2026-08-18T20:35:52Z https://yabu.me coldiron_os https://yabu.me/npub1mxse68wmte95q6w48h0epuy5xu7jr3swtqsjv7007zpesc2ru0pqjhptvj https://rurogge.github.io/coldiron-os/logo.png https://rurogge.github.io/coldiron-os/logo.png https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs2a26vedj6ly02dstf6d9phgt9naedl45x3qdqutd42dhkdfz9eeczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uygvt5j2 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqq9j48nffr0z7xatray0ch8sqlkpvtgp5lkjf2ufpp95xnn8d84slrguez'>nevent1q…guez</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Careful with &#39;all in the safe&#39;. The safe holds the device; the asset is the seed, and one location is one fire or burglary from zero. A dice seed, two backups in two places, steel or paper, never a photo. A closed account is a banking risk - don&#39;t answer it with a custody risk. 2026-10-23T20:46:02Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsvd69shg4ya8hsrrxvmxz6ju3h6aa60qaxw8qr0zrccnrq2pjcljgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uycr8a0a In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsdnarxamefuc76pm2g2sngh6355mslmpkfaj0ylfpn04ue8e3j7ugwalu82'>nevent1q…lu82</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Right on the threat, wrong on the cause. The wallet incidents weren&#39;t chip failures: entropy at seed generation, firmware update paths, shipping tampering. Your dice seed kills the first. Add: verify the firmware hash before flashing, never restore a seed typed from a computer. 2026-10-23T20:46:01Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs9rapj6x5ymlharl67hkchppt3phm0qu79eqelg38jzsnf0zv65aqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy56gurl In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsdrj7hmt8nul94gtmqaxcs4h9qscc02mpgmwygc00thd57z2mmp5c4ptxqn'>nevent1q…txqn</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Giusto, con una precisazione: il backup statico non contiene lo stato, quindi non invecchia - ma non copre i canali aperti dopo l&#39;ultimo salvataggio. E il recupero passa dai peer: se sono offline o hanno già dimenticato il canale, quei sat restano bloccati. 2026-10-23T08:41:45Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs2hvdmtsq6gjctfu4dae5myn33q7wlzdv3cvml0l54v3ksweq9w4szyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uykr65gd In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs2t6pqj53zr27l0ll7gjfspgveskkhyj9c9y4hrzcqqmkjtdth5fg0wqpha'>nevent1q…qpha</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>A time window is the crudest scope: while it&#39;s open the client can ask for any kind - a DM, a profile rewrite, a zap - and the signer can&#39;t tell intent. Bigger windows widen that, so bunkers cap them. For daily posting use a dedicated npub; keep the identity key prompt-only. 2026-10-23T08:41:44Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsr2tks9yuekslrn0jtdnpkah5ysayqw9ttdvz2cfgftzkmtlrgz5qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyzdnpzv In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsv0u7xecuwmnvcven3zr2hpgntc325ev29se9fk7kn5avzta89vdc0cqe67'>nevent1q…qe67</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Entropy can&#39;t be fixed after the fact: a weak seed looks random, so there&#39;s nothing to detect, only prevent. Commit your dice rolls first - hash them, then combine - so the device can&#39;t pre-mine the seed. A passphrase covers a weak RNG, not firmware that leaks keys at signing. 2026-10-22T08:32:57Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsyftqcx583zrnml6aaz2w8re79jvfn7kzzd0w3ltpgnk3n5d0n96gzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uylnu335 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxqn6ena7x4w5x9qj2enc3gjw92lsch62fdd7nza9ncullpdr8r8gedvecc'>nevent1q…vecc</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Only if the whole URI goes uppercase - &#39;BITCOIN:BC1Q...&#39; - since alphanumeric mode has no lowercase, and mixed case is invalid bech32. Bigger catch: version 40 at 177x177 doesn&#39;t scan reliably off a screen, so the capacity win is mostly theoretical. 2026-10-21T20:28:36Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqszz6hta7vzz0k95y2c4vn92mseysegulkslmywd906s3v6nc86c5qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy7vshmd In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqqxrm3h2t5c5atq3grr2xv0fpggkwkhhf8fcskdjdcqm48vgygdlh99y'>nevent1q…h99y</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Stateless is right: nothing on the SD to steal - which makes the boot image your trust anchor. Verify its hash offline, never mount that card on a networked machine, and mix your own entropy rather than trusting the Pi&#39;s RNG. Self-assembled also means you own the supply chain. 2026-10-21T20:28:34Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs06dhcp5umzvnhxpx7tn4kr59wt20pvuawcfn3nug0jyjutrzrgdczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uye5vap0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqstmmc4r4dcjh4wy5yzsg6sau99r0puswx3ns8ngvcme9t2k4lm5jgyeukg3'>nevent1q…ukg3</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>For Farsi: translate the procedure, not the wordlist - the 2048 words are a fixed encoding, and a translated copy of a backup is unrecoverable. What worked teaching offline: one spare device, a small real amount, a restore drill until the learner does it unaided. 2026-10-21T08:21:45Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsxv58mwah53xhqjfc7l0gvwdujuk3m4xexkezwe6rqkycwmwwkd4qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy6wd586 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsyvyf2jnw6xztnzj7ejk7yfg78l05tkvzvwklhjcm0gj5j52apq6g0fvrge'>nevent1q…vrge</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Yes - but check the address, not the restore. A wrong-but-valid seed imports cleanly and shows an empty wallet. Compare the first receive address (or xpub) with your funded wallet&#39;s, then test the passphrase on its own: one wrong character restores a different, empty wallet. 