{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","title":"lisa neigut [ARCHIVE] wrote","author_name":"lisa neigut [ARCHIVE] (npub1sp…s64t2)","author_url":"https://yabu.me/npub1sprhp66c693av0c0n9had046hcdcckp2th25fnmphwstc5e4wg9qxs64t2","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://yabu.me","html":"📅 Original date posted:2021-10-25\n📝 Original message:Hi all,\n\nIn a recent conversation with @glozow, I had the realization that the\nmempool is obsolete and should be eliminated.\n\nInstead, users should submit their transactions directly to mining pools,\npreferably over an anonymous communication network such as tor. This can\neasily be achieved by mining pools running a tor onion node for this\nexpress purpose (or via a lightning network extension etc)\n\nMempools make sense in a world where mining is done by a large number of\nparticipating nodes, eg where the block template is constructed by a\nmajority of the participants on the network. In this case, it is necessary\nto socialize pending transaction data to all participants, as you don’t\nknow which participant will be constructing the winning block template.\n\nIn reality however, mempool relay is unnecessary where the majority of\nhashpower and thus block template creation is concentrated in a\nsemi-restricted set.\n\nRemoving the mempool would greatly reduce the bandwidth requirement for\nrunning a node, keep intentionality of transactions private until\nconfirmed/irrevocable, and naturally resolve all current issues inherent in\npackage relay and rbf rules. It also resolves the recent minimum relay\nquestions, as relay is no longer a concern for unmined transactions.\n\nProvided the number of block template producing actors remains beneath, say\n1000, it’d be quite feasible to publish a list of tor endpoints that nodes\ncan independently  + directly submit their transactions to. In fact, merely\nallowing users to select their own list of endpoints to use alternatively\nto the mempool would be a low effort starting point for the eventual\nreplacement.\n\nOn the other hand, removing the mempool would greatly complicate solo\nmining and would also make BetterHash proposals, which move the block\ntemplate construction away from a centralized mining pool back to the\nindividual miner, much more difficult. It also makes explicit the target\nfor DoS attacks.\n\nA direct communication channel between block template construction venues\nand transaction proposers also provides a venue for direct feedback wrt\nacceptable feerates at the time, which both makes transaction confirmation\ntimelines less variable as well as provides block producers a mechanism for\n(independently) enforcing their own minimum security budget. In other\nwords, expressing a minimum acceptable feerate for continued operation.\n\nInitial feerate estimation would need to be based on published blocks, not\npending transactions (as this information would no longer be available), or\nfrom direct interactions with block producers.\n\n\n~niftynei\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20211025/a5c7aebf/attachment.html\u003e"}