Nostr notes by Marcus Satbard

Community warning: a shitfork liar who pushes others onto the ...

2026-04-11T06:34:37Z

In reply to nevent1q…um73
_________________________

Community warning: a shitfork liar who pushes others onto the fork but refuses to swap sats to get more on its side, hence himself deeming it less valuable

quoting
nevent1q…lymc
It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

Fortunately, most network participants are rational actors and ...

2026-04-04T06:20:27Z

In reply to nevent1q…uvxd
_________________________

Fortunately, most network participants are rational actors and won't put themselves on the path of losing sats to benefit centralised cloud mining service providers

Burning sats on cloud mining is not decentralization, it's ...

2026-04-02T11:05:43Z

In reply to nevent1q…dp9t
_________________________

Burning sats on cloud mining is not decentralization, it's not incentive compatible

Tak samo kult Luka

2026-03-26T11:00:14Z

In reply to nevent1q…27jz
_________________________

Tak samo kult Luka

Satoshi nie podpisywał emailów i nie ufał bym temu co podaje ...

2026-03-25T09:28:55Z

In reply to nevent1q…7cdx
_________________________

Satoshi nie podpisywał emailów i nie ufał bym temu co podaje ten typ, który jest przez zaufanych OG uznawany za agenta rządowego. Też lepiej podać faktyczny cytat, a nie tłumaczenie, z linkiem do źródła.

Nie widzę takiego cytatu, najbliższy z tego dnia na BT to: ...

2026-03-25T09:20:55Z

In reply to nevent1q…4nvh
_________________________

Nie widzę takiego cytatu, najbliższy z tego dnia na BT to:
https://satoshi.nakamotoinstitute.org/posts/bitcointalk/188/
W każdym razie, "co raz bardziej" nie oznacza "wyłącznie". Warto też mieć na uwadze, że wtedy node oznaczał również minera generującego bloki.

Not that difficult. It's easy to sneak in something without a ...

2026-03-24T09:40:42Z

In reply to nevent1q…fd36
_________________________

Not that difficult. It's easy to sneak in something without a review. Moreover, review is just a BS glance over theatre in most projects. Especially now in the age of LLM coding. It's also hard to spot a well hidden backdoor.

Tak, głównie aby ograniczać wystawianie się na zbędne ...

2026-03-23T14:44:46Z

In reply to nevent1q…u2cl
_________________________

Tak, głównie aby ograniczać wystawianie się na zbędne promieniowanie elektromagnetyczne

Community warning: a shitfork liar who pushes others onto the ...

2026-03-23T13:55:40Z

In reply to nevent1q…gryt
_________________________

Community warning: a shitfork liar who pushes others onto the fork but refuses to swap sats to get more on its side, hence himself deeming it less valuable

quoting
nevent1q…lymc
It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

Możesz przytoczyć konkretny cytat?

2026-03-23T10:05:45Z

In reply to nevent1q…jf37
_________________________

Możesz przytoczyć konkretny cytat?

The person on the left is wrong, but instead of realizing it ...

2026-03-19T13:38:46Z

In reply to nevent1q…p4l4
_________________________

The person on the left is wrong, but instead of realizing it after being told this a gazillion times, they decide to double down on mental gymnastics and stretch further and further into insanity.

It sounds like signing the petition is putting people at risk. ...

2026-03-19T13:24:04Z

In reply to nevent1q…3cfj
_________________________

It sounds like signing the petition is putting people at risk. The gov will know who to suspect of not reporting.

So CFTC means KYC for everyone? I hope it won't be shotgun ...

2026-03-18T09:25:00Z

In reply to nevent1q…9pgd
_________________________

So CFTC means KYC for everyone? I hope it won't be shotgun KYC.

Sadly Paraguay is not a good option any more ...

2026-03-14T07:45:25Z

In reply to nevent1q…vfpg
_________________________

Sadly Paraguay is not a good option any more https://nitter.net/JAN3com/status/2031811241610502571

When someone is calling for your death and walking towards you ...

2026-03-12T12:51:32Z

In reply to nevent1q…dv8k
_________________________

When someone is calling for your death and walking towards you brandishing a knife, it's natural to kick them in the groin. It's called self-defence.

Na dzisiejszym spacerze społeczności z okazji Dnia Kobiet ...

2026-03-08T16:07:30Z

Na dzisiejszym spacerze społeczności z okazji Dnia Kobiet robiliśmy orange flowering
#Poznań #Polska

https://keepandroidopen.org/

2026-03-07T18:39:34Z

https://keepandroidopen.org/

Zapraszam w najbliższą niedzielę na spacer społeczności ...