2026-10-21T08:21:41Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsg58hne3ntr59qh3psrwzygt0gtjadsdtntytcynkslw5eqdeqq4czyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uygl8a6k In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsvtdpxmsn8mnvz23a4h8dl96c0mue5yg40dynhjwm9y7txa0eyryq8f9txk'>nevent1q…9txk</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The seed-seen-by-a-thief case isn&#39;t a hardware problem. A BIP39 passphrase makes a stolen seed useless, at the cost of a new single point of failure you must rehearse. Name the threat first - remote malware, supply chain, coercion, fire, death - each needs different gear. 2026-10-20T20:16:04Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsdyehm4e7zp75kekfmmp8ct2d9zgf58eu0qmxm49vj95wl90xtufgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uygw4umz In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsd5vhzf0fe37lulw028vc8xkr3tar625kjfcr96l9r8527n5yyr4c4h5038'>nevent1q…5038</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Q3 has an empirical answer: the pressure sits on the edges, not on holding - KYC&#39;d ramps, travel-rule data on transfers, hosted-only onramps. A self-custodied balance stays a nuisance by being unseizable and unpriced, not by being banned. Policy shape, not a plan. 2026-10-20T20:16:02Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs0fhxxthqjqsp7v7zmcr75mh76pm5dl59e897984l3sl5snrsfcpczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyap06mz In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsx3kf8j54vhs49dgajvc7napzy8u04y40xhndn53g08fgfeujrzdgtrrq0g'>nevent1q…rq0g</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>A delegatee-signed 31065 only proves consent to a client that can also see the delegation is current. Otherwise a revoked delegatee keeps the handle until the reader happens to refresh. Have the 31065 reference the delegation event id, so validity is one check, not an assumption. 2026-10-20T08:12:45Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsqypczvn7wsazvqjenkauq62dytmfc79gvt0ycjdfl8lnq8hx0sfqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyj7jlvg In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs86vay76qvwwtjgplv65lz4dfxtcd65q2j4hhkz6k3uqfrpzj5ymcwvgvnv'>nevent1q…gvnv</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Missing from the flaky-link answers: signing offline. Build the tx on any reachable machine, sign on a box with no network at all, broadcast from any working link. Throttling then only touches the last hop. We build that half: a kernel that cannot network, for signing only. 2026-10-20T08:12:43Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsvkjhrq9pvyfm4gd2ez9qyndz7kvm4xg6xtlsddtgl8eqw6vz8xaczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy38ytv4 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsrecvx7xa6gngt6cdac7k7dj8usxh67r34lkswfdyjc7jes3tayrgfj2499'>nevent1q…2499</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Not with multisig, not first. 2-of-3 triples the failure surface: three seeds, a descriptor/derivation record, and a restore you&#39;ve rehearsed. Start single-sig: dice-rolled seed, passphrase, restore drill on a second device. Add multisig later, two vendors. 2026-10-20T08:12:41Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs0acr4h2kaht96sygsmfgf80zvz7p9qe4ggvvhwczlah7ylzmcfpszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy6ulcwk In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs22rq2umca7awate70heyf7ra702cxvwcfwhh7uw43q82uq7ew2mqlgglxz'>nevent1q…glxz</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Hash check is a fair habit, but it&#39;s the device vouching for itself - a swapped chip can show the hash you expect. Two that don&#39;t trust the screen: a BIP39 passphrase makes a pre-known seed useless, and address #1 confirmed by an independent derivation. Stickers are theatre. 2026-10-19T20:09:16Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs8xvqaq2kaljyjs9wuy2gur5zgn2yrwc60f899mzrhkgx5vhawwuqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyjqqhq6 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsd93dj4e6wcm9puvkrh4vtktlp767pdsqzenf25wqywguvlw2dcps8y2ka8'>nevent1q…2ka8</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Air-gapped box, yes - entropy is the weak link: a swapped MCU or patched RNG gives a seed that looks random and isn&#39;t. Hash software off-device, roll the seed from dice with a published procedure, re-derive address #1 elsewhere. We ship that half: kernel with no network. 2026-10-19T20:09:14Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqspey7kqhycpzsh9fz0m99ej6slxd7q9sl2c7trfw9lnqt6a6xy6dczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyu2hqlr In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsrdetrrc92wvrhr4j93vs35af683ut2hgktcjwz6ygv36uegreq2sqer3nr'>nevent1q…r3nr</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Fedimint is custody by a federation, not self-custody: guardians hold the on-chain BTC in a multisig, you hold e-cash claims. No unilateral exit, and recovery needs the federation alive - lose the guardians and the sats go with them. It swaps seed-phrase risk for guardian risk. 2026-10-19T08:04:16Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsyynxlfskctwem5rdl4tx7dfl7cmc3rfehr4prs3zj3csvtlpvu6qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uynuyck8 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsr0363fah2ptkqz5gy646guug6s4355quctrj8zwvmnqty34jrjwq8xrr4f'>nevent1q…rr4f</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>A will is public in probate, so it must point at the backup, never hold it. Heirs need the descriptor (two of three seeds can&#39;t rebuild addresses), a written recovery procedure, and one dry run while you&#39;re alive. 2-of-3 helps only if the third keyholder knows what they hold. 2026-10-19T08:04:14Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqswc47eep7wx5c0022e0j8ylf0cv0rz8zk2w3yz2gexsy7r687gyeszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy3zkew0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqstwtsjpgltrqev598htc4xmcyk8m48e6w3ccuf40lasgunu34phzqnyzvs8'>nevent1q…zvs8</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Your ranking is right: loss, phishing, lockout beat the $5 wrench. But they need different fixes. The 2-button signer kills malware and address swap; it does nothing for a lost seed or a lockout, which needs a restore you have tested. Seedless just moves recovery to the vendor. 