{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","title":"t4es5ter5 wrote","author_name":"t4es5ter5 (npub1rx…ana9d)","author_url":"https://yabu.me/npub1rxdgaa26crjvsrxsxn90lcmsyujz2k37f5d2a5fty3w9z4hzxznqvana9d","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://yabu.me","html":"I have decide to stop with my lightning node.\nToo risky.\n\nAlso got another force close of WalletOfSatoshi\n\nhttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-October/022032.html\nhttps://stacker.news/items/288995\n\nI think this new class of replacement cycling attacks puts lightning in a\nvery perilous position, where only a sustainable fix can happen at the\nbase-layer, e.g adding a memory-intensive history of all-seen transactions\nor some consensus upgrade. Deployed mitigations are worth something in face\nof simple attacks, though I don't think they're stopping advanced attackers\nas said in the first full disclosure mail.\n\nThose types of changes are the ones necessitating the utmost transparency\nand buy-in of the community as a whole, as we're altering the full-nodes\nprocessing requirements or the security architecture of the decentralized\nbitcoin ecosystem in its integrality.\n\nOn the other hand fully explaining why such changes would be warranted for\nthe sake of lightning and for designing them well, we might need to lay out\nin complete state practical and critical attacks on a ~5 355 public BTC\necosystem.\n\nHard dilemma.\n\nThere might be a lesson in terms of bitcoin protocol deployment, we might\nhave to get them right at first try. Little second chance to fix them in\nflight.\n\nI'll be silent on those issues on public mailing lists until the week of\nthe 30 oct. Enough material has been published and other experts are\navailable. Then I'll be back focusing more on bitcoin core.\n\nBest,\nAntoine"}