2026-03-05T16:12:57Z

Zapraszam w najbliższą niedzielę na spacer społeczności entuzjastów bitcoina: 13:00 zadaszony stojak rowerowy na skraju Ewangelickiej przy Skwerze Jana Suwarta
https://www.openstreetmap.org/?mlat=52.402955&mlon=16.943619#map=19/52.402955/16.943619
#Poznań #Poznan

It's way less when you price in custiodial/beta platform ...

2026-03-05T07:05:51Z

In reply to nevent1q…xuc7
_________________________

It's way less when you price in custiodial/beta platform risks, locking capital for 6 months and the fees. I estimate the chances at below 2% but having my buy No trigger below 90%. The other side has plenty of margin to price in those factors.

Community warning: a shitfork liar who pushes others onto the ...

2026-03-02T07:36:25Z

In reply to nevent1q…pw89
_________________________

Community warning: a shitfork liar who pushes others onto the fork but refuses to swap sats to get more on its side, hence himself deeming it less valuable

quoting
nevent1q…lymc
It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

In another words, the previous rules where whenever MASF will ...

2026-03-01T16:24:54Z

In reply to nevent1q…wndf
_________________________

In another words, the previous rules where whenever MASF will succeed. The altered ones are about if MASF+UASF will succeed. Big difference. The change was beneficial for those holding Yes shares (shares supporting 110).

The previous rules concerned whenever 110 would activate and be ...

2026-03-01T13:13:40Z

In reply to nevent1q…dkrn
_________________________

The previous rules concerned whenever 110 would activate and be enforced before the expected flag day activation.

It’s a horrible precedent that you’ve changed the market ...

2026-03-01T12:52:25Z

In reply to nevent1q…p2fs
_________________________

It’s a horrible precedent that you’ve changed the market while it was already running. You should have created an alternative market instead.

Shitforkers launched an attack on our money. Don't let them ...

2026-02-26T14:28:18Z

Shitforkers launched an attack on our money. Don't let them carry out an attack on something even more precious: our time.

They bent a little bit by not deprecating the datacarriersize ...

2026-02-26T10:35:49Z

In reply to nevent1q…57v4
_________________________

They bent a little bit by not deprecating the datacarriersize setting

Nostr event nevent1qqsg6ekrfv5jkl3d2a4qrmvwnel7xz454esaa98jrfejzyfl75q9nhczyzewyfy5sd3ykrjjsu38y9chvfsr5mgnznepcr8q97xjtha2ew697fkqsn9

2026-02-26T10:21:54Z

21M [BTC] > 21M [BTC] + 21M [BLV]

Community warning: a shitfork liar who provides a platform for ...

2026-02-26T06:46:41Z

In reply to nevent1q…z4u7
_________________________

Community warning: a shitfork liar who provides a platform for the fork promotion but refuses to swap sats to get more on its side, hence deeming himself it less valuable

quoting
nevent1q…tmpw
It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

Will you back up your words with sats? Otherwise, it’s an ...

2026-02-26T06:44:06Z

In reply to nevent1q…zpfz
_________________________

Will you back up your words with sats? Otherwise, it’s an explicit shitfork promotion and proof that your words can’t be trusted. I can also offer a trustless swap of sats between the two chains. I’m willing to accept smaller amounts than Rob1Ham (nprofile…5pxz) does.

quoting
nevent1q…tmpw

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…u6ky
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

It is not a debate but an attack on bitcoin. Time for debate is ...

2026-02-23T06:09:30Z

In reply to nevent1q…94uw
_________________________

It is not a debate but an attack on bitcoin. Time for debate is during the consensus‑building process, before announcing activation, which should be announced only for changes with a wide consensus.

And shun shitforkers, the social layer defends bitcoin too ...

2026-02-21T13:34:58Z

In reply to nevent1q…prsf
_________________________

And shun shitforkers, the social layer defends bitcoin too 🛡️

Community warning: a shitfork liar who pushes others onto the ...

2026-02-21T13:29:35Z

In reply to nevent1q…nq26
_________________________

Community warning: a shitfork liar who pushes others onto the fork but refuses to swap sats to get more on its side, hence himself deeming it less valuable

quoting
nevent1q…ddyp
It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

Community warning: a shitfork liar who sold out to provide a ...

2026-02-21T13:13:36Z

In reply to nevent1q…p6aj
_________________________

Community warning: a shitfork liar who sold out to provide a platform for the fork promotion but refuses to swap sats to get more on its side, hence deeming himself it less valuable

quoting
nevent1q…ddyp
It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

Community warning: a shitfork liar who pushes others onto the ...

2026-02-20T11:34:24Z

In reply to nevent1q…rgyq
_________________________

Community warning: a shitfork liar who pushes others onto the fork but refuses to swap sats to get more on its side, hence himself deeming it less valuable

quoting
nevent1q…lymc
It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

That's cool but then for that market creating it by me is not ...