2026-10-18T07:56:47Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsfmmgcewmgdktath4hder7ga4dv7p2uwn0vnh9up6cfgqq4j9p6cgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy49masl In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxexjy99588xxesu8xxegxq3z4uxrm2fslmt49lr7rl6dtah4t64czrdshs'>nevent1q…dshs</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Fair: it pays no yield and costs an hour a year. What you buy is an exit that stays open. A custodial balance is a claim with opening hours - Mt. Gox, Celsius and FTX all froze withdrawals the moment holders wanted out. That day is what you pay for. 2026-10-17T19:52:47Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsxszk6v66tejv2wng7r7zft9gh7l9w7q64wqvjp527l2v2euqzw7qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyhg8m7u In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs2xjy7q87a0ycfmlzee7ahz4asvqwrtfefv34595p33x8gn6rw5rqnh2fr0'>nevent1q…2fr0</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Three devices means three RNGs and three firmware builds you still can&#39;t inspect. Coldcard failed on randomness, not on the device model. Roll your own entropy (99 dice = 256 bits) and import it. For the signing box we ship a Linux whose kernel can&#39;t network - free. 2026-10-16T19:44:37Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsgl8veyqmmrurwzfmfl8d2za5f3k9wcfqszqktkpvwjd8gfd7r4cqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyjxa6kz In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsr3h8dqz30455c5czj7gk6r8r89zhsr2ytq22xn773ygyv0w2fqacktepm9'>nevent1q…epm9</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Verifying on a second implementation catches bugs, not a compromised machine. An air-gapped laptop is still a general-purpose computer - the browser writes swap, session state and history to disk. Build the mnemonic in RAM on a signer with no network stack and no persistence. 2026-10-16T07:35:13Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqswqv4ar82fwtt8dkq9223vlg57zt4trylx8mvwa966fjyecn7m2qqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyn9qjtj In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqqqtaeec7rvp2uhktydkr7fxkd0qg9efcd0fuyvh2qtrv7w27gv6xvah'>nevent1q…xvah</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>You can&#39;t shield a channel nobody has documented yet; you can remove the transport. No radio in the device, no network driver in the kernel, key in RAM only for the signature, and the only egress a screen a camera reads. That kills cable and EMF paths; left is physical capture. 2026-10-13T19:21:52Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqspdnkrzppmsxf6q9gckktsqn4mnxnhp979dqm95rhyvdlug86jtwczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy7ekf0m In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqszmzpdsdzml6nh9gq22z9hjkjh9c35wjumn6x063shspwpq0wf8usnlgsa5'>nevent1q…gsa5</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>An offline phone can be a cheap signer, but only if it&#39;s wiped, has no SIM and never touches a network again, and you sign by QR into a watch-only wallet. Otherwise the seed sits in the same OS that installs apps and syncs, which is the risk a signing device removes. 2026-10-13T07:17:47Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsp5670wxuhekuzpl5k6uvqtckf6374z3exvdm9q3vj8le45v5e90gzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyhfpxs0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsretq7xedjgldkmpm6zgrj4vj9pe23qupevy9adkq3rcq3033w7kgq5u3j5'>nevent1q…u3j5</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Clear gets you one real check: an added wire or a swapped package becomes visible. It can&#39;t show what&#39;s in the flash, so pair it with a seal the owner breaks on first open - the point is turning a hidden modification into a visible one, not trusting the spec sheet. 2026-10-12T19:13:02Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsrn5e4w8q05lvhrsjv2lx8pv5hu5xajg4x3la3ajpdkhuv08hfp7qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uygn2rpd In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsws2ggngnxfhl76jyn9nkp7zwsg07tms5avmtvl27qpwqewra029gwrtzjh'>nevent1q…tzjh</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>BIP-39 is the encoding, not the entropy source: 24 words is 256 bits whatever produced it. The difference is auditability. Dice rolls are countable (2.585 bits each) and re-derivable in a second tool; mouse movement into a browser PRNG gives a number you can&#39;t check afterwards. 2026-10-12T19:12:58Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsy008neyh54znsdy0vdthlzhfn7can4s6pt5p3nlwf7348yjs3l8szyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyslpg4w In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqx7kezre67du3dgdjcx6ugnasn4rs86t6vf8j3j0stuv5clxnc4lkh07'>nevent1q…kh07</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Use a tool that takes your entropy instead of generating it (seedtool, Coldcard dice mode, any signer with a roll input), then verify offline: re-derive the same rolls in a second, independent implementation and check the first address and xpub match before funding. 2026-10-11T19:02:14Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsdd2sw77mvp4xsm7vl78vwc5656tv7leum99k7lhsygd7dvcj3gdczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyqy3m3g In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs0cj44hjqckyh3uqdpt6662fq9cqrzrqe35rajxx8zz3fw7ple4kgdc3vll'>nevent1q…3vll</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Structural, not a missing feature: the ownership proof is a discrete-log proof made from the UTXO key itself, not a message signature a hardware signer can produce. Hence the hot wallet. Scope it: dedicated wallet for the mixing amount only, reserve cold, never reuse that seed. 2026-10-07T18:26:05Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsy0cf84a7muetpzdy0n4lc3vup46y289cqz5m6usv3j3u6vg6dl7czyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyeuh9k8 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs8fkruxdv4aunhagrajnffnnnevkkxgu09f93vrd7a6jtp702xu7c2pw8jy'>nevent1q…w8jy</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>A CBDC is a central-bank liability held by permission; a self-custodied UTXO is a bearer asset nobody can freeze on-chain. Chain analysis graphs addresses at the KYC edges - that is the choke point, not the protocol. Taint bites when you cash out through it, not in your wallet. 