{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","title":"vinney...axkl wrote","author_name":"vinney...axkl (npub19m…8axkl)","author_url":"https://yabu.me/npub19ma2w9dmk3kat0nt0k5dwuqzvmg3va9ezwup0zkakhpwv0vcwvcsg8axkl","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://yabu.me","html":"\u003e So if a network is exit preserving then does that mean that someone can easily exit and then snitch on everyone else in the network in return for a large state reward?\n\nyes.\n\n\u003e Is there anything besides force that preserves a norm of \"don't snitch on us even if there is a large perverse incentive to do so?\"\n\nno. except for better incentives in the opposite direction. and high moral character and personal integrity. and bulletproof opsec.\n\nultimately i believe a proper agora only works if it is composed of \"enlightened\" (using that term loosely to mean impeccable character) and perfectly pseudonymous actors.  \nsnitching drops enormously when: A. actors value integrity over snitching and cheap rewards \u0026 B. nobody knows who to turn in, identification-wise.  \nonce bootstrapped by that process, it might get large enough that the reward for hewing to the norms is greater that any State can match. But by that point you're talking about a fully-established \"Ancapistan\""}