2026-02-18T11:09:55Z

In reply to nevent1q…5wyl
_________________________

That's cool but then for that market creating it by me is not a good option. It would be shewed. The fork proponents wouldn't trust me. I will bet if you create a market with at least one month later date, for example 10/31 to be symbolic.

Meaning who's an arbiter of truth and decides on outcomes ...

2026-02-18T10:35:06Z

In reply to nevent1q…eszx
_________________________

Meaning who's an arbiter of truth and decides on outcomes when closing user created markets?

When it comes to user created markets, who's settling them, ...

2026-02-18T10:33:21Z

In reply to nevent1q…80xx
_________________________

When it comes to user created markets, who's settling them, creators or Predyx?

Perhaps that wasn't clear but that's how Amethyst ...

2026-02-18T10:22:21Z

In reply to nevent1q…cre3
_________________________

Perhaps that wasn't clear but that's how Amethyst displays your profile. The profile is not domain verified.

Does "no BS" mean that you don't run Knots?

2026-02-18T09:26:27Z

In reply to nevent1q…2jvc
_________________________

Does "no BS" mean that you don't run Knots?

Wasn't that market created by Predyx? Normally, Predyx ...

2026-02-18T09:24:14Z

In reply to nevent1q…2jvc
_________________________

Wasn't that market created by Predyx? Normally, Predyx displays who the market creator is. It's not indicated for that market, so it looks like it's created by Predyx.

Community warning: a shitfork liar who sold out to provide a ...

2026-02-18T09:13:29Z

In reply to nevent1q…6yzz
_________________________

Community warning: a shitfork liar who sold out to provide a platform for the fork promotion but refuses to swap sats to get more on its side, hence deeming himself it less valuable

quoting
nevent1q…lymc

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…c9wj
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

Can you fix NIP-05 verification of this profile? It looks like a ...

2026-02-17T13:42:34Z

In reply to nevent1q…036d
_________________________

Can you fix NIP-05 verification of this profile? It looks like a fake one.

That market is not well designed, as unconditional activation ...

2026-02-17T13:42:04Z

In reply to nevent1q…036d
_________________________

That market is not well designed, as unconditional activation will most likely happen a few days after the 1st of September. Also, after activation there need to be fresh UTXOs that are spent and violate BIP110 constraints. It looks like Predyx is run by Knotzis that want to make it look like the fork has higher chances of success.

Markets at Predyx are clear: it’s a shitfork. Likewise all ...

2026-02-17T09:07:14Z

In reply to nevent1q…txau
_________________________

Markets at Predyx are clear: it’s a shitfork. Likewise all other markets. Indeed it’s also clear from the trustless sats swap market in the Polish 21 TG group, which you now own after my initiative... That’s why you should finally do your job TomekK (nprofile…cl8m) and start enforcing the rules of the group. You should not allow it to become a platform for shitfork promotion. There has been a long-standing precedent for that in bitcoin communities since the blocksize war. The massive bitcoin community on Reddit is a good example.
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/about/

Exercise your right of freedom of association and take care of ...

2026-02-16T08:03:52Z

Exercise your right of freedom of association and take care of your reputation by not associating with shitforkers who attack bitcoin. The social layer protects it too 🛡️

Nostr event nevent1qqsv3965xel2dj4jm9x0p5s4j6qumnt7dlmx2vvjfwtz33dzz7ux0nczyzewyfy5sd3ykrjjsu38y9chvfsr5mgnznepcr8q97xjtha2ew6974mvvfh

2026-02-13T11:02:23Z

Shitforkers shall be shunned

To protect others from their propaganda and make them pay a price ...

2026-02-13T10:58:48Z

In reply to nevent1q…3xk0
_________________________

To protect others from their propaganda and make them pay a price for attacking bitcoin. They can't be trusted if they promote a fork they don't believe will succeed. There's long-standing precedent for such social layer defence since the blocksize war. r/bitcoin community is a good example.

I see your point but we should not underestimate our enemy. ...

2026-02-12T20:10:11Z

In reply to nevent1q…u94w
_________________________

I see your point but we should not underestimate our enemy. It's way easier to constrain bitcoin rules than to relax them. It's a shitfork even in the economic valuation of its proponents so they should be ostracized for promoting it and pay at least social cost for attacking bitcoin.

Miner signaling doesn't mean much either. A block creator can ...

2026-02-12T17:51:36Z

In reply to nevent1q…u94w
_________________________

Miner signaling doesn't mean much either. A block creator can signal but then don't enforce the constrained rules.

I'm just offering to swap sats and checking who can be ...