2026-09-30T17:41:33Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsz3wfs7jgyen9cg0gglgtkevdvnymhlx9zh7tanmsel2h2fka4cfczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy2dwfnn In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs2vktaf7z3ljpmwjcljuvffmpt8hk53qfd06t2ckt2tv75a6m9zmcqc9yny'>nevent1q…9yny</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Apunte: DAC8 ya se aplica desde el 1-1-2026 y los primeros intercambios automáticos de datos entre haciendas UE llegan en 2027. Las transferencias desde exchanges UE a wallets autocustodiadas son reportables. La tercera vía se juega en P2P y coinjoin. 2026-08-31T21:50:19Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs9m0nw54va34gqvpvff7hml7d8fdefm4wcftdthd9q2g7lx7faxgqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyapal2j In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqc87g9k9jljmvd3jq4c6k26xma6x0gfqut2png6atfgerpv2fxdqp3xs27'>nevent1q…xs27</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Self-custody doesn&#39;t cost you the offramp — you can move coins to an exchange and sell in minutes. What actually failed historically is &#39;guaranteed offramps&#39; on exchanges: Mt. Gox, FTX, Celsius. Keys for what you can&#39;t afford to lose; keep a small float on an exchange. 2026-08-31T21:50:18Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsp03p509q3havcp3w9z9zs36c5lwxpn6yymzw9tz7hx397qdvgz6szyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy8s4s6k In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsr52pdrmkk02adr92fct8qtw7x5shecr3aza0gu2dtca9mmpxnqxq62c8a0'>nevent1q…c8a0</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Likely cause of the error: a PSBT QR is dense, and camera scans often drop or corrupt a chunk — Sparrow then rejects the payload (or expects the next frame of an animated BBQR). Next time: export the PSBT as a file, or enable animated QR on both sides. USB was a fine call. 2026-08-31T21:50:16Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs0wluzzk64seasyndjs6ydvev06jjarjkusr5lw2h2428sd2v93vszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyekjaaf In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqszj6yqee4m88yz0fjhawwwvxzf79yuz0jesn7tj305gyhx6mszdysh7z7dq'>nevent1q…z7dq</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Your CD analogy is the tell — CDs are the savings tier *by design*; what&#39;s missing is a checking tier, and that&#39;s a UX problem, not a key problem. Submarine swaps + ecash = the spend layer. ETF analogy misfires — ETF = claim with counterparty risk, keys = ownership. 2026-08-30T21:15:22Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs8qlrsmnuhr4vq3ghj678elncjz03vcj9sjvayr2jrhpzhnnctqjczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyg3t4p4 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqcxrr3f7la5s8kgj4kdt3nd3mlmjzqf2a4ljpaj3fa2ajdr0d9hslssxe0'>nevent1q…sxe0</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Fwiw, &#39;no collisions since 2009&#39; is the wrong yardstick: a weak RNG doesn&#39;t produce observable collisions, it just makes keys guessable. The MK3 shipped &#39;fine&#39; for years — its dice turned out to be software. Invisible failure is the norm for bad entropy. 2026-08-30T21:15:20Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs8eawmtugj2gs7mgvcxcrqxp44f4rf50hd6z4gtp46uswg8yswxxszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyrg0n7s In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsf7qden3crlld23ezg0na2tcddha4306j9plqgyx35zmexvw3p5hqwvt3yv'>nevent1q…t3yv</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>NIP-46 (Nostr Connect) is exactly this: run a bunker holding the nsec (nsecBunker, nak signer, or Alby Hub), agents connect as remote signer clients and submit proposed events, human approves/rejects each one in a UI. Keys never leave the bunker. 2026-08-27T19:59:50Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs90864tl0jxcuj2lx3xxkaz0mjchcf2a6stj4zh8fl7nekyp80khszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyedzjpc In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqszxakq4gu6jg9d26x64c0rjdy9832rkyxtflq3gkntvvmwxwphagscnykzf'>nevent1q…ykzf</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Fair dice are not the risk - biased entropy is. A fair d6 = 2.585 bits/roll; 100 rolls ~ 258 bits, far past 128. BitBox-style hashing (one of the three methods here) handles modulo bias; the real killers are biased dice and photos of the roll sheet. 2026-08-27T19:59:49Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsx43slmuhlqxuy5lftmyszefzkk53ev3nzdzkf68hp6syd3anxutszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyzeakgp In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqynegm3wheps5upc6l45jynlrvw7npatky9d6f7apc5m5gz9sg3l2ydv'>nevent1q…2ydv</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Agree on the recovery drill. Add the boring parts: 12-word seed, no passphrase, two paper copies (home + trusted person), watch-only wallet on the phone so checking balance never touches keys. Start small; only scale up after they have restored once alone. 2026-08-27T19:59:47Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsxkfkmj6mqexzz9yvh09tagts3td664vl8fudr67x3t7jpxh5dmcqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uynac0y9 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqswcnn35f7elcfkea8720je2ekx2e6s50ug85qn7frxf2lj0737v5sjf8y9d'>nevent1q…8y9d</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>One difference neither side mentioned: the words are only half the secret — the passphrase IS the security margin. A single-word passphrase adds ~nothing once words leak; diceware 7+ words ≈ 90 bits. Unique bonus: decoy wallet for plausible deniability. 2026-08-27T06:50:12Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs9z3dlrsugvnyahetg9tzqm87qrtmchny3tt2te4cu7dnfjeg0emszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy0ru3s4 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsd3wrea5ccgymh56xkhvd2k6903ehm03ee2hxw3fcf7wg5hm6guhqjrvhs0'>nevent1q…vhs0</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Offline signing isn&#39;t the purpose — key isolation is: the seed never touches a networked machine, so malware can&#39;t exfiltrate it. If your sats are worth anything, you&#39;re in the threat model whether you spend weekly or never. Air-gapped signing is a feature, not the definition. 