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  <updated>2023-06-07T01:52:37Z</updated>
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  <title>Nostr notes by Karl-Johan Alm [ARCHIVE]</title>
  <author>
    <name>Karl-Johan Alm [ARCHIVE]</name>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsw7eau4dvexn49h6r0qrgps6cpdkvm4mwmyskeak5am7yzwusy5vgzyrmp6m6l0f29hwjvxgtslp3s5kk7kxe2m8k09zqamcuc3nlyg7uqzrpxtg5</id>
    
      <title type="html">📅 Original date posted:2021-03-15 📝 Original message:On ...</title>
    
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://yabu.me/nevent1qqsw7eau4dvexn49h6r0qrgps6cpdkvm4mwmyskeak5am7yzwusy5vgzyrmp6m6l0f29hwjvxgtslp3s5kk7kxe2m8k09zqamcuc3nlyg7uqzrpxtg5" />
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      In reply to &lt;a href=&#39;/nevent1qqspu4tz6ksc4kgqh53kwdqcnrayrzeetgcr5689gmulcpmmnff7d8qyv6wr9&#39;&gt;nevent1q…6wr9&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;_________________________&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;📅 Original date posted:2021-03-15&lt;br/&gt;📝 Original message:On Tue, 16 Mar 2021 at 07:48, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev&lt;br/&gt;&amp;lt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&amp;gt; wrote:&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; Overall, the tradeoffs here seem ludicrous, given that any QC issues in Bitcoin need to be solved in another way, and&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; can&amp;#39;t practically be solved by just relying on the existing hash indirection.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The important distinction here is that, with hashes, an attacker has&lt;br/&gt;to race against the spending transaction confirming, whereas with&lt;br/&gt;naked pubkeys, the attacker doesn&amp;#39;t have to wait for a spend to occur,&lt;br/&gt;drastically increasing the available time to attack.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;It may initially take months to break a single key. In such a&lt;br/&gt;scenario, anyone with a hashed pubkey would be completely safe* (even&lt;br/&gt;at spend time), until that speeds up significantly, while Super Secure&lt;br/&gt;Exchange X with an ultra-cold 38-of-38 multisig setup using Taproot&lt;br/&gt;would have a timer ticking, since the attacker need only find a single&lt;br/&gt;privkey like with any old P2PK output.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;(* assuming no address reuse)
    </content>
    <updated>2023-06-07T18:30:52Z</updated>
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