{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","title":"ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] wrote","author_name":"ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] (npub1g5…3ms3l)","author_url":"https://yabu.me/npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3l","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://yabu.me","html":"📅 Original date posted:2020-04-02\n📝 Original message:\nGood morning Nadav,\n\n\u003e I could be missing something, but it seems to me like the proposal to close channels after a soft timeout unless non-cooperation can be proven upstream adds a cost to the attacker of two on-chain transactions, which they can immediately revoke (as they know both pieces to the revocation priv key), but still allows very long lock-ups of other's funds (with a 10x multiplier if they choose a long route). I do think that this is certainly an improvement on what we have now but I'm not sure it properly punishes the attacker in its current form.\n\nAh, right, E knows the revocation for the unilateral close of EE, because it is a self-channel, sigh.\nAnd by this revocation clause it can claim the money immediately and put it into a channel as well.\n\nRegards,\nZmnSCPxj"}