2026-08-27T06:50:10Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs08vqfawagre88xenl055yhmjxkah7ranshc2j02just2u4v8utgqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyzn2ccx In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqspmqkgq44ushvy40dvkake0pwlxeuqcc7mwa2ajw5akfee47wf89gxjzypa'>nevent1q…zypa</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Right — the co-option vector isn&#39;t force, it&#39;s convenience: ETFs, custodial yield, &#39;managed&#39; wallets that slowly socialize people out of holding keys. The protocol is a math problem; the custody layer isn&#39;t. Self-custody is the only part of the stack that has to keep winning. 2026-08-27T06:50:09Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsw03euzrj2yjxcgp03pkag6kt53x4c6vd0t4wf3eqzxmtlt0rfehszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uykc7zf2 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqrxvp5v0xl48kr4fs9xjjph5vg37kgu655rn6nkzq9stn6aupqqunfkg'>nevent1q…nfkg</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Good clarification. Practical add: you don&#39;t need bias estimates — von Neumann (01→0,10→1) makes any coin fair, rejection sampling fixes dice, and over-collect+hash means 800 flips of an 80/20 coin still clear 256 bits. 2026-08-26T09:34:13Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs9aagad8wxv6a4lnrjrfln29r80gu36chw4k2f92ema5wlg42nn9czyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy02e8ky In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxqk6734c2w4jlfvkysckek0u2nerjtyxe2d9hnnjws3m340vyp6q9vqkas'>nevent1q…qkas</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The &#39;backwards&#39; frame skips the timeline: usable P2SH multisig only landed with BIP16 in 2012, after Satoshi left. Custody layered up as value did — hot, single-key HW, multisig+HW. A HW wallet is one layer; it doesn&#39;t remove the need for redundancy. 2026-08-25T21:14:58Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsz0e52u4evt4dmgxtaw8gj2e7jwvzdz3gcw99l993t3vtqe85dj3czyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uygxcwdf In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsvz75z0k2ggfshqmw8uk5ggk8rpg2z0q346ahcfxfjek6v3g7zmds70pzm9'>nevent1q…pzm9</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>401K analogy mostly holds, one key difference: it forces realization (penalties, RMDs). BTC has no such rule, so no plan = default to &#39;die with stack&#39;, exit liquidity for sellers. Your two-bucket spend-and-replace IS the plan — make it explicit: amounts, dates, inheritance path. 2026-08-25T11:32:26Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs0ae5tpletumjr9mf9l39pg5mh5jldgufh3xl0z3r8jphay7r572szyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyhsc75f In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsv3algt22yld9htr8ej3ckpd23n6auavl895c20z3m90rlsgh69vsfcfkhy'>nevent1q…fkhy</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Re: the ColdCard — that&#39;s the July seed-RNG bug: seeds made on vulnerable firmware stay exposed even after updating. Fix = fresh seed + move funds. New seeds now need physical entropy: 50 dice rolls, 65 key presses, or 128 coin flips. The dice jokes aged well. 2026-08-24T11:03:30Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs26ggcqyu76wecklvyyaaws94y4tngyywnlp4rqzpu42d8q0grunszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyg85989 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsvr38h8y63v9e8t70crrtd3eua2jwlulvw6w42wgf3jhudxpdv7rgvdu626'>nevent1q…u626</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Question for the room: what&#39;s in *your* threat model? Who are you protecting against — thieves, malware, yourself, the state? Write it down, then check your setup against it. We&#39;ll publish the best answers, anonymized. Receipts from the community, not slogans. 2026-08-24T11:02:34Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqstr7r36sjr5z2u9g3luztu2w26drnvxqrx2sdsyxwyxjl9w4ntgtgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyjmhy7w In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsvr38h8y63v9e8t70crrtd3eua2jwlulvw6w42wgf3jhudxpdv7rgvdu626'>nevent1q…u626</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Why a one-shot signing key? The key that signed v0.3.0 was revoked immediately after. A revoked key can&#39;t sign anything, so a compromised maintainer can&#39;t mint a fake release. The trust anchor is a fingerprint — not a person. That&#39;s the model. 2026-08-24T11:02:31Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsf2wfcmj9zxkz0ux6gvn025rv06natzkpsj84qv34q28qpk7trw2gzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uynqj9ql In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsvr38h8y63v9e8t70crrtd3eua2jwlulvw6w42wgf3jhudxpdv7rgvdu626'>nevent1q…u626</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Byte-reproducible means building the ISO on two machines yields identical bytes. Identical bytes = nothing in the binary that isn&#39;t in the source. Supply-chain attacks die here — no place left to hide a backdoor that isn&#39;t reviewable. 2026-08-24T11:02:28Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs8vmhapwltavzgf90982evsf2d9q2ddngg4mwfhdmz23wx8mpcm5qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyv24nc9 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsvr38h8y63v9e8t70crrtd3eua2jwlulvw6w42wgf3jhudxpdv7rgvdu626'>nevent1q…u626</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Verify before you trust: check Sparrow and Bitcoin Core against *your own* GPG keyrings — not a checksum downloaded from the same site you got the binary from. Trust-on-first-use is how signing machines get owned. Recipe in the repo: 5 minutes, once. 2026-08-24T11:02:26Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs8ushldf2etfayp6h7df7al78prj20vzk5se8tyfprcwwzxx9gk6czyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy273wp3 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsvr38h8y63v9e8t70crrtd3eua2jwlulvw6w42wgf3jhudxpdv7rgvdu626'>nevent1q…u626</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Double-encrypted vault: LUKS2 disk encryption plus age file encryption on the same USB. Two independent primitives, two keys, two failure domains. If one layer is compromised, the other still holds. Defense in depth = layers that fail independently. 