2026-02-12T15:36:19Z

In reply to nevent1q…4swq
_________________________

I'm just offering to swap sats and checking who can be trusted and who sold out to become a shitfork promoter. Indeed gambling here is helping to push a contentious change onto bitcoin by platforming that propaganda. Moreover, not at your own expense but at the cost of all bitcoin users.

I'm just offering to swap sats and checking if I can still ...

2026-02-12T15:31:06Z

In reply to nevent1q…7hty
_________________________

I'm just offering to swap sats and checking if I can still trust you or if you sold out to become a shitfork promoter. Indeed gambling here is helping to push a contentious change onto bitcoin by platforming that propaganda. Moreover, not at your own expense but at the cost of all bitcoin users.

Man, I have been looking for a single BIP‑110 promoter who ...

2026-02-12T15:18:55Z

In reply to nevent1q…rkk7
_________________________

Man, I have been looking for a single BIP‑110 promoter who doesn’t consider it a shitfork for over 3 months. I’m willing to swap smaller amounts via a trustless (on‑chain) multisig. It turns out, they’re all full of shit liars who push others towards a fork that they don’t believe will succeed.

Do you care to save face and back your words with sats? ...

2026-02-12T13:08:12Z

In reply to nevent1q…3t9f
_________________________

Do you care to save face and back your words with sats? Otherwise, you're explicitly providing a platform for shitfork promotion and showing that your words can't be trusted. I already offered you an opportunity to swap sats, so that you can double those on the fork side, in a trustless (onchain) manner.

quoting
nevent1q…tmpw

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…t863
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

Those who don’t respect the consensus and push a contentious ...

2026-02-10T17:35:22Z

Those who don’t respect the consensus and push a contentious change using dirty tactics such as lawfare or empty‑word propaganda (words not backed by sats) don’t deserve respect

Will you back up your words with sats? Otherwise, you're ...

2026-02-09T10:35:07Z

In reply to nevent1q…azfj
_________________________

Will you back up your words with sats? Otherwise, you're giving a platform for an explicit shitfork promotion and proving that your words can’t be trusted. I can also offer a trustless swap of sats between the two chains. I’m willing to accept smaller amounts than Rob1Ham (nprofile…5pxz) does.

quoting
nevent1q…ddyp

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…u6ky
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

Considering the organiser’s stance, a fancy one could be: ...

2026-02-09T10:22:13Z

In reply to nevent1q…9w0k
_________________________

Considering the organiser’s stance, a fancy one could be:
Shitforky Liar’s Walking Circus

OMG, so now you’re promoting a shitfork backed by BS legal ...

2026-02-09T09:39:24Z

In reply to nevent1q…zyyt
_________________________

OMG, so now you’re promoting a shitfork backed by BS legal threats… By fighting with CSW, you’ve become like him. Do you want to swap some sats via a trust‑less multisig, doubling them on the fork’s side? If you honestly believe in its success and therefore don’t consider it a shitfork, then it’s a rational decision to make. You can be the first one who actually doesn't consider it a shitfork. If you don't have a whole coin to swap, I'm happy to swap smaller amounts than Rob1Ham (nprofile…5pxz) does.

quoting
nevent1q…ddyp

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…w3mz
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

The social layer defends 21M from shitforks #Poznań #Polska ...

2026-02-09T08:56:53Z

The social layer defends 21M from shitforks
#Poznań #Polska

Zapraszam w najbliższą niedzielę na spacer społeczności ...

2026-02-05T15:01:12Z

Zapraszam w najbliższą niedzielę na spacer społeczności entuzjastów bitcoina: 11:00 zadaszony stojak rowerowy na skraju Ewangelickiej przy Skwerze Jana Suwarta
https://www.openstreetmap.org/?mlat=52.402955&mlon=16.943619#map=19/52.402955/16.943619
#Poznań #Poznan

Do you care to save face and back your words with sats? ...

2026-02-02T12:14:14Z

In reply to nevent1q…rkgq
_________________________

Do you care to save face and back your words with sats? Otherwise, you're explicitly promoting a shitfork and showing that your words can't be trusted. I've already offered you an opportunity to swap sats between the chains in a trustless (on-chain) way.

quoting
nevent1q…em7g

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…t863
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

That's centralising, controlling and rent seeking... 21% fee ...

2026-01-30T09:25:33Z

In reply to nevent1q…lvqh
_________________________

That's centralising, controlling and rent seeking... 21% fee for the official title? What does that even mean? Also nsecs can't be passed like an ownership of an account and should not be shared, so it's better for organizers to use their profiles. It's then clear who's organizing a walk. The current decentralized model with value4value is better.

Do you care to save face and back your words with sats? ...

2026-01-30T06:14:53Z

In reply to nevent1q…grd2
_________________________

Do you care to save face and back your words with sats? Otherwise, you're explicitly promoting a shitfork and showing that your words can't be trusted. I already offered you an opportunity to enter a trustless (on-chain) futures contract over two months ago...

quoting
nevent1q…lymc

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…w3mz
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

That's all irrelevant in the context of the offer to swap ...

