003e but every layer 2 protocols its own set of messages concerning the\n\u003e\u003e construction.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e nLocktime is always set to 0x000000\n\u003e\u003e Maybe we can implement anti-fee sniping and mask among wallet core\n\u003e\u003e txn set:\n\u003e\u003e https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/aabec94541e23a67a9f30dc2c80dab3383a01737/src/wallet/wallet.cpp#L2519\n\u003e\u003e ?\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e In the case of a close, a failed collaborative close would result in an\n\u003e\u003e error and a uninlateral close\"\n\u003e\u003e Or can we do first a mutual closing tx, hold tx broadcast for a bit if\n\u003e\u003e \"opt_dual_fund\"\n\u003e\u003e is signaled to see if a tx_construction + add_funding_input for the\n\u003e\u003e channel is received\n\u003e\u003e soon ? At least that would be a dual opt-in to know than one party can\n\u003e\u003e submit a funding-outpoint\n\u003e\u003e as part of a composed tx ?\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Antoine\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Le lun. 27 janv. 2020 à 20:51, lisa neigut \u003cniftynei at gmail.com\u003e a écrit :\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Some of the feedback I received from the check-in for the dual-funding\n\u003e\u003e\u003e proposal this past Monday was along the lines that we look at simplifying\n\u003e\u003e\u003e for breaking it into smaller, more manageable chunks.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e The biggest piece of the dual-funding protocol update is definitely the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e move from a single peer constructing a transaction to two participants.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e We're also going to likely want to reuse this portion of the protocol\n\u003e\u003e\u003e for batched closings and splicing. To that extent, it seemed useful to\n\u003e\u003e\u003e highlight it in a separate email.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e This is a change from the existing proposal in the dual-funding PR #524\n\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003chttps://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/pull/524\u003e -- it\n\u003e\u003e\u003e allows for the removal of inputs and outputs.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e The set of messages are as follows.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Note that the 'initiation' of this protocol will be different depending\n\u003e\u003e\u003e on the case of the transaction (open, close or splice):\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. type:   440 `tx_add_input`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. data:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`32*byte`:`channel_identifier`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u64`:`sats`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`sha256`:`prevtx_txid`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u32`:`prevtx_vout`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u16`:`prevtx_scriptpubkey_len`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`prevtx_scriptpubkey_len*byte`:`prevtx_scriptpubkey`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u16`:`max_witness_len`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u16`:`scriptlen`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`scriptlen*byte`:`script`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`byte`:`signal_rbf`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. type: 442 `tx_add_output`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. data:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`32*byte`:`channel_identifier`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u64`:`sats`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u16`:`scriptlen`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`scriptlen*byte`:`script`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. type: 444 `tx_remove_input`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. data:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`32*byte`:`channel_identifier`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`sha256`:`prevtx_txid`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u32`:`prevtx_vout`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. type: 446 `tx_remove_output`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. data:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`32*byte`:`channel_identifier`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u64`:`sats`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u16`:`scriptlen`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`scriptlen*byte`:`script`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. type: 448 `tx_complete`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. data:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`32*byte`:`channel_identifier`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u16`:`num_inputs`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u16`:`num_outputs`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. type:  448 `tx_sigs`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. data:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`channel_id`:`channel_identifier`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u16`:`num_witnesses`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`num_witnesses*witness_stack`:`witness_stack`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. subtype: `witness_stack`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. data:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`sha256`:`prevtx_txid`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u32`:`prevtx_vout`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u16`:`num_input_witness`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`num_input_witness*witness_element`:`witness_element`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. subtype: `witness_element`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. data:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`u16`:`len`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     * [`len*byte`:`witness`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e ## General Notes\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Validity of inputs/outputs is not checked until both peers have sent\n\u003e\u003e\u003e consecutive `tx_complete`  messages.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Duplicate inputs or outputs is a protocol error.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Feerate is set by the initiator, or in the case of a closing\n\u003e\u003e\u003e transaction, negotiated before the transaction construction is initiated.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Every peer pays fees for the inputs + outputs they contribute, plus\n\u003e\u003e\u003e enough to cover the maximum estimate of their witnesses. Overpayment of\n\u003e\u003e\u003e fees is permissible.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Initiator is responsible for contributing the output/input in\n\u003e\u003e\u003e question, i.e. the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   funding output in the case of an opening, or the funding input in the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e case of a close.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   (This means that the opener will pay for the opening output). In the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e case of a splice,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   the initiator of the splice pays for the funding tx's inclusion as an\n\u003e\u003e\u003e input and the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   new 'funding tx' output.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Any contributor may signal that their input is RBF'able. The nSequence\n\u003e\u003e\u003e for this input should be set to 0xFEFF FFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF otherwise.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - The initiating peer is understood to be paying the fee for the shared\n\u003e\u003e\u003e transaction fields (nVersion [4], segwit marker + flag [2], input + output\n\u003e\u003e\u003e counts [2-18], witness count [1-9], nLocktime [4]; total [13-40bytes])\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Inputs MUST be segwit compatible (PW* or P2SH-PW*)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - All output scripts must be standard\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - nLocktime is always set to 0x00000000.