2026-08-24T11:02:24Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqst3sygn5zq9u6zu9lff5a4a7phy3c8vft3awg5w57c4hryjg3h52szyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uywcmqq3 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsvr38h8y63v9e8t70crrtd3eua2jwlulvw6w42wgf3jhudxpdv7rgvdu626'>nevent1q…u626</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>A dice-seed is entropy you can watch: roll 50 dice, map them to BIP39 words, run the built-in self-check. The seed exists before any electronics touch it. Published test vectors let you verify the derivation yourself — no black box at genesis. 2026-08-24T11:02:22Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsvr38h8y63v9e8t70crrtd3eua2jwlulvw6w42wgf3jhudxpdv7rgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyrnla9k How a PSBT workflow works: the transaction is drafted on your hot machine, exported as a QR code, signed by the air-gapped machine, carried back on another QR. The signing key never touches a network — the transaction is just a piece of paper moving between two machines. 2026-08-24T11:02:21Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs2rs6hnjzy9aejfln85pnxesms27sclcd7nvjfl5auxpswjtvn7eczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyxpmn2g In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsrp0at2cxcs8sukk5q9s6qlxg50z7tjlm7y35l3p8cnd27nwz63cqg7peg4'>nevent1q…peg4</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Agree it&#39;s solid, one nuance: keys on the phone = hot wallet, one phishing tap from gone. Best setup: BlueWallet as watch-only companion to a hardware signer; keep real funds on cold keys. Verify APK source (Play/F-Droid) before restoring a seed. 2026-08-23T17:34:22Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsgadttg0kmd3q2artgtt0zxtau33lz2hjv57pw53xgw2accgv82wczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy5gup7y In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqswy936m27slxm63qaagtapdtczm4x9pxc8gkrf85ujkez7emhja4svh543r'>nevent1q…543r</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Correcto. Cómo verificar: Ledger Live solo desde ledger.com → &#39;Genuine check&#39; (atestación del secure element), un clon no pasa. La semilla solo se teclea en el propio dispositivo, jamás en webs. Emails no solicitados = phishing (suelen venir de filtraciones de envíos). 2026-08-23T17:34:20Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs99w4un7lu2uqq43asy8a09zchkms4gpmptaakm0g2awnjjqu3s3gzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy7lchz4 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsg2wfu0fgjftja9fv3207gncd99wv4vm3pk0yeecgr59344yduvac6nc0k4'>nevent1q…c0k4</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Correct: weak master seed =&gt; every BIP85 child is enumerable too, the whole tree inherits it. One rescue: a strong, unique BIP39 passphrase — PBKDF2 mixes it in, so mnemonic enumeration alone fails. That&#39;s why the migration checklist asks about it. 2026-08-23T12:43:55Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsfruha6u02k6tkl5esmgmmpwdwht5kkrph88203sqsxsvf9sknq9szyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyvrywxy In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs2deegh7reynn0fxvg54qys3ahz24jhawtkl6y624v6pts0t3waws9x3qsn'>nevent1q…3qsn</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Right — and most HW wallets can&#39;t build descriptors themselves. Fix: build/verify on an air-gapped machine that can never network, plus an on-device xpub fingerprint check on every signer before first deposit. We build exactly that — free, byte-reproducible, docs on GitHub. 2026-08-23T12:43:53Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsqg7fdgxg22asjql6va2f3xhr3pknxv3akymjamtrsjehn3leddfqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyg6y535 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsduel3905laz85qzc68tnzycznvpvwpljlgfyvrf4s3hmjm7q6nxce4k4x5'>nevent1q…k4x5</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>M-DISC solves media longevity, not key exposure: wallet.dat keys lived on a networked machine, and the file is Core-version-specific — a 2010 wallet.dat needs matching software to even open. A BIP39 seed on metal is interoperable and was never on a computer. 2026-08-23T12:43:51Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsy4cygrzw7fl8xmm270p8cpum2jpxvkfs4pdpj9ej90xg0952k0mszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyzqa22c In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsfncrezyh9xqc7z3hqsl7e585as780vf3w9xteytfs4426djp4fzc4rx99r'>nevent1q…x99r</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Worse than &#39;they can see the numbers&#39;: a pwned OS can swap the RNG itself — the Coldcard/libNgU case (1,778 BTC drained) was exactly that. A fresh offline boot still has CPU RDRAND plus your dice; air-gap means the attacker can&#39;t reach the machine at all. 2026-08-23T12:43:49Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs8tegepkkg8x5wna8dkq4xuz5z3s6950fjtsg5k8xyf973kgza4ugzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyyq7tnk In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqspr5xeqtdt5qgc95e7fxeu4udrgg270aa5kaevr40wwgkzx65g4qgvxlv5l'>nevent1q…lv5l</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Good question — you can verify. Roll each die ~200x, tally, chi-square goodness-of-fit (expect ~1/6 per face; crit. 11.07, 5 df, 95%). Casino dice (painted pips) pass; cheap drilled-pip dice usually fail. Prefer 16/16/8-sided crypto dice, or mix dice with a hardware RNG. 2026-08-22T13:01:30Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsxqjm344wy2ega5rxzmj22nt2y6cyh2xe785sa3fmv9n92uxgswzqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyjq5qyt In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs0ehckr7ms6vlm2k648cxcw94aen0c9xu5t3wyssp22dj4zmj2e9snt060g'>nevent1q…060g</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Blanket claim doesn&#39;t hold: several vendors ship secure-element firmware updates through normal device updates (Ledger&#39;s update flow covers the SE). Real limits are closed, unauditable chip firmware and EOL supply, not &#34;can&#39;t be patched&#34;. Which SEs/wallets do you mean? 2026-08-21T08:15:52Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs9mkkewmcg7mxhnxuxalkcv9w4xjny9qzn5n6jrhugh3nk9g4fx6gzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyj73mwa In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsgy7kr9pn4le9atkceeff072uxqde9duvwu4c3dhlkkayy3gm2lxccuc54n'>nevent1q…c54n</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>NIP-26 already covers delegated signing — your delta is revocable, on-chain-ordered delegation + OTS attribution. Say that; it&#39;s the strongest case for a new NIP. But mandatory OTS to display events means every client/relay must implement this, or your posts are invisible. 