2026-01-29T19:33:11Z

In reply to nevent1q…z5aa
_________________________

That's all irrelevant in the context of the offer to swap sats between the chains. I despise NFTs, ETH and #BLV

If consider bitcoin in its current form a shitcoin, why you ...

2026-01-29T19:25:51Z

In reply to nevent1q…9rzs
_________________________

If consider bitcoin in its current form a shitcoin, why you don't want to swap your stash, or at least a part of it, for the fork? You can double your sats on the fork side.

Broken in-mem cache. The app needs frequent force closes as a lot ...

2026-01-29T15:35:16Z

In reply to nevent1q…wuwv
_________________________

Broken in-mem cache. The app needs frequent force closes as a lot of inbox content (replies, zaps, etc.) keeps disappearing.

Indeed, it should be called BEP: Bitcoin Enshitification Proposal

2026-01-29T10:42:40Z

In reply to nevent1q…7afq
_________________________

Indeed, it should be called BEP: Bitcoin Enshitification Proposal

Pushing a contentious fork is gambling. Moreover, not only at ...

2026-01-29T10:39:52Z

In reply to nevent1q…rx93
_________________________

Pushing a contentious fork is gambling. Moreover, not only at your own cost, but at the cost of bitcoin users.

Will you back up your words with sats? Otherwise, it’s an ...

2026-01-29T08:49:14Z

In reply to nevent1q…3780
_________________________

Will you back up your words with sats? Otherwise, it’s an explicit shitfork promotion and proof that your words can’t be trusted. I can also offer a trustless swap of sats between the two chains. I’m willing to accept smaller amounts than Rob1Ham (nprofile…5pxz).

quoting
nevent1q…ddyp

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…t863
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

Will you back up your words with sats? Otherwise, it’s an ...

2026-01-29T08:34:15Z

In reply to nevent1q…aw5m
_________________________

Will you back up your words with sats? Otherwise, it’s an explicit shitfork promotion and proof that your words can’t be trusted. I can also offer a trustless swap of sats between the two chains. I’m willing to accept smaller amounts than Rob1Ham (nprofile…5pxz).

quoting
nevent1q…tmpw

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…t863
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

Will you back up your words with sats? Otherwise, it’s an ...

2026-01-29T08:29:32Z

In reply to nevent1q…tfw2
_________________________

Will you back up your words with sats? Otherwise, it’s an explicit shitfork promotion and proof that your words can’t be trusted. I can also offer a trustless swap of sats between the two chains. I’m willing to accept smaller amounts than Rob1Ham (nprofile…5pxz).

quoting
nevent1q…ddyp

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…u6ky
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

Do you care to save your face and back up your words with sats? ...

2026-01-29T08:09:29Z

In reply to nevent1q…hhnc
_________________________

Do you care to save your face and back up your words with sats? Otherwise you're explicitly promoting a shitfork and showing that your words can't be trusted. I already offered you an opportunity to enter a trustless (on-chain) futures contract over two months ago...

quoting
nevent1q…ddyp

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…w3mz
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

There’s no such a thing as attacking bitcoin at no cost. The ...

2026-01-27T18:04:29Z

There’s no such a thing as attacking bitcoin at no cost. The social layer protects it too! The shitfork liars should not be surprised when honest bitcoiners, who care about their reputation, don’t want to be associated with them in any way.

BIP-110 proponents are worse than Roger Ver. He also didn’t understand decentralisation, but at least he put his capital behind the fork, so he didn’t consider it a shitfork. Additionally he exited cleanly with a hard fork, not trying to mount a 51% attack to push through a contentious soft fork.

RDTS promoters more closely resemble CSW by not being backed by their own capital and resorting to babbling, bluffing, lying and lawfare.

quoting
nevent1q…k7pz
For over 2 months, I’ve been challenging shitfork promoters in my native‑language 21 group to enter a futures contract. There are actually a few of them in that group as TomekK (nprofile…cl8m) allows the group to be used as a platform for promoting the shitfork. I can report that all of the promoters turned out to be full of shit liars who knowingly push others towards a cliff (explicitly promoting a shitfork, a fork they don’t believe will succeed). There’s no genuine support backed by sats in the Polish 21 community. There have been only folks who have expressed interest in taking the same side of the contract, defending 21M against the contentious fork.

My offer remains open and like Rob1Ham (nprofile…5pxz) I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP-110 proponent into actually making the bet with me but I’m happy to take smaller bets than Rob does.

So whenever you see someone promoting that shitfork, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

nevent1q…tmpw

Although that doesn't seem to make sense, I wonder if you ...