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - The `num_inputs` and `num_outputs` in `tx_complete` is a count of that\n\u003e\u003e\u003e peer’s final input and output contributions, net any removals.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Either peer may add or remove inputs and outputs until both peers have\n\u003e\u003e\u003e successfully\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   exchanged a `tx_complete` message in succession.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Either peer may only add or remove their own input or output.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - In the case that a `tx_complete` agreement cannot be reached, either\n\u003e\u003e\u003e peer may\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   fail the channel or open protocol (whatever is reasonable for the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e particular case)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   - In the case of a splice, this would be a soft error (channel returns\n\u003e\u003e\u003e to normal operation until\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     otherwise failed or closed.)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   - In the case of an open, this would be a failure to open the channel.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   - In the case of a close, a failed collaborative close would result in\n\u003e\u003e\u003e an error and a unilateral close.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e ### Considering the Simple Open case (2 parties)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Both peers signal `opt_dual_fund`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Opener initiates a channel open with `open_channel2` message,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e indicating the feerate for the opening transaction\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Accepter signals acceptance of channel open as proposed, including\n\u003e\u003e\u003e proposed feerate, via `accept_channel2`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Opener sends `tx_add_output`, with the funding output for the sum of\n\u003e\u003e\u003e both peer’s funding_amount\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Opener sends `tx_add_input` for each input the wish to add to the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e funding transaction\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Opener sends `tx_add_output` for their change\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Opener sends `tx_complete`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Accepter sends `tx_add_input` for each input they wish to add to the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e funding transaction\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Accepter sends `tx_add_output` for their change.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Accepter sends `tx_complete`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Opener sends `tx_complete`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Opener and accepter exchange commitment signatures; etc.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e ### Considering the Splice case:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Both peers signal `opt_splice_ok`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - One peer initiates a splice, also signaling the feerate for the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e transaction. Exact protocol unspecified herein.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Initiator sends `tx_add_input` with the original funding output\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Initiator sends `tx_add_output` with the new, post-splice funding\n\u003e\u003e\u003e output\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Initiator sends `tx_add_input/output` as needed to add all desired\n\u003e\u003e\u003e inputs + outputs\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Initiator sends `tx_complete`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Peer sends `tx_add_input/output` as needed to add all desired inputs +\n\u003e\u003e\u003e outputs\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Initiator sends `tx_complete`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Peer sends `tx_complete`\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Initiator + peer exchange commitment signatures, etc.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e ### Considering the Close case:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Both peers signal `opt_collaborative_close` in their\n\u003e\u003e\u003e `node_announcement`.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - A peer initiates a close sending a `shutdown`, as per usual.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - A feerate is negotiated. Out of band for this particular portion of\n\u003e\u003e\u003e the protocol.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e -The closing initiator (peer which first sent `shutdown`), sends\n\u003e\u003e\u003e `tx_add_input` to spend the funding output and `tx_add_output` to add their\n\u003e\u003e\u003e output for the channel closure.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - The peer responds with `tx_add_output`, adding their output to the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e close transaction.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - If `option_upfront_shutdown_script` is flagged but no such output with\n\u003e\u003e\u003e a value at or within a reasonable feerate gap of the peer's funding output\n\u003e\u003e\u003e is present, then the peer must fail the channel.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e ## Updating a collaborative transaction with RBF:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - If any input is flagged as RBF’able, then the transaction is\n\u003e\u003e\u003e considered eligible for RBF\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - RBF can be initiated by either party, and serves as an initiation for\n\u003e\u003e\u003e another round of transaction composition, as outlined above.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Note that this section has been cribbed and re-purposed from the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e original RBF proposal for splicing, see\n\u003e\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2018-November/001621.html\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. type: 45 (`init_rbf`) (`option_collaborative_rbf`)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. data:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e    * [`32`:`channel_id`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e    * [`4`:`fee_step`]\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Each `fee_step` adds 1/4 (rounded down) to the initial\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e transaction feerate. eg. if the initial feerate was 512 satoshis per\n\u003e\u003e\u003e kiloweight, `fee_step` 1\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e is  512 + 512 / 4 = 640, `fee_step` 2 is 640 + 640 / 4 = 800.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e The sender:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   - MUST set `fee_step` greater than zero and greater than any prior\n\u003e\u003e\u003e `fee_step`.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e The recipient:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e   - if the new fee exceeds the sender's current balance minus reserve\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     after it is applied to the splice transaction:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e     - MUST error.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e NOTES:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. 1/4 is a reasonable minimal RBF, but as each one requires more\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e    tracking by the recipient, serves to limit the number you can create.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. Rule 4 of BIP125 requires a feerate increase to at least surpass the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e minimum transaction relay setting. Ratcheting by 25% should satisfy this\n\u003e\u003e\u003e requirement\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 3. An additional rule will be added to the checks of an RBF transaction\n\u003e\u003e\u003e that it must include at least one identical, replaceable input as the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e original transaction.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Lightning-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20200130/98cbf857/attachment-0001.html\u003e"}