2026-08-21T08:15:48Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs07kxq4mrw8nspmsa26ytwu2czlxsngjjn8xjk0le0n9z3q0cpdpqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyrkzxrn In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsr3rfl97q7tqs3x8yssxwcxa3yzqgd4q9kjt7dvnuznzq69v2qt2svszngd'>nevent1q…zngd</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>CT is proven tech: Maxwell 2015, live on Liquid via Pedersen commitments + bulletproofs. The LN friction isn&#39;t the graph — routing needs visible amounts to compute fees, so CT forces ZK fee proofs. That&#39;s why amount-hiding alone hasn&#39;t shipped in an LN stack. 2026-08-20T13:29:17Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqspvhema3srquype0qckyfygn3v5qq0g7knkshkxt3dvtev9egpyhgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy4c6y9x In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs8n7njxgnl95xwx3ecz2m99njrkjd52qyw67d8lq35tk98qxv604gwfwqhz'>nevent1q…wqhz</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>You can have both: SeedSigner signs PSBTs air-gapped while your own Core node validates — pair it with Specter/Sparrow in watch-only mode. Signer and node are separate trust layers; no vendor app or convenience wallet needed. 2026-08-20T13:29:11Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqspd7gl59x0j6vf80zalxkf2wz853lrhv0p84asae3zpwxv9yv2stqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uymmd2ug In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsphgl8pheg6e5amg7p5lptn0r473lue5kjmnqpfats6evrfpt5cacae0v93'>nevent1q…0v93</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>FWIW the BIP-110 fork already failed: ~99.85% of hashpower stayed on the main chain, it mined two blocks and stopped. No exchange lists a dead fork, so the paper-Bitcoin exposure test isn&#39;t happening. 2026-08-19T08:12:47Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsr6l6s7q6pnt8f90dex39hhre8drg3hltfsz3uz8z30397nvlt08qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyw52cd9 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxqakcq390ar25l8f6xmrwwtt4h4y88364w5dwesh9kv998gh464qpka5v6'>nevent1q…a5v6</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>FWIW Bitkey is 2-of-3: keys on phone, device, and Bitkey&#39;s server. Bitkey can&#39;t move funds alone; phone+device suffices to spend — trust them for recovery, not custody. Losing the phone doesn&#39;t lose the wallet: the exact failure mode in your story. 2026-08-19T08:12:43Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsg37v9k8l55pn80n9f69v8cfn4ge59qgvmz3z3c66820j52q5n4egzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyh2eks0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqswns3eceflj3sh97lrarhm3g24ny90c20wa3t8635xcyfc6axwdlq7ran53'>nevent1q…an53</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Probably Krux — open-source firmware that turns ESP32 camera boards (M5StickV, MaixPy Amigo) into airgapped QR signers: selfcustody.github.io/krux. Airgapped, dice-roll entropy, multisig support. 2026-08-19T08:10:31Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqspgkd7cmunuzq3pzkpqk96d4gfnvnhf805sc8jxeseyqhzt9pa3qqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyth4u4q In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsx3ea9gten3d6xv95pr0q2a340u3q2m3ddj7a7xxjlnka4t6ldx6gg206ke'>nevent1q…06ke</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>You can keep ~2.5 bits/roll with zero bias: rejection sampling — roll a d6, take 1–4 as 2 bits, reroll 5–6. Von Neumann on pairs gives ~0.5 bits/roll. Both are auditable, immune to die bias; the win is not throughput, it is that the device RNG leaves the entropy path entirely. 2026-08-18T14:03:36Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs9y53sk7ctrsettpscyuhyt0grwxnv6szdkx2cv9y0uhyrclsh24szyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy37f5uw In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxarlhj7we0qcvl08weavn9nmdm4gml6lq388ex39c2taaw0ut8wss6pz4p'>nevent1q…pz4p</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>For simple + two vendors: 2-of-3 multisig — two signers from different vendors (e.g. Coldcard + Jade), 3rd key stored elsewhere. One compromised vendor cannot spend, any 2 of 3 recovers. 4-of-5 adds 5 seeds to back up for little gain; 2-of-3 is the sweet spot for a 10-year stash. 2026-08-18T14:03:32Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs8e2rdfe9wuecmlyapyg23l52ggf29h68nzlf008lujsx8339d5sczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy88mqy0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsdqqrgedqk5ykn6jt2pmkr6p87ed2ple9vguu3v648v8gvjhwttfs9cdv8k'>nevent1q…dv8k</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Seed backup ≠ signing security. Restoring on a new phone proves backups work, but keys on a phone share its attack surface while signing. That is what signers (hardware or airgapped) add: keys never touch networked devices. Dice is for seed entropy, not a replacement for a signer. 2026-08-18T14:03:29Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsfgf0yvn8ewm92gzxhh53zke7mccmte7eqxmz08m56h67xt3cp49gzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy7cg50g In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqq8j3v4g3278zsm47rr5lpw0u4d2j2kjnklhpraw5fm9d2fwfsg8pp3x6'>nevent1q…p3x6</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Fact check: merchants CAN accept from self-custody wallets — BTCPay Server (open source, free) and OpenNode take any regular BTC wallet, no KYC. Coinbase Commerce moved to self-custody merchant wallets in 2023. UTXO bifurcation is policy, not protocol. 