2026-01-27T11:22:18Z

In reply to nevent1q…k0f6
_________________________

Although that doesn't seem to make sense, I wonder if you checked the updated logic after the BIP has changed?

quoting
nevent1q…u6ky
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

Although that doesn't seem to make sense, I wonder if you ...

2026-01-27T11:21:32Z

In reply to nevent1q…t2ke
_________________________

Although that doesn't seem to make sense, I wonder if you checked the updated logic after the BIP has changed?

quoting
nevent1q…w3mz
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

Do you care to save your face and back up your words with sats? ...

2026-01-24T06:16:38Z

In reply to nevent1q…296e
_________________________

Do you care to save your face and back up your words with sats? Otherwise you're explicitly promoting a shitfork and showing that your words can't be trusted. I already offered you an opportunity to enter a trustless (on-chain) futures contract over two months ago...

quoting
nevent1q…ddyp

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…u6ky
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

For over 2 months, I’ve been challenging shitfork promoters in ...

2026-01-22T08:24:43Z

For over 2 months, I’ve been challenging shitfork promoters in my native‑language 21 group to enter a futures contract. There are actually a few of them in that group as TomekK (nprofile…cl8m) allows the group to be used as a platform for promoting the shitfork. I can report that all of the promoters turned out to be full of shit liars who knowingly push others towards a cliff (explicitly promoting a shitfork, a fork they don’t believe will succeed). There’s no genuine support backed by sats in the Polish 21 community. There have been only folks who have expressed interest in taking the same side of the contract, defending 21M against the contentious fork.

My offer remains open and like Rob1Ham (nprofile…5pxz) I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP-110 proponent into actually making the bet with me but I’m happy to take smaller bets than Rob does.

So whenever you see someone promoting that shitfork, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…tmpw
It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

Dla organizatora naprawianie pieniądza niestety oznacza ...

2026-01-18T09:05:00Z

In reply to nevent1q…t8qn
_________________________

Dla organizatora naprawianie pieniądza niestety oznacza "naprawianie" bitcoina... wbrew konsensusowi. A jeśli chodzi o to czym jest bitcoin, to wg narracji kultu spamowej histerii, bezpośrednio tłumacząc słowa wiceprezesa firmy, która za tym wszystkim stoi: bezwartościowym altcoinem.

Concerning, or even shocking, is the fact that you’re pushing ...

2026-01-13T15:00:43Z

In reply to nevent1q…0jap
_________________________

Concerning, or even shocking, is the fact that you’re pushing others towards a fork that you don’t have conviction in. Your economic decision proves that you don’t believe the fork will succeed. Sats are the signal. I’m shocked that you can lie like that, faking confidence.

It’s also concerning that you can’t even come up with any BS excuse of why you’re negating your words with your economic action. I’m shocked that you’re replying with primitive personal attacks instead of honestly trying to address the matter.

I’m defending 21M here from the fork which is being pushed (activation announced) but for which consensus has not been built. Likewise defending the community from shitfork liars. The social layer defends bitcoin too! Also on Nostr.

Do you care to save your face and back up your words with sats? ...

2026-01-12T13:05:35Z

In reply to nevent1q…66jw
_________________________

Do you care to save your face and back up your words with sats? Otherwise you're explicitly promoting a shitfork and showing that your words can't be trusted. I already offered you an opportunity to enter a trustless (on-chain) futures contract over two months ago...

quoting
nevent1q…pn4z

It’s important to have a futures market with any contentious fork in Bitcoin.

Why?

Because the party forking gets what is called the “free call option”.

They can tweet, do long monologue videos about how their fork will win, and how no one will oppose them. They can use company resources to legally pressure miners, post populist rhetoric disassociated from reality (pľēb şľőp) and then… wait.

The activation comes, and they are delta neutral on a fork.

If…

No fork happens - they have their bitcoin.
The fork is successful - they have their bitcoin.
A chain split happens - they get Bitcoin on each side of the fork

See the problem? There is an opportunity cost of time and resources coordinating the fork (maybe reputation too), but that’s it! They can antagonize the network at no cost of bitcoin.

It’s worse than that though, everyone who told them they were wrong can’t even dump their hostile fork if they fail to even launch it.

The actual party who has to put up material cost in a fork are the miners. Since they cannot mine on both chains at once, they must choose where to secure coins. The only publicly stated mining pool position on this fork is f2 pool opposing it (~12% of hash rate).

My proposed on chain futures market requires no ecosystem coordination. The Bitcoin is settled automatically, and in the event there is a chain split, each side gets 2 BTC (each party gets the bitcoin they think will “win”).

A futures market forces actors among the Bitcoin network with different opinions to put skin in the game, price the risk, and act. It presents an opportunity to lock up Bitcoin for a time, and profit as a rational actor if they have conviction in their position.

The market will do this independent of your wishes otherwise. Via prediction markets, on chain, or exchange future markets (any exchange could get fees for swapping the fork to buy more bitcoin). We saw futures markets with the last contentious fork in 2017 when bitfinex listed futures.

If no market forms at all, it shows there are not two sides to the market, I’m here as one side of the market, so we know the side that is a no show.

This kind of weakness is death for a fork. If the side forking is unwilling to burn the ships, and put their bitcoin at risk, they are of low conviction and the fork will fail.

There will be a myriad of reasons as to why people who are so vocal and certain that BIP 444 will activate, won’t bet. To be clear, it’s cope.

Their optimal positioning as it relates to the opportunity to wager is:

1. Ignore
2. Public consider the bet, but to never commit.
3. Hand wave any reason to say the market is either immoral, illegitimate, impractical etc.

Any of these maintains the illusion of strength when they are actually weak. A requirement in fork psychology is to appear as if it’s a certainty, because forking is a game of chicken with the network.

A 1:1 ratio implies a 50% chance likelihood to succeed, far lower than they’d have you believe success is.

Additionally, to counter offer with a differnt ratio/odds gives up the game. They blink, show their hand and signal that they think 50% is way to high of a likelihood, and all the bluster comes tumbling down.

I’ve given feedback on the GitHub already from a technical perspective my objections to the BIP, they went largely unaddressed before the GitHub was locked.

Notice who will continue engaging in this content without taking the bet, they are seeking attention because they must consume the discourse as their shred of a hope to win.

Surely, there is already rumbling of restricting how 444 works, already a weakening of their position.

People will say I am wrong, but won’t take the wager.

Makes you think right?

I’ll give 10% of my potential winnings from the contract if you refer a BIP444 proponent into actually making the bet with me.

So whenever you see someone talking about the certainty of this fork activating, link them to this post so we can both make some bitcoin!

quoting
nevent1q…5aj6
I have now fully open sourced the code which creates this on-chain BIP-444 futures contract!

The contract starts with an atomic deposit into the contract address of 1 BTC each (to make sure both parties put in the same amount into the contract address).

Context: BIP-444 makes the use of OP_IF & OP_NOTIF consensus INVALID upon activation.

The contract is built as follows:

The taproot address uses the NUMS point as described in BIP341, to provably show the key path is not active.

We have two parties, a "YES" (444 activates) and "NO" (444 does NOT activate). YES and NO for short.

The first leaf is a 2 of 2 multisig of both parties. This exists to be able to self send the UTXO AFTER BIP 444 activates. This is because BIP-444 just added a clause that UTXOs created before activation will NOT have the BIP-444 consensus rules applied to them. This self send removes that exception.

The second leaf: has 2 ways you can spend with it, a 2 of 2 (YES and NO) multisig, just like the first leaf OR the NO party, with a time lock which is LESS THAN the third tap leaf. This is important because it uses OP_NOTIF

The Third Leaf: The YES party can spend, after a time lock AFTER the second leaf.

The order of the timelocks is important. If BIP-444 activates, the spending condition that can spend before you will be consensus invalid, so it doesn't matter if you believe 444 activates.

So to summarize:

- If BIP-444 DOES activate, the party who believes it will be able to use the second tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.
- If BIP-444 DOES NOT activate, the party who believes that will use the third tap leaf to get 2 BTC out.

Since each side is highly confident in their position, the fair market price is a 1:1 ratio, implying 50% likelihood.

With 85 days until activation, this contract as written gives you an implied ~430% APY on your bitcoin! The risk is being incorrect on your opinion of BIP-444 activating.

You could modify the collateral each side puts up to get different implied odds of the futures contract as well.

Github: https://github.com/Rob1Ham/BIP-444-Futures
Address: https://mempool.space/signet/address/tb1p07flh4waghmkeep0l20nf2tyn4tw9wy3w4j5vkrf6mue9ddtakgsgc5clr

Anyone who wants to take the BIP-444 WILL activate side, let me know! The Author of the BIP has agreed to this, I have already asked for a larger bet size beyond the 1 BTC I initially proposed, but I have more!

#Poznań #BitcoinWalk #ProofOfWalk ...

2026-01-04T19:08:57Z

#Poznań #BitcoinWalk #ProofOfWalk

Zapraszamy w sobotę na #Poznań #BitcoinWalk 11:00 zadaszony ...

2025-12-31T13:51:57Z

Zapraszamy w sobotę na #Poznań #BitcoinWalk
11:00 zadaszony stojak rowerowy na skraju Ewangelickiej przy Skwerze Jana Suwarta
https://www.openstreetmap.org/?mlat=52.402955&mlon=16.943619#map=19/52.402955/16.943619

Oh OK, Chrome extension market is bigger but there are some only ...

2025-12-22T17:04:39Z

In reply to nevent1q…gt8k
_________________________

Oh OK, Chrome extension market is bigger but there are some only available on Firefox

Why?

2025-12-22T14:39:45Z

In reply to nevent1q…tz57
_________________________

Why?

Buy a standing desk, sell the chair

2025-12-16T20:42:31Z

In reply to nevent1q…f9g8
_________________________

Buy a standing desk, sell the chair

"Luke doesn't like" would be more precise

2025-12-16T15:33:03Z

In reply to nevent1q…7re0
_________________________

"Luke doesn't like" would be more precise

42M as bitcoin minimalists are fine with chain split if they ...

2025-12-16T15:30:57Z

In reply to nevent1q…7re0
_________________________

42M as bitcoin minimalists are fine with chain split if they don't succeed mounting 51% attack with BS legal threats

Building the strategic reserve should not be done with 25y cage ...

2025-12-08T09:25:08Z

In reply to nevent1q…gads
_________________________

Building the strategic reserve should not be done with 25y cage attack

Zapraszamy jutro na #Poznan #BitcoinWalk 11:00 niezadaszony ...

2025-12-06T08:57:55Z

Zapraszamy jutro na #Poznan #BitcoinWalk
11:00 niezadaszony stojak rowerowy na dolnej zachodniej Wartostradzie przy moście Rocha
https://www.openstreetmap.org/?mlat=52.403358&mlon=16.944625#map=19/52.403358/16.944625

Well said buddy! I would add his ridiculous criticism of the ...

2025-12-02T10:35:36Z

In reply to naddr1qq…vrje
_________________________

Well said buddy! I would add his ridiculous criticism of the grassroot Brexit movement and praise of the totalitarian EU as factors which put him closer to a statist than a libertarian.

To collect some brownie points in the cult of spam paranoia

2025-11-21T14:17:49Z

In reply to nevent1q…j2nq
_________________________

To collect some brownie points in the cult of spam paranoia

History will remember with glory those who stood up and defended ...

2025-11-19T12:16:14Z

History will remember with glory those who stood up and defended the 21M from contentious forks

Indeed, the fee market achieved that, considering the spam went ...

2025-11-19T12:14:50Z

In reply to nevent1q…3knk
_________________________

Indeed, the fee market achieved that, considering the spam went away and we have <1sat/vB and non-full blocks

21M won't turn into 42, #Lukecoin won't happen or will ...

2025-11-18T09:52:14Z

21M won't turn into 42, #Lukecoin won't happen or will gravitate to 0

Bitcoin will survive the #knotsi attack and emerge stronger ...

2025-11-17T11:46:58Z

Bitcoin will survive the #knotsi attack and emerge stronger afterward

We'll fight back with words We'll back up our words in ...

2025-11-14T08:27:18Z

We'll fight back with words
We'll back up our words in futures/prediction markets
We won't platform the contentious fork propaganda
We'll fight self-custoding our sats
We'll fight running own #Core nodes
We'll fight with our BS blackmail resistant hashrate
We'll crash the #knotsis

I asked a few days ago in my native language group offering ...

2025-11-10T12:14:54Z

In reply to nevent1q…wmug
_________________________

I asked a few days ago in my native language group offering flexibility on amount. Although there are people manipulatively pushing non-techie lemmings on that highly contentious and rushed fork no one is willing to back their words with sats. Moreover one of the main BIP444 promoters there, earlier explicitly answered that he believes that the fork has more than 50% chance to become more valuable. Verified, #BLV supporters are full of shit and should not be trusted.

Let's see if the author of the BIP really puts sats behind ...

2025-11-10T08:59:15Z

In reply to nevent1q…w3mz
_________________________

Let's see if the author of the BIP really puts sats behind his words. It's a digital-only new account so it's easy to throw words when long-term you're not risking reputation.

Will you share the code/instructions so that others can also ...

2025-11-05T19:04:57Z

In reply to nevent1q…xc8k
_________________________

Will you share the code/instructions so that others can also challenge #444clowns from their circles?

Haha the "nothing to worry about" bit was read in between ...

2025-11-03T12:22:47Z

In reply to nevent1q…ewux
_________________________

Haha the "nothing to worry about" bit was read in between my casual Polish lines, not liable for anyone getting rekt when driving ;)

It's unlikely the bitties would get smaller, prob ...

2025-11-03T05:57:04Z

In reply to nevent1q…8j23
_________________________

It's unlikely the bitties would get smaller, prob AI-generated

You mean chopping with Bitaxes?

2025-11-02T09:30:36Z

In reply to nevent1q…nfqy
_________________________

You mean chopping with Bitaxes?