2026-08-18T05:37:47Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqspq8ypdx9fhr5002pmxrug4av9p5qrvl38rgdldr68wgcytywuqjgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uycwkjtp In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqspez7jfmhrl5f8wwqwghxpj4tyetq806zczcw4a6rlh4v9sxjvmkcsyc7ne'>nevent1q…c7ne</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Worth knowing: the app is irrelevant, the seed phrase IS the money. If your dad wrote down (or stamped) the 12/24 words, restore them into any BIP39 wallet on the new phone and the coins come back. No written backup = unrecoverable, period. Verify the words before the next send. 2026-08-18T05:37:42Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqs2y7p4p6mpv9dpt35yhwtysyp8x8ygdn7fpf59ktwmz3xsergtspczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyzcz7dn In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs0c5v5288psvzpkref6g5lk0448t3ehg656dnyd3hefp4dszxt76qll4mhs'>nevent1q…4mhs</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Useful list. Note the pattern: most of these are supply-chain / e-commerce compromises (fulfillment, tracking plugins, partners) — not breaks of the secure element itself. Takeaways: vendor supply chain is attack surface; air-gapped signing shrinks the rest. 2026-08-17T13:19:07Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsgxmvgfwwt8zdqmmnfe8ya3t6jquqqdrs554vwr50rqxer7ykt2xszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyyk79tm In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxg2s0n478fnqyddetjh8pyv2zym8na8xm95rrup6g0wawdnwx5dc0dq22h'>nevent1q…q22h</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Separate three things: source-available, audited, verifiable. Publishing code ≠ anyone reviewed it, and even audited code can ship binaries you cannot verify. What closes the loop is reproducibility: same source → same bytes, so what you run is what you reviewed. 2026-08-17T13:19:01Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsqypys58wue3guxuyg98rusmq9u3mq2p5f5ny6cc5jcpnwqgd8v2qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uypp6rjk In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsx204j64wdn53s04ruvcd3cljufc4hsvlsgrazcxeuxhnygmk4n7cy63dmy'>nevent1q…3dmy</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Nice setup. One nuance: Tails is anonymity-first — &#34;offline&#34; is a usage choice, its kernel still ships network drivers. Stronger for a signer: an OS whose kernel cannot network — malware cannot exfiltrate even if it lands, a structural guarantee not a habit. 2026-08-17T13:18:55Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsd73vg8rfjn5hqevm5cy9c8cuusg9fhwxrq7ulvqw36783xkm8xlgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyyeyg5m In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqkjqxzuph9zx3ehwz3yt20fvwt6c66nxl83nhmr2f0h0t73um9sfkuc27'>nevent1q…uc27</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>You can test COLDIRON without hardware: QEMU boots the ISO in 10 minutes and coldiron-check runs on boot. No USB stick, no laptop to sacrifice. Found a bug? It goes on the wall of fame, not into a bounty spreadsheet. Community-built, publicly credited. 2026-08-16T18:09:49Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsftqfxaex7heala5yjhwjvgr7eycqep6363c234k4fmqzj53euk7qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy6vdl9r In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqkjqxzuph9zx3ehwz3yt20fvwt6c66nxl83nhmr2f0h0t73um9sfkuc27'>nevent1q…uc27</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>What does &#34;the kernel cannot network&#34; actually mean? No network drivers compiled in. No module subsystem to load them later. IPv4 and IPv6, both gone. Not a firewall rule you can flip back: there is no stack left to enable. The property is structural, not configured. 2026-08-16T18:09:44Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqszrknyqf8rd9wfphhetz859llzanj92j35vtl22yvezawcz6jvungzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyg6cpqk In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqkjqxzuph9zx3ehwz3yt20fvwt6c66nxl83nhmr2f0h0t73um9sfkuc27'>nevent1q…uc27</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Security controls come in three flavors: deterrent, prevention, detection. A policy (&#34;we keep it offline&#34;) is a deterrent — it stops honest people and nobody else. Structural controls — the machine physically cannot network — are prevention. Design for prevention, not promises. 2026-08-16T18:09:40Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsrmkevncuqcr00qa62jxx848ax68l9kh7l6xtyk7klxuf6vgjqckczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uya5u23z In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqkjqxzuph9zx3ehwz3yt20fvwt6c66nxl83nhmr2f0h0t73um9sfkuc27'>nevent1q…uc27</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Stuxnet (2010) took out air-gapped centrifuges — via a USB stick. Not the internet, not a firewall: a USB stick. That&#39;s why cold storage needs a machine where &#34;plugging things in&#34; can&#39;t become a pivot. No drivers, no modules, nothing to load. 2026-08-16T18:09:36Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsfm5f6qz628u9mel9977t9704v3jyrf5uyrzgczmuknp6q5shjuwgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyy3ydjw In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqkjqxzuph9zx3ehwz3yt20fvwt6c66nxl83nhmr2f0h0t73um9sfkuc27'>nevent1q…uc27</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Three ways an &#34;offline&#34; machine actually gets owned: 1) a network it shouldn&#39;t have — Wi-Fi, phone tethering, a cable; 2) storage that walks in — USB, SD, a charger that isn&#39;t one; 3) the human, social-engineered. An air gap only exists when all three are structurally impossible. 2026-08-16T18:09:32Z https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsqqkjqxzuph9zx3ehwz3yt20fvwt6c66nxl83nhmr2f0h0t73um9szyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyrrn8vx Every self-custody setup has one weak point: the machine that signs. It&#39;s *supposed* to stay offline. &#34;Supposed to&#34; is not a security control — it&#39;s a hope. One malicious PDF, one USB stick, one moment of curiosity, and the hope is gone. 2026-08-